The Indian government has taken a major step towards
completing its controversial nuclear cooperation deal with the United States
by moving the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency for
approving an inspections (safeguards) agreement it signed last year with the
IAEA secretariat pertaining to civilian nuclear reactors.
The news has been greeted by the domestic political opposition with howls of
protest and accusations of deception and a violation of the commitment the Manmohan
Singh government made just a few days ago to seek a vote of confidence from
Parliament before approaching the IAEA Board of Governors.
Meanwhile, the text of the safeguards agreement, which the government claims
is classified and confidential, has been leaked. About 10 hours after it was
posted on several websites by arms control groups on Wednesday night, the Indian
Ministry of External Affairs made it public yesterday only to draw acerbic
criticism of its contents.
The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government is in a minority in Parliament
after the Left parties, on whom it was dependent for support for more than four
years, withdrew it two days ago. The Left parties' decision came after the government
reneged on its promise not to move the IAEA Board without considering the findings
of a joint UPA-Left committee on the nuclear deal, set up last year.
In a dramatic U-turn, the Samajwadi Party, a regional party based in northern
Uttar Pradesh state, has decided to back the deal and support the government.
But it is not clear that the SP's 39 members of parliament (MPs) can help the
UPA stitch together a parliamentary majority after the Left's 59 MPs withdrew
support.
The Left has sharply attacked the UPA for approaching the IAEA despite being
a "minority government." It says Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was
in an unseemly hurry to push the deal and demands to know what he discussed
with U.S. President George W Bush when they met in Japan earlier this week on
the sidelines of the G8 summit.
The Right, led by the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, has accused
the government of "deception at midnight" for surreptitiously moving
the IAEA.
Both opposition groups have criticized the safeguards agreement as falling
well short of the solemn commitments Singh made to the Indian Parliament in
March 2006.
Singh had told Parliament that the agreement would be "India-specific,"
India would obtain assurances of uninterrupted fuel supply, the rights to build
a "strategic fuel reserve" and take "corrective measures"
in case of an interruption in supplies.
"However, the agreement circulated amongst the Board of Governors does
not contain these assurances in the main text; it does so only in the preamble,"
says M.V. Ramana, an independent nuclear affairs analyst at the Center for Interdisciplinary
Studies in the Environment and Development in Bangalore. "And the preamble
does not have operative significance or legal force."
"Besides," adds Ramana, "the body of the text is almost identical
to the language of the standard safeguards agreement the IAEA signs with non-nuclear
weapons states, called INFCIRC (Information Circular) 66 in the Agency's jargon.
This will make it open to the criticism that it fails to defend India's strategic
autonomy as a de facto nuclear weapons state, as Singh promised to do. Nor does
it explicitly guarantee uninterrupted fuel supplies."
The Right has already launched an attack on the agreement along these lines.
The BJP has accused the government of violating the assurance contained in the
original text of the deal signed between Bush and Singh in July 2005 that India
would have "the same benefits and advantages" and the same obligations
as other "states with advanced nuclear technology" such as the U.S.,
a term widely interpreted to mean nuclear weapons-states.
On the other hand, the agreement has drawn flak from arms control and nuclear
disarmament groups both in India and internationally because it unduly favors
India.
Says Sukla Sen of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace, a broad-based
network of more than 200 Indian peace groups: "The agreement is fatally
flawed because it is part of a larger deal that allows India to keep its nuclear
arsenal and make more fuel for nuclear weapons. It detracts from the objectives
of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and will have a negative global
impact."
Similarly, U.S. Congressman Edward Markey, a senior member of the House of
Representatives Energy and Commerce Committee, and co-chair of the House Bipartisan
Task Force on Non-proliferation, has described the agreement as "worse
than useless" and "a sham."
He was quoted as saying: "This pathetic safeguards agreement not only
seriously undermines the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but it also sends the exact
wrong message to Iran: that international nuclear safeguards are only for show.
With this agreement, the IAEA has thrown its principles out the window and has
abandoned its most important responsibilities."
Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association (U.S.) has also slammed the agreement,
and says, it "contains conflicting language on what India might be able
to do if it resumes testing and fuel supplies are terminated."
According to the preamble, India may take unspecified "corrective measures"
to ensure fuel supplies in the event that they are interrupted. But Paragraph
32 of the text says that India and the IAEA will jointly determine whether and
when a facility may be withdrawn from safeguards. This is different from the
normal INFCIRC 66 agreement which gives the IAEA "the sole authority"
to do so.
Kimball added that if India interprets the agreement as allowing it to remove
facilities or materials from safeguards in the event of a fuel supply interruption
(which would only likely happen in the event that India resumes testing), this
would violate the principle of permanent safeguards over all nuclear materials
and facilities. It would also contradict the requirement established by the
U.S. Congress in implementing legislation passed in 2006 the Hyde Act
that the safeguards last "in perpetuity and are consistent with
IAEA standards and practices."
As the debate on the nuclear deal moves on to a different plane, two things
are clear.
First, the Indian domestic political opposition is highly unlikely to be satisfied
with the government's interpretation that the safeguards agreement as drafted
meets the requirements of the promised "India-specific" agreement
with all its assurances.
"It is plain that the agreement will not fly and receive anything approaching
consensual or broad-based support in India," says Ramana. "It will
remain controversial and highly divisive."
Second, the agreement will face some resistance, possibly in the IAEA Board
of Governors, and almost certainly in the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers' Group,
which must grant India clean and unconditional exemption from its nuclear commerce
rules, which prohibit trade with a country that has not signed the NPT and does
not accept full-scope safeguards on all its nuclear facilities in perpetuity.
The deal must clear these hurdles in record time if it is to be taken up by
the U.S. Congress before it adjourns on Sept. 26 prior to the Nov. 4 elections.
According to the Washington Post, the Hyde Act mandates that Congress
must be in 30 days of continuous session to consider it, and there are less
than 40 days left in the session. So the deal "appears unlikely to win
final approval in the U.S. Congress this year."
That leaves only a short interval, the next couple of weeks, for both the IAEA
and the NSG to clear the deal. It is improbable that this will happen.
The Indian government's "victory" in taking the deal to the IAEA
in the teeth of strong domestic opposition may yet turn out to be pyrrhic.