Immigrant Slayings, Political Liquidations: Business as Usual in Macedonia

A veteran UN worker in Kosovo recently put it to me like this:

"…after one month in the Balkans, you're so excited that you vow to write a book about the place.

"After one year, however, you only want to write an article. After two years – you don't want to write a single word."

Being near the latter stage myself, I rather take the gentleman's point. A fine example of the endless intriguing and banal infighting that characterize the Balkans is the current "mujahedin" scandal in Macedonia, in which previous top cop Ljube Boskovski stands accused of staging the murders of six Pakistani (and one Indian) illegal immigrants. According to a widely circulated new report from Macedonia's current interior ministry, Boskovski and a handful of high police officials were hoping to portray the dead men as Islamic holy warriors bent on getting to the West to commit terrorist attacks. Well, they were indeed trying to get to the West, authorities now attest, but merely in order to work menial jobs to support their families back home. Early critics of the police action thus seem to be vindicated.

Boskovski swears the men were truly mujahedin, and vowed to defend his position. Yet because he skipped a court hearing Tuesday, an arrest warrant has been issued. It is not yet clear whether he's on the lam, or is just continuing to protest the ad hoc manner in which his parliamentary immunity from prosecution was stripped. According to a Reality Macedonia report on Wednesday, his lawyers claim that this action, performed by a small committee, was invalid because "…only the Parliament as a whole may dissolve this privilege."

As if things weren't Balkan enough already, Boskovski's lawyers are also claiming that "…the police abducted their client in the morning of May 4, and keeps him hidden in an unknown police station in Skopje, in order to manipulate the media." With reality comfortably obfuscated in the usual Balkan fog, the rest of the drama is sure to be as sensational and confusing as ever.

Some Background on "Brat Ljube"

Statements from the ministry condemning the killings have been directed predominantly towards Boskovski. "…That was an act of a sick mind," Spokesman Mirjana Konteska said. "They lost their lives in a staged murder." A Macedonian media observer told me that in his opinion, "Yes, Boskovski probably is crazy enough to do something like that." The former minister, known for his blunt speech and strong nationalist rhetoric, began to suffer in the polls after the Western-imposed peace plan of 2001 took effect the following year, and as his vision of Macedonia started to appear less and less like the imposed post-war one. Boskovski's special police, the Lions, were criticized for their heavy-handedness and dismissed as being nothing more than the minister's private security detail. The nadir was reached in May 2002, when Boskovski accidentally shot up four bystanders while demonstrating his prowess or lack thereof with a grenade launcher. The final months of his tenure saw a journalists' protest against police brutality. The following May saw the addition of his name to the US blacklist, and an ongoing but ultimately unsuccessful investigation by The Hague Tribunal regarding alleged atrocities at the battle of Ljuboten. However, even by The Hague's liberal standards, this was a bit of a stretch.

A colorful character to say the least, "Brat Ljube" ("Brother Ljube") as he made himself known was perhaps best known for his longstanding relationship with Croatia, where he has citizenship, property, and a restaurant. He spent much time there during the 1990's, allegedly working for the Croatians during their war of secession against Yugoslavia – which bizarrely would have allied him with Agim Ceku, a Kosovo Albanian warlord whose own merry bunch of bandits would attack Macedonia in 2001, when Boskovski became interior minister.

Release of the Evidence and a Thwarted Candidacy

The Pakistani revelations came out on April 30, or two days after the presidential election won by the sitting prime minister, Branko Crvenkovski. Incidentally enough, Boskovski had declared himself a candidate against the wishes of his own party, VMRO-DPMNE, which had already selected a more moderate nominee, heart surgeon Sasko Kedev. Not to be deterred, "Brat Ljube" collected the requisite 10,000 signatures and vowed to run as an independent. However, the State Elections Commission ruled that Boskovski's candidacy would be nullified – based on the fact that he hadn't lived in the country for at least 10 of the past 15 years.

At this, Boskovski pointed out that in previous elections other candidates not meeting the residency requirement had been allowed to run. When still turned down, Boskovski declared that he would boycott the election as a form of protest. His former coalition partner, the equally disqualified Arben Xhaferi of the Albanian DPA, had also previously declared his party would boycott the elections. Apparently, the "reformed" VMRO of Kedev had refused to make a deal that would reward the Albanians for their support with the creation of a new vice-presidential post – something entirely gratuitous and unconstitutional. When Kedev refused, Xhaferi declared the boycott. However, Xhaferi later announced that rather than boycott, the DPA would simply support neither candidate.

Why is this all worth mentioning? Like neighboring Serbia, Macedonia has a law that states at least 50 percent of eligible voters must turn out in order for the election result to be valid. While hardly representing the "Nader Factor," Boskovski could still command a few thousand votes; if Xhaferi had joined him in the boycott, the required 50 percent may really not have materialized. At this point, Boskovski became not only an embarrassment to his party but also a hindrance to the smooth workings of government. In short, it was high time for him to get the chop.

Quite obviously, the Pakistani liquidation was far from being the perfect crime. Its resolution, however, has turned out to be the perfect antidote for almost everyone involved. Indeed, the most remarkable thing about the whole affair is that for once, the interests of almost every party have been satisfied by the same action: in this case, eliminating Boskovski. This makes perfect sense in light of what must happen by the middle of this month – that is, the formation of a new government.

The Hypothetical and the Actual Scenario

When SDSM party chief and Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski won the president's chair on April 28, big changes in the country's leadership were set in motion – the biggest in fact since September 2002, when Crvenkovski's party and their Albanian partners (the DUI of former militant leader Ali Ahmeti) stormed to victory in parliamentary elections, deposing the VMRO-DPMNE government of then Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski.

In Macedonia, presidential elections are held every five years. Until the tragic death of President Boris Trajkovski in a February 26 plane crash, they had been scheduled for November or December of this year. But the president's death exacerbated the political process, forcing the parties to commit to candidates and campaign long before they had been prepared to do so. It is quite likely that, had Trajkovski lived and all gone according to plan, neither Crvenkovski nor Kedev would have been candidates at all. It's also likely that in this case the Boskovski-Pakistani revelations would not have been unveiled now, but instead saved for a later date. Of course, these are all conjectures, but in light of the way things usually work here, not outlandish ones.

Interests Satisfied in the Opposition Party

The elevation of Crvenkovski to the presidency has left a huge, sucking void in the Macedonian government. Not only will his former post have to be filled, but so will the vacated post of his successor, and any other ones affected. And, now that SDSM will have control over the two top positions, the Albanian coalition partners will have to be satisfied as well. A whole game of Macedonian musical chairs is thus set to begin.

Yet there's more. What makes this story almost worth writing about (in respect to my introductory anecdote) is that the opposition wins, too. For a long time it has been clear that Boskovski was past his sell-by date. Since close ally Ljubco Georgievski made the unprecedented move of giving up the VMRO party leadership last year, the party has been trying to "reform" itself, moving away from the tough nationalist positions espoused especially by Georgievski and Boskovski. The elevation of former Finance Minister Nikola Gruevski as party boss also upset other old-guard members such as Marjan Gorcev, a former agriculture minister hailing from the farming heartland of Strumica. Although broadly representative of the party's rural, nationalist roots, Gorcev, Boskovski, and Georgievski were out of step with the new direction the party has been forced to take since the botched war of 2001.

With the framing of the Ohrid Agreement in June of that year, and with the increased shaping influence of Western interventionists since, the VMRO seems to have learned its lesson. Under the tutelage of Gruevski, the party is striving to become more cosmopolitan, more PR-conscious, and more in line with EU policy as they perceive it. Whether or not this will really helped their electoral chances is debatable: like the British Tories, who have been out to pasture for the past seven years of Blairite rule, the VMRO and other European nationalist parties have had their traditional platforms cut out from under them by the EU's virulently anti-nationalist policy – a gigantic, prolonged abreaction to Europe's fascist past that is itself beginning to take on totalitarian dimensions.

In any case, there's no question that eliminating Boskovski without having to do so themselves is in the party's long-term interests. Now they have the best of both worlds: to be rid of his influence, while at the same time seeming to uphold the "rule of law" by protesting the manner in which Boskovski lost his parliamentary immunity last weekend, at the hands of a hastily appointed committee. The intention of this defense is to point out the political nature of the move. Yet they have kept relatively quiet about contesting the actual killings themselves. Boskovski is apparently the only one left who believes in the original version of the 2002 events.

Interests Satisfied in the West

The sudden, headline-grabbing immigrant murders scandal has been a big relief for the West, too. Not only did was it a vindication of their disdain for Boskovski and his government, but it also took world attention away from criticisms of election corruption. Immediately after the election, VMRO cried foul, charging the victors with mass ballot-stuffing and other voter fraud. They demanded that the election even be redone in certain municipalities.

While the OSCE and other international monitors conceded that "some" indiscretions had taken place, they declared that the election had been "generally democratic" and quickly moved to hail the new chief, Branko Crvenkovski. Nevertheless, the top story for one whole day – until the breaking of Paki-Gate, that is – was election fraud. The losers produced a long list of misdemeanors, all of which allegedly took place through the agency of sometimes armed DUI thugs in Albanian voting areas. The Macedonian Helsinki Human Rights Commission later also condemned the elections, and any day now, their British counterparts are expected to release a similar critical report based on their own observations.

Whether or not the election had been fair and free, repeating it would have been a major headache. First of all, perhaps the turnout would have been too low – thus nullifying the whole result, and instigating a whole new election which would have seen a lower turnout still from Macedonia's disillusioned voters. Second of all, the whole tiresome procedure would have contributed to prolonging Macedonia's political and economic limbo. Since the country has no independent policy of its own, this was seen as being an unreasonable irritation. "It's not important who the president is – just give us one so we can start dictating orders." And so the West.

Paki-Gate: Paving the Way for a New Prime Minister

Now more than ever, what Macedonia needs is a manager. Someone like Zoran Djindjic was in Serbia, but perhaps less slippery and less outspoken. The best candidate would seem to be Interior Minister Hari Kostov, a former business whiz who led Macedonia's leading Commercial Bank to international awards and plaudits. While putting him in a police uniform rather than the finance ministry never did seem to make sense, this and certain other appointments were explained by some commentators as a fine way for Crvenkovski to keep underlings from becoming too powerful by working in their chosen areas.

Kostov's notable acumen and business background make him a good choice to the West. In contrast, the other senior candidate, Defense Minister Vlado Buchkovski, is perceived as being less of a diplomat and more of a technocrat. One government insider told me that "Buchkovski is loyal, and a good listener. He will always confer with Branko [Crvenkovski] first. But he will probably remain in Defense or, perhaps, become interior minister."

In this light, we can read the remarkable confluence of recent events as setting the course for the future shape of Macedonia's political leadership. It was bad news for Buchkovski when a defense ministry associate, Ljubomir Popovski, was accused of taking bribes on the day after the election. Simultaneously, Kostov and his police were receiving international praise for indicting Boskovski over the immigrant slayings: It was "very much a positive step" for the country, stated NATO Spokesman Craig Ratcliff. Finally, the long-awaited extradition of two wanted Albanian militants from UNMIK in Kosovo was announced on April 29. In other words, three major victories for the Macedonian police – and all won just one-to-two days after the election.

The rapid succession of all these events may thus be a way to clear the path for Kostov's elevation to the post of prime minister. Considering the timing, the sudden action against his predecessor Boskovski seems almost as contrived as the latter's immigrant murders were.

The Real Power Brokers in 2004: the Albanian DUI

Not only is the position of prime minister up for grabs, of course. While Crvenkovski publicly denied that his Albanian DUI coalition partners would get a special reward for supporting him, tradition decrees that they will. The election of 2004 was only further confirmation that the Albanians have (and have always had) the real electoral power in Macedonia, owing to their great importance in creating a majority along with one of the two major Macedonian parties. Now it seems a perfect symmetry has been attained: In 1999, Boris Trajkovski was elected president as VMRO's candidate, under murky circumstances and with the help of the Albanian DPA. Today, the SDSM candidate won, with the help of the thuggery of the Albanian DUI.

Whether legally done or not, you got to hand it to them – they got out the vote. The Albanians saved the election, and SDSM knows it. They will indeed have to hand it them, perhaps in the form of a major position in the imminent government coalition. Is it beyond the limits of the surreal that an Albanian who only three years ago fought against the Macedonian army would today be put in charge of that army? It's unlikely, but not impossible. Maybe they will be content with the finance ministry. But for sure the DUI (which already heads four major ministries) is in line for something.

Imminent Fractures?

