Meddling With the Status Quo in Turkey

If America is, as some say, the indispensable country, then Turkey is the really indispensable country. Forget about Iraq, Afghanistan, or Iran. Considering Turkey's unique status as the only Muslim country in NATO and its European Union ambitions, not to mention its location right on Europe's periphery, any potential instability there becomes of greater immediate relevance to the West than in the other three states. The ironic thing, therefore, is that the West seems to be provoking Turkey toward instability through its own ostensibly good intentions.

Several turbulent events occurring over the past few months indicate troubles in the land Mustafa Kemal Ataturk built out of the wreckage of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War. Now, more than 80 years later, there seems to be no alternative to Turkey's "European course"; however, staying the course also means challenging a status quo that has for almost a century proven a guarantor of the country's stability. However, the status quo is not only being challenged by Europe, but by Islamic influences and more.

To some extent, "Kemalism" – the idea of a European, secular yet Islamic state defended by the constitution and military, created by a charismatic leader with a strong cult of personality – is a relic of another time, in the same league with Tito's Yugoslavia of Socialist brotherhood, the Communist regimes, and so on. While one could make many arguments about why Turkey's political experiment has outlasted the latter ones, it is more productive to consider the real implications of what meddling with the status quo will mean for the country, the region and the world.

It is very interesting to note that the interested parties in Turkey today – the European Union, the Islamists, the military, the U.S., and others – are playing with inherent paradoxes and self-contradictions of the Turkish state, a singular creation that cannot evolve predictably while still remaining the same country, in the same way that the post-Communist countries have. At the same time, various parties are doing their best to ensure that Turkey undergoes "reforms" and other changes, the long-term perils of which they continue to ignore.

The Return of Kurdish Separatism

The recent conjunction of dangerous events in and around Turkey has restored fears that troubles thought to have been retired are instead being restored. It hasn't just come out of nowhere, of course. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 began on a sour note, with Ankara's "shocking" (to the neocons, anyway) parliamentary decision forbidding a U.S. attack from southeastern Turkey. From then on, latent suspicions of American designs on the region have turned into overt misgivings, as the popularity of books such as Metal Storm and movies like Valley of the Wolves attest.

The Turks have been proven right about one thing: that the U.S. invasion would embolden the Kurds, first by "liberating" them in a northern Iraq bubble even more comfortable than the one protected by the prewar "no-fly zone" scheme. A relatively peaceful autonomy in the north has given the Kurdish warlords time to develop their own resources and their forces for a potential independence drive, should the rest of Iraq collapse in a civil war.

As the Turks feared, the Iraqi example has revived hopes among extremists in the sizable Kurdish population of southeastern Turkey. The 15-year conflict that was halted in 1998, at a death toll of over 30,000 is back on: as the LA Times reported on May 25, "violence has been steadily escalating in the predominantly Kurdish southeastern region since June 2004. That is when the PKK ended a five-year unilateral truce it had declared after the capture of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in February 1999. The PKK said it was taking up arms again because of what it termed the government's failure to negotiate a lasting peace."

The most recent Kurdish terrorist act may have been the spectacular fire, broadcast on television stations worldwide, that engulfed a section of Istanbul's busy airport on May 24. At first, the government declared it had been caused by an electrical mishap; soon, however, a group calling itself the Kurdish Freedom Falcons claimed responsibility. Whatever or whoever may have caused the fire, any perceived terrorist link can only increase the public's desire to see the army hold on to its powerful position as defenders of the state's territorial integrity.

However, the Turkish security forces have suffered some rough treatment recently, with charges of corruption and "black ops" (an alleged surreptitious role in the bombing of a Kurdish bookshop in the southeast last November) now bringing unprecedented scrutiny on the military as an institution. While the army habitually and perhaps naturally bristles at the civilian government's attempts to control it, the pressure is irritating especially now that it is coming from the Islamic-leaning government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's AK Party.

With the Kurdish provocations looking to continue for the foreseeable future, the future of Iran (which has its own Kurdish minority right on Turkey's doorstep) currently unclear, it is likely that the Turkish military will play up its traditionally assertive presence – as worrying recent events in Greece have shown.

Misdirected Aggression Against Greece

A deadly fighter-plane collision over the Aegean on May 23 threatened to re-ignite hostilities between Greece and Turkey, but the two governments were quick to downplay the mishap. Nevertheless, the crash near the island of Karpathos, which left the Greek pilot dead, was interpreted by Greeks as a brazen act of aggression. Considering how far the Turkish plane was from the Turkish mainland, it's hard to see it in any other way.

Some in Greece viewed the collision as collateral damage from the ongoing clash within civilizations that Turkey is facing. Pointing to Turkey's "persistent military activity along its western border," Kathimerini trenchantly summed it up thus:

"[O]ur country has proved itself to be a good neighbor. It uses every opportunity to promote Turkey's bid to join the European Union. In contrast, Turkey makes it clear on a daily basis that it is a dangerous neighbor. Irrespective of the language it may use, the virtually constant sorties by Turkish jets (often armed) are throwing bilateral relations into turmoil. It may be true that these tactics are the product of Turkey's domestic crisis but this cannot serve as a permanent pretext for Turkey exporting its problems."

At the same time, the newspaper also questioned the Turkish claim that it had been flying a "routine" military training mission in "international airspace." According to Kathimerini's Costas Iordanidis, "the composition of the Turkish flight – a reconnaissance RF-4, accompanied by two F-16s – its flight path, and the fact that the Turkish pilot was armed create the clear impression that this was an operational mission to take aerial photographs of Greek military installations on Crete."

Given the relative proximity of Karpathos and Crete, the hypothesis would seem to have some plausibility. Considering also that some argue for Turkish involvement in the Vodafone wiretapping scandal that erupted this spring in Athens, could a new EU installation such as this one on Crete have also perhaps aroused Turkish interest?

The tragic collision had knock-on effects a few days later when the Greek coast guard had to come to the rescue of a Greek fishing boat, "after it was ordered by a Turkish military ship to leave an area near a small disputed islet in the Aegean Sea," reported Deutsche Presse-Agentur on May 30, citing the Athens News Agency. Arguments over this uninhabited islet, Imia, caused a standoff 10 years ago that almost led to open conflict. Five days later, in a non-related and not very helpful accident, a Greek and a Turkish tanker collided near the island of Hydra. The captain of the latter vessel was accused of failing to yield right-of-way to the Greek ship, as the war of words continued.

Greece has warned that it will stop supporting Turkish EU accession if Ankara keeps up its belligerence. The EU, looking on, is taking note of the scenario envisioned by Athens; that is, if Turkey is provoking military action against an EU neighbor now, before even having the leverage of membership, what could it be expected to do after joining?

This is the message the Greeks have been trying to get across for a long time. For the EU, however, the security concern is also influenced by the Islamic factor – Turkey's "other" identity and how it might become an issue should Turkey gain the clout of equal membership, thereby obliging both the EU and Turkey to honor the bloc's religiously liberal mores – not to mention extending the borders of the union to Syria, Iraq, and Iran.

The Role of Islam and EU Negotiations in the Coming Months

The role of Islam in Turkish society is both complex and contradictory, ranging from the liberal and irreligious population seen in large cities to the conservatism of rural areas, and even to terrorists. The Jamestown Foundation reported that in April "six suspected al-Qaeda militants were arrested; according to security officials, the suspects were planning attacks in Turkey," concluding that "these arrests seem to indicate al-Qaeda's continued interest in Turkey – a development that significantly aggravates the already tense security situation caused by the activity of Kurdish militants." Various bomb attacks in recent years have indicated a terrorist presence, though assigning the blame to Kurds or Islamists has in some cases been difficult.

Now, all of the problems are in danger of being exacerbated – not alleviated – in the country's attempts to please the European Union through reforms. It sometime seems that the EU wants Turkey to be more liberal than Europe, which itself makes frequent criticisms of Turkey's alleged lack of religious freedom. However, the Kemalist policy of upholding secularism by banning headscarves in schools, for example, sounds an awful lot like what they do in France: the difference being (for now) that judges can be killed for upholding the law only in Turkey.

