NATO's Eastern Enchantment - by Christopher Deliso

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has frequently been dubbed an alliance in search of a purpose. If restricted to its historic mandate as an organization for mutual self-defense, it should have disintegrated together with the Soviet Union. Fortunately for the terminally-ill alliance, Europe's alleged failure with Yugoslav peacekeeping in the 1990's took it off of life support. Bosnia, and later Kosovo, provided NATO with a renewed (albeit manufactured) sense of relevance, urgency and historic import. Thenceforth, NATO would be known as the alliance for righteous humanitarian intervention.

After 9/11, with no one feeling particularly humanitarian anymore, NATO was saved yet again when it was transformed into an anti-terror organization. This latest incarnation was crystallized this week, in the form of an "elite rapid reaction force." The contingent, currently 9,000-strong, will expand to 20,000 soldiers within 3 years. The force is intended to "…be able to deploy within five to 30 days to deal with operations ranging from evacuations and peacekeeping to counterterrorism or high-intensity combat." The transformation process is crucial and continuous, as NATO Supreme Commander James E. Jones recently said. According to him,

"…we are really consumed with trying to define once and for all, in a way that makes understandable sense, NATO's true military requirement for the 21st century."

Confusion in the Ranks

However, the lack of geographical restriction on operations is making NATO appear more like some kind of US Worldwide Auxiliary Army. And indeed, America's big military contractors are quite happy to check off an ever-increasing NATO wish list, as the alliance seeks to modernize and upgrade its technology. Washington is now strongly suggesting that its European allies allocate at least 2 percent of national GDP for defense, and fire unneeded soldiers to free up more cash for buying American-made goodies.

However, despite its new lease on life, NATO's essential mission is still somewhat ambivalent. While apologists like General Jones declare it to be a fighting force for the 21^st Century, recent events indicate that the alliance is still fundamentally mired in its Cold War past. Due perhaps to the advanced age of many in the Pentagon today, a pervasive Russophobia is preventing NATO from keeping its eye on the ball. Cold War dinosaurs in the Bush Administration push NATO expansion in countries bordering on Russia. This sends mixed signals not only to the Russians but to the wider Western public, which might like to know exactly what its tax dollars are subsidizing the alliance to do. Indeed, does NATO still exist in order to fight (Islamic) terror, or merely to contain Russia?

As recent events in the "New Europe" have shown, this is now causing a chronic misreading of events that, if continued, will only harm NATO's future. At the same time, this erroneous obsession with Russia will perpetuate the same ambivalence of mission, and ensure that events now taking place in Eastern Europe will remain misunderstood. These factors cannot be good for the future of an alliance that has flirted with death twice in the last five years.

The Looming Problem

To illustrate this thesis, we must turn to recent events in the "New Europe" – that Rumsfeldian nomenclature for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that were purchased cheap politically and which represent a fallow field for US arms contractors.

Nowadays, the major problem for the expanding alliance is that of security and intelligence sharing. This has been highlighted most recently by contentious events in Slovakia and Bulgaria, two countries which Washington has praised mightily in the past. The US, afraid that similar events could occur in other new NATO states, paradoxically underestimates the likelihood of this while overestimating and misinterpreting its significance. We turn first to Slovakia.

Slovakia: Where's the Trust?

On 23 September, a cryptic report from the respected Jane's Intelligence Digest claimed that NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson was urging NATO members to stay away from the Slovaks, and to suspend ratification of Slovakia's NATO membership. This followed Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda's recent sacking of Jan Mojzis, chief of Slovakia's National Security Office (NBU). According to RFE/RL,

"…the security watchdog vets officials to decide who should be granted access to sensitive information – a crucial role, since Slovakia is joining NATO next year."

On 5 October, Dzurinda succeeded in firing Mojzis. While the issue is complex and somewhat murky, it apparently boils down to a rivalry between Slovakia's two security services. The NBU is perceived as being more NATO-friendly, whereas the Slovak Intelligence Service (SIS), favored by the Prime Minister, is rumored to have more unsavory connections. In an earlier analysis, Jane's had reported that the SIS

"…was involved in illegal activities, including arms-trading, that it recruited active journalists, and that plenty of former communist secret agents (ŠtB) work in the SIS.

…the SIS was also involved in an illegal wire-tapping scam surrounding the independent daily newspaper SME; SIS later described the case as a being a result of a "technical problem."

Picking up on the story, a security analyst with Slovakia's Institute for Public Affairs, Jozef Majchrák stated that while Slovakia will not be prevented from entering NATO, "…it is definitely possible that it won't have equal access to classified NATO information."

Despite being quickly denounced by both Prime Minister Dzurinda and by NATO, the Jane's report had its effect. The replacement candidate for the NBU top spot has been reported to be one Milan Ježovica, an advisor of Dzurinda's who formerly worked at the Slovak Embassy in Washington. However, according to Jane's, Ježovica "is hardly likely to be received with any enthusiasm in Brussels" as he is a graduate of the Moscow State Institute for International Relations, "in the past a notorious recruitment ground for Soviet-era agents."

Boris and Natasha Infiltrate NATO!

This is the crux of the problem for a NATO set on eastward expansion. And it has surfaced not only in Slovakia, but also in Bulgaria, and hypothetically in every Eastern European country once associated with Russia. That is to say, the perceived danger of Soviet-era spies lurking in government ministries. Look out, they could be anywhere!

However, as usual, American planners have lost the plot. Is NATO's "transformation" intended to make it a streamlined anti-terrorist fighting force, or just a souped-up device for Russian containment? NATO's unreasonable Russophobia is easily explicable, however, when we consider the kind of Cold War dinosaurs now in charge at the Pentagon.

Bulgaria's Blunder: the Asparukhov Affair

American officials were taken aback, to put it mildly, when Bulgarian Prime Minister Simeon Saxecoburggotski recently nominated a former Soviet spymaster to be his personal security advisor. The prime minister was talking tough on the appointment of General Brigo Asparukhov as recently as last week, until a barrage of diplomatic intervention and Western media reports forced him to abort the mission on Wednesday. Reported the BBC,

"…General Brigo Asparukhov, who worked for Bulgarian intelligence for more than two decades when it was an ally of the Soviet Union, announced on Wednesday that he was no longer interested in the post.

His planned appointment had been strongly criticised by Nato, the United States and Britain, which said he would compromise the security of the western alliance. Announcing the decision, Bulgarian Government spokesman Dimitar Tsonev said Mr. Asparukhov did not want to harm Sofia's bid to join Nato and the European Union. He 'did not want his name to be linked to eventual obstacles in the process of Bulgaria's integration to the Euro-Atlantic structures', according to the spokesman.

Mr. Asparukhov added that he had been the target of 'illegitimate attacks' and 'lies,' the spokesman said."

Last week, when the Bulgarian prime minister was still considering appointing Asparukhov, NATO leaders not only objected but "made it clear" that the former Communist "…be kept away from the Alliance's classified information." Further, US Ambassador James Pardew warned that Asparukhov's appointment could "potentially hurt" Bulgaria's international "prestige."

What the controversial, seasoned Balkan diplomat meant, of course, was that America would not tolerate anyone who – no matter how experienced – had worked for the Evil Empire. I imagine this would eliminate a large percentage of the potential human resource pool – and not only in Bulgaria. Be that as it may,

"…Bruce Jackson, president of the U.S. Committee on NATO Enlargement, said that officials in Washington were "stunned" and "worried" by the news of Asparuhov's appointment, local media reported. Jackson described the development as a "step back" for Bulgaria and hinted that the appointment might be viewed as an outright insult by Washington.

In the meantime, Western experts say that Bulgaria could be denied access to the alliance's classified information if the controversial former intelligence chief is serving as a security advisor."

Again, as with Slovakia, the obsession with denying "classified information" is stressed. However, in both cases NATO and the US do not have to search so far as Moscow, when the truth lies much closer.

Political Infighting, Not a Communist Plot, Is to Blame

"In 1991," complained Asparukhov in a recent interview, "as head of the Bulgarian counter-intelligence, I had contacts with the Americans, their secret services and all the European secret services without exception, and the assessments of our joint work in those six years were excellent, and there are facts to prove it."

With the Bulgarian elections of 1997, Asparukhov was replaced by the new government of Ivan Kostov. The next year, he became head of the Socialist Party, and held a parliamentary seat until last month when he resigned to take up – or so he thought – the advisor's position for Prime Minister Saxecoburggotski. As with the Slovak situation, it seems more likely that internal political infighting is really behind the controversy – and not some Russian plot. Indeed, George Tenet, for example, is an exception in that he has survived as CIA director under both Democratic and Republican administrations.

In Eastern Europe, government leaders are reflexively removed with each election (or sometimes, even before). The fact that half the time they have "Communist ties" has to do more with these countries' recent history than with some scheme to resuscitate the Soviet Union by ruining NATO. Every politician in Europe knows the score. What suppliant state today would want to go against the wishes of the world's only superpower?

However, this has not stopped the analysts from continuing to push the myth. Discussing Slovakia and Bulgaria, RFE/RL (in other words, the US Government) adds:

"…the two cases highlight the difficulties facing NATO and candidate countries in establishing the trust needed for them to share classified intelligence information. Stephen Blackwell is head of the European Security Program at Britain's Royal United Services Institute: 'I think [the two cases] reflect a general concern. Obviously, this is potentially a major problem for NATO enlargement, given the prevalence of former communist-era intelligence operatives within these countries.'

It's not just these two countries. Romania, for example, has long been a source of Western concern. Bucharest's intelligence service is stuffed with former communist-era secret police officers, and former Securitate members still wield great influence in politics and business."

Well of course they are! Does the US expect these groups to be staffed by former Quakers? Does it believe that by wishful thinking it could somehow retroactively reverse the region's entire recent history?

A Flawed View

The real obsession, of course, is with Russia. As the article reveals,

"…Blackwell says NATO is worried about the possibility of operatives being linked to organized crime – or of handling NATO secrets and passing them to foreign intelligence services, notably Russia's."

There is no country in the "new Europe" that is in danger of reverting to Communism. However, the "Communist" charge is still sufficiently scary in some quarters that European political rivals can smear one another with it when trying to curry favor with the US. Yet all too often, America and its Western allies fail to judge the situation for what is, that is, a byproduct of political infighting and nothing more. In fact, the danger NATO faces next year, when expanded to 26 members, is that similar internal feuds will prevent the alliance from coming to the necessary consensus for action. The Russians have nothing to do with this; they just have to sit back and enjoy a good laugh.

Decision-Making, Or a Lack Thereof

According to the recently unveiled annual report of the respected International Institute of Strategic Studies, NATO's key problem remains "…the issue of consensual decision-making, which is necessary in order to mount military operations." The report contends that NATO's very credibility depends upon how it resolves this problem. Blackwell also evokes this issue, claiming that while NATO leaders America and Britain "see each other as being very reliable" in intelligence sharing, this trust does not extend very far. In the end,

"'…what this general problem might reinforce is the tendency of NATO to evolve into coalitions of the willing with specific issues and crises being dealt with by ad hoc groups of states. This issue tends to reinforce that tendency, where countries that have a political problem with a certain issue or certain region might opt out or may be asked to stand aside,' Blackwell said."

It is unclear how NATO as it has traditionally been understood could survive when fragmented into "coalitions of the willing" and "ad hoc groups." However, as the recent problems with Slovakia and Bulgaria have shown, the likelihood for disagreement, turbulence and general mistrust is only bound to increase with the passage of time and the expansion of the alliance. Indeed, NATO's enchantment with the east may prove its undoing.

Parting Shots

We can close here with two more brief examples. In January, the Pentagon set up a training camp for Iraqi "civil administrators" in the south Hungarian town of Kaposvar. It caused deep unease among the local population and government to find out (unofficially) that armed militias were actually being trained there. When I asked a Hungarian defense attaché what the Americans were up to, he replied, "I don't know and I don't want to know." More recently, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson has shown increased frustration with an allegedly non-compliant Hungarian Parliament. Robertson wants a quick approval for sending Hungarian troops to the new rapid reaction force. American officials have stated publicly that the laws of certain European states must be "streamlined" so that parliamentary approval becomes unnecessary for sending troops into war. This blatant interference with state sovereignty will only increase domestic opposition among opposition parties and nationalists, whom the US had better hope will simultaneously also be former Communists.

Hungary is not the only state in the "New Europe" to have large popular unease with being part of the American-led alliance. Imminent member Slovenia has also experienced quite substantial domestic opposition. Aspiring member Croatia was reluctant to support the US on Iraq. And Turkey, while a NATO member of long standing, also has a population that has been resolutely opposed to Western warmongering. As NATO veers further and further from its traditional mandate of self-defense, and becomes associated more and more closely with American rule, we are likely to see increasing popular opposition to the alliance.

Second, NATO has now promised Macedonia membership in the club by 2007; how will this possibly work when Macedonians in the intelligence and defense structures do not trust their Albanian colleagues, and vice versa? In the bigger picture, how will NATO effectively cooperate with its new members in sensitive matters, when many of them have weak institutions, high corruption and are prone to the kind of political volatility that makes for easy smears and scandals?

In the end, the West can blame all of these factors, but it shouldn't blame the Russians for interfering. After all, they don't have to push in order for NATO to fall flat on its face once again. If the trans-Atlantic runs into mortal danger again in the future, there is no guarantee that it will be saved for a third time – which is why top military brass are taking the expansion process so seriously. Unfortunately for them, however, by obsessing over the wrong threats they remain stuck in the past. And that can't be good for finishing General Jones' all-consuming task, of finally coming to a consensus regarding "…NATO's true military requirement for the 21st century."