The year is 2010 and, yes, Saddam Hussein is gone and there are no American
troops in Iraq, but, as the report suggests, "the challenge will be to see
whether a modern, secular successor government emerges that does not threaten
its neighbors" – especially since those dogged Iraqis are back at work on their
nuclear weapons program. Meanwhile, the national security agenda of American
policymakers, who face no conventional military challenges, is dominated by
five questions: "whether to intervene, when, with whom, with what tools, and
to what end?"
Surveying the world in 2010, we find a Russia irredeemably in economic
decline, a China beset by too many internal problems to hope for military dominance
in Asia, and a North Korea so transformed that military tensions have vanished
from the Korean peninsula (along, evidently, with the North Korean nuclear
program). Oh, and those food riots that swept the globe recently, they never
happened. After all, it's well known that food production has kept up with
population pressures, and energy production has been more than a match for
global energy needs. As for global warming? Never heard of it. On the bright
side, the key to the future is "international cooperation," led, of course,
by us truly.
An alternate universe from a missing Star
Trek episode or that new sci-fi novel you haven't read yet? Not quite.
Thanks to the best brains in the many agencies
that make up the U.S. intelligence community, or IC, it's been possible for
me to venture into the future, just as our own world is being shaken to its
roots – into the years 2010 and 2015, to be exact.
There, surprisingly enough, life is relatively calm and the United States
remains the preeminent Power of Powers. There, you aren't likely to hear the
words "deep recession" or "depression" on anyone's lips.
In that far perkier future our intelligence analysts sent me to, you can exist
forever and there will never be those four jets, box cutters, and 19 hijackers.
The Bush administration will never barge into the world "unilaterally." The
U.S. will not be renowned for torture techniques or an offshore secret prison
system of injustice, and nothing will contravene then-Chairman of the Council
of Economic Advisers Ben Bernanke's 2005 assessment
that soaring housing prices were due to "strong economic fundamentals."
In neither 2010 nor 2015 will anyone have heard of the collapse of Lehman
Brothers or the giant insurance company A.I.G. In neither year will newspapers
have headlines like "Worst
Crisis Since '30s, With No End Yet in Sight." In neither will anyone know
that the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, conducting two bankrupting wars
that refused to end.
Think of it as the blandest, tidiest, least-likely-to-occur future around.
And it was even paid for with your tax dollars.
Planting the Stars and Stripes in Future Soil
In a world where shock has repeatedly been the
name of the game, where tall towers fall in clouds of toxic ash, investment
houses disappear in the blink of an eye, and a black man is the Democratic
Party's candidate for president of the United States, the American intelligence
community has been straining to imagine a future without surprises or discontinuities.
As its experts summed the matter up in 1997, "Genuine discontinuities – sharp
nonevolutionary breaks with the past – are rare, and our focus is on evolutionary
change."
Lucky is the country that didn't bet its foreign policy on that bit of intelligence
wisdom. Of course, in the long decade of hubris, from the Soviet Union's collapse
in 1991 (something American intelligence neither predicted nor expected) to
the moment American troops entered Baghdad in April 2003, it seemed obvious
enough in Washington that a generational Pax Americana was settling
over the world.
As a result, the futures the IC's analysts produced back then were remarkable
mainly for their inability to imagine what was stirring under the surface of
the obvious. As a result, when you visit those futures, you're not likely to
have the urge to throw away your Arthur Clark or Isaac Asimov or Philip Dick
or William Gibson classics. But maybe you'll still be curious, as I was, to
know what that "community's" top minds missed when they peered ahead. Think
of it as a window into the limits of our intelligence services when they tried
to grasp the real nature of U.S. power by forecasting the future.
What's strange is that the distant future was once the province of utopian
or dystopian thinkers, pulp fiction writers, oddballs, visionaries, even outright
nuts, but not government intelligence services. Peering into it was, at its
best, a movingly strange individual adventure of the imagination, whether
you were reading Edward Bellamy or Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Yevgeny Zamyatin
or H.G. Wells, George Orwell or Aldous Huxley. That was, of course, before
the Pentagon and allied outfits began planning
for the weaponry of 2020, 2035, and 2050; before war turned nuclear and so,
with the exception of two cities in 1945, could only be "fought" in think tanks
via futuristic scenario writing; before names
like Complex 2030, Vision 2020, UAV [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle] Roadmap 2030
were regularly affixed to government programs. In fact, the U.S. government
has been planting the Stars and Stripes deep in territory previous left to
sci-fi dreamers for quite a while.