However, even here, with that (apparently) religiously motivated courthouse killing, the situation is foggy. The Turkish commentator in the above-linked article cites an organized crime link and decries the "disinformation pumped into the domestic and international media" regarding the shooting: "even BBC news, has broadcasted the incident globally as an attack by an Islamic militant who chants 'God is Great,' just after the incident. Still none of this has been confirmed and there is no evidence to prove [the gunman's] relation with any radical Islamic movement."

The EU has also consistently told the Turkish government to show more respect for minority religious freedoms, the prime example being the still-closed Greek theological seminary of Chalki. What the Euro-parliamentarians don't say when criticizing the government's inaction is that by giving the green light to the Greeks, numerous much more substantial Islamic groups would demand the same rights – something unpalatable for a government always wary of the Islamists' desire to steer Ataturk's country away from its secularist course. Yet religious freedom is a European value, isn't it?

When a Turkish government such as the present one is popularly identified with Islamic interests, suspicion among the military grows, leading to displays of muscle meant to show who is really in charge. And when a government such as the present one takes measures to rein in the military through the courts, the latter's shows of strength intensify. And so we have "incidents" like the bookstore bombing, the military over-flights in Greece, resurgent arguments over rocks jutting out of undefined territorial waters, and a hardening of attitudes on Cyprus – another problem the EU deferred for the future when it allowed the southern, Greek part of the island to join without having first reached a settlement with Turkey over the northern sector of Cyprus it has occupied since the 1974 invasion.

Now that that mess was created, the EU's call for Turkey to open its ports to Cypriot vessels (backed strongly by Greece) thus becomes both a precondition for EU membership, and an obstacle, provoking as it does Turkish nationalism. Given the misgivings many EU countries feel about letting Turkey into the club, it could be argued that some of their objections over areas in need of "reform" are more or less just stalling tactics, the imposition of impossible demands meant to buy time and keep Turkey out indefinitely.

Indeed, as Reuters reported on May 29, the looming problem now is in fact "Turkey's refusal to open its ports and airports to traffic from Cyprus, as required under a customs union with the 25-nation bloc, extended to cover the 10 new EU members in the so-called Ankara protocol last year."

The Reuters piece goes on to quote a senior EU ambassador in Brussels, who says, "[W]e will have some crisis with Turkey in the second half of the year because they haven't solved the Ankara agreement and Cyprus." And EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn is said to be "working to avoid a 'train crash' over Cyprus." These are not exactly encouraging signs.

When Turkish and EU foreign ministers meet on June 12 to begin negotiations "in earnest," the agency reports, the EU will revert to its worn old strategy of citing "persistent problems with freedom of expression, religious and minority rights, and the role of the military in political life despite past reforms."

It is easy enough for the West to lament that Turkey has deviated from its proper course by its alleged sluggishness. The country can be blamed for "reform fatigue" or, as Reuters claims, "electoral politics [that have taken] precedence over EU-driven reforms." When the situation calls for blame, the government and/or the military can always be scapegoated for their "persistent problems."

However, few in the Western media or the EU (at least as it reveals itself to the public) seem interested in considering these issues in their proper and detailed context. This is very unhelpful for any proper comprehension of the situation – an understanding that is necessary for preventing future conflict. Turkey's apparently paralytic state, which the West claims it must snap out of, cannot be changed without certain perils.

After all, the country has been at peace for over 80 years because of a strict adherence to a singular political theology, one that might not survive the European transformation deemed so necessary for Turkey's future. More than any other country in Europe, Turkey is unique, and it has taken unique compromises for it to even exist.

However, as latent centrifugal forces continue to be accelerated by misguided foreign interference, the future composition, outlook, and even territory of the Turkish state become less and less clear. The character of Europe's constant ultimatums – eerily reminiscent of the situation exactly 100 years ago – raises the possibility that now as then, things might become very exciting indeed.