In short, everyone seems to win from the liquidation of Boskovski – the government, the opposition, the West, and even Pakistan, which can use this as an opportunity to show it is not really a terrorist sponsor. Yet it's not feasible to expect everyone to win in any one contest, which is why the whole government reshaping project means actually a potential implosion of Macedonian political life.

"There are a lot of fractures in all the parties," the same government insider told me. "I have spoken with a lot of people who think there will be more splintering as factions break off, maybe to start new parties."

We have already mentioned the VMRO splintering. SDSM too may be afflicted by the same disease. The party's former presidential candidate in 1999, Tito Petkovski, is rumored to be growing estranged. His defection would be a substantial one for the party. In general, both parties are undergoing a period of metamorphosis in which their old guards are forcibly retired, promoted, or challenged by younger and more unknown aspirants/technocrats.

While the whole intrigue over the new government will play out in the next two weeks, the long-term effects will not be felt until the fall. This is when the local self-government elections mandated by the war-ending Ohrid Accord are set to be held. Macedonia has made a substantial reduction in the number of its municipalities – simply by uniting and enlarging them in a quixotic, paradoxical attempt to devolve more power to the local people.

The reduction of municipalities has broadly favored the large Albanian population areas, by subsuming adjoining Macedonian minority areas into them. Even in areas where Albanians make up the minority, if they are at least 20 percent the Ohrid Accord's special privileges will kick in. With the Macedonian political scene descending into completely vindictive and fragmentary dissolution, the only result can be a gradual solidification in Albanian power. The plan for the future federation is already set; the only task that will remain for Macedonian leaders in their obsolescence is to sign the relevant forms as set out by the European Union to formally codify what is already a reality.

A Time for Cynicism?

As I think has been abundantly demonstrated, the whole immigrant slaying issue is incidental, a minor but telling detail in the bigger picture of Macedonia's political reality. Nevertheless, for the Western media it is a "top story" in its own right. The four major "stories" of the Macedonian year so far have been: the death of Trajkovski; the election of Crvenkovski; Paki-Gate; and (soon) the formation of a new government. Yet the mass media has neither the wherewithal nor reader attention span to make a detailed report of what underpins and links all of these events.

One possible spin-off story, in the wake of the new revelations, would be a cynical report debunking once and for all the "myth" of foreign Islamic fighters penetrating Macedonia. The West has never wanted to admit the idea of mujahedin collaborating with Albanian militant elements in Macedonia and Kosovo, as doing so would mean admitting that they'd abetted their presence, in some cases knowingly and in others through sheer ignorance. The example of the Pakistani immigrant deception might even lead to a wholesale media dismissal of the possibility of mujahedin in Macedonia.

On the other hand, it perhaps doesn't matter what the media believes. That will not affect the actions or investigations of the Macedonian authorities into the detrimental presence of Islamic fighters in their country. Nor will it affect the interest of Macedonia's foreign partners in this regard. Over the past few months, representatives of various Western intelligence agencies have visited the country to confer and also arranged visits for their Macedonian colleagues. Collaboration with Serbia and Greece is obvious. Israel, which regards the Balkans as the second most dangerous region to its security after the Middle East, has also taken a keen interest. And the Americans are riveted by the topic, if somewhat unsure about what to do about it.

Of course, the ultimate irony would occur if the current "outrage" in Pakistan over the killings spills over, provoking some disgruntled terrorists to add Macedonia to the target list.

It's unlikely that the Macedonian government will ever again take to liquidating illegal immigrants illegally. That is perhaps the best result of this whole complex, sordid mess. In the future, the burden of proof will fall upon the government to prove any would-be terrorists are in fact terrorists before dusting them. The very American, "Shoot 'em all and let God sort 'em out" ethos clearly does not apply in civilized Macedonia.

However, this is not the only sort of cynicism that should be inspired by the "mujahedin" killings. In the bigger picture, all of the events linked to the April 28 election should be taken with a grain of salt. The current government should be commended for striking a blow for truth and justice in pressing the case of the slain immigrants. But we shouldn't imagine they are shedding too many tears for the deceased, who are after all being politically manipulated in death just as they were in life. What the mass media sees as the story of a human tragedy is, in its larger context, more of a depressing farce. And a tragic one, to be sure, for the future of acrimonious, self-devouring Macedonia.