In the process, regularly analyzing the distant future has become almost as
much the duty of the 18 agencies of the U.S. intelligence community as doing
National Intelligence Estimates on Iran. Ever since the 1990s, they have been
hard at work preparing committee-made futures that simply won't happen. To
judge by their work, they are a community of seers without sizzle, and yet
the next of their fantasy futures, for the distant year 2025, is about to be
made public.
Predicting America's Diminishing Power
Every few years the National
Intelligence Council (NIC) is mandated to provide "'over the horizon' estimates
of broader trends at work in the world." Just in case you've never heard of
the NIC, it describes itself as "a center of strategic thinking within the
U.S. government, reporting to the director of national intelligence (DNI) and
providing the president and senior policymakers with analyses of foreign policy
issues that have been reviewed and coordinated throughout the intelligence
community."
Sometime in the 1990s, its analysts embarked on a project, released in 1997,
called Global Trends 2010, a best-guesstimate about the nature of our world
13 years hence. In 2000, Global Trends (GT) 2015 came out, followed in 2004
by GT 2020.
As the 2020 project proudly described the process, the IC "consulted experts
from around the world in a series of regional conferences to offer a truly
global perspective. We organized conferences on five continents to solicit
the views of foreign experts…." In other words, no prospective stone was left
prospectively unturned to keep top U.S. policymakers up to speed.
Recently, this Washington
Post headline caught my eye: "Reduced Dominance Is Predicted for U.S."
As the Post's Joby Warrick and Walter Pincus noted, the latest of the
NIC's reports, Global Trends 2025, due out this December, was previewed
in a speech by Thomas Fingar, "the U.S. intelligence community's top analyst."
Officially, he's the deputy director of national intelligence for analysis
as well as the chairman of the National Intelligence Council. The report is
already supposedly being briefed to presidential candidates McCain and Obama.
Indeed, talking to the 2008 Intelligence and National Security Alliance Analytic
Transformation Conference, Fingar praised the IC for its job restoring "confidence
in the product" (a not-so-subtle reference to what the Bush administration
did to its reputation back in 2002-2003) and hyped the IC's "17 years of forecasting
and scenario-building." He then previewed the upcoming "product" on the futuristic
intelligence block, "intended to shape the thinking of [the] new administration,"
and here was his prediction of America's fate as 2025 approaches:
"[T]he U.S. will remain the preeminent power, but that American dominance
will be much diminished over this period of time… the overwhelming dominance
that the United States has enjoyed in the international system in military,
political, economic, and arguably, cultural arenas is eroding and will erode
at an accelerating pace with the partial exception of military. But part of
the argument here is that by 15 years from now, the military dimension [that]
will remain the most preeminent will be the least significant…."
I'd have to guess that NIC members are, at this very moment, doing a little
rewriting on this issue as the known world descends around our projected ears.
Anyway, just how useful was Fingar's "news," even before our financial system
plunged into the maw?
Let's face it, if the Post headline had said: "America [or China, or
a clique of petro-states] Predicted to Rule World in 2025" that might
have been news. But if you've been paying the slightest attention to your daily
paper, Fingar's speech offered a hint of a future hardly more illuminating
than a headline saying, "Water predicted to remain in Indian Ocean in 2025."
Birthed by the T. Rex of global intelligence combines, his revelation represents,
at best, a hen's egg of knowledge. Admittedly, such a prediction might have
taken real insight back in 1997 when the U.S. was riding high, and only a handful
of declinist scholars like Immanuel
Wallerstein were considering
the possibility that American power was not on a path to new heights. But
in 2008, did anyone really need costly conferences on five continents to imagine
a future in which that power would be in decline, a forecast that is now a
commonplace of best-selling book titles and could have been read at Web
sites like this one years ago?
The Future Behind Us
Still, I couldn't resist zipping back to 1997
and then 2000 just to get a sense of what – when Washington was riding high
– the IC thought lay ahead in 2010 and 2015.
Three years after it made its 1997 findings public, the NIC's analysts saw
nothing but signs of the increasing dominance of American power in the global
future. Like the new administration of that moment, they were bullish on America,
so much so that they even critiqued the NIC's seers of 1997 as weak-kneed on
the U.S.: "The effect of the United States as the preponderant power is introduced
in GT 2015. The U.S. role as a global driver has emerged more clearly over
the past four years, particularly as many countries debate the impact of 'U.S.
hegemony' on their domestic and foreign policies."
While, in 2000, there seemed no serious obstacles to the growth of American
power 15 years in the future, poor Russia remained a declinist state which,
fortunately, would "continue to lack the resources to impose its will," and
China faced "an array of political, social, and economic pressures that will
increasingly challenge the regime's legitimacy, and perhaps its survival."
And here was yet more splendid news from the NIC's point of view: "The global
economy, overall, will return to the high levels of growth reached in the 1960s
and early 1970s." Even better, "[i]nternational cooperation will continue to
increase through 2015." (Evidently, they forgot to brief top Bush administration
officials on that particular prediction!)
Despite some discussion of non-state actors, loose nukes, and a potential
"trend toward greater lethality in terrorist attacks" – after all, two American
embassies in Africa and the USS Cole had by then been devastated – the
IC saw no global wars on terror ahead. Terrorism was an outlier in a heady
world of "globalization" that, in 2015, was remarkably sunny-side up when it
came to us.
As with any document by committee, many of the report's reigning predictions
were carefully qualified elsewhere in the document, a familiar kind of cover-your-butt-ism
in which you bravely predict the obvious – and (just in case) its opposite.
The exuberant U.S. economy, to take a typical example, was also described as
"vulnerable to a loss of international confidence in its growth prospects that
could lead to a sharp downturn, which, if long lasting, would have deleterious
economic and policy consequences for the rest of the world." There was even
an appendix ("Four Alternative Global Futures") that offered modest scenarios
in which U.S. power might "wane" somewhat, but here was the IC's money paragraph
for 2015:
"Experts agree that the United States, with its decisive edge in both information
and weapons technology, will remain the dominant military power during the
next 15 years. Further bolstering the strong position of the United States
are its unparalleled economic power, its university system, and its investment
in research and development – half of the total spent annually by the advanced
industrial world. Many potential adversaries, as reflected in doctrinal writings
and statements, see U.S. military concepts, together with technology, as giving
the United States the ability to expand its lead in conventional warfighting
capabilities."
Sigh… In the future that's now behind us, we know just where that sort of
thinking led.
By 2004, of course, things were beginning to go sour in Bushworld, and so
the 2020 study had a somewhat more
dystopian edge to it. (It could pose the question, "U.S. Unipolarity –
How Long Can It Last?" even if the answer was: a long time.) And finally, this
December, it seems, the "waning" of U.S. power will make it, just a tad late,
out of the appendices and into the bloodstream of the future.
Handmaidens of Delusion
What's undeniably fascinating about these futuristic
exercises is the degree to which they reflect the limits of the world of the
present as seen from Washington; they reflect, that is, just what Washington
has been (and largely still remains) incapable of grasping about the nature
of power – and danger – on this planet. In this way, the IC's analysts remained
handmaidens to delusion, not just when it came to foreign powers, but when
it came to our own country. The Global Trends reports will remain significant
documents for future historians who want to chart just how glacially slow was
Washington's realization that the collapse of Soviet power didn't actually
mean American power was destined to be transcendent on Earth.
In its predictions, it's clear that the IC had little better luck getting
its agents embedded in the future than it did getting them inside al-Qaeda
or into Iran. Not surprisingly, given what we know about the bureaucratic morass
that is American intelligence, the GT reports have all the faults of intelligence
by committee and negotiation – which is why H.G. Wells, Arthur Clark, Isaac
Asimov, George Orwell, and others, who caught something of the strangeness
of possible futures, would never have had a chance in hell of succeeding in
careers in the IC. Wells' Martians with their poison gas and flying machines,
Orwell's Big Brother with his "memory hole," and Huxley's "feelies" would have
been left on the negotiating room floor. Far too quirky. Far too many "discontinuities"
involved for the IC.
Better to forecast what the people you brief already believe, raised to the
highest predictive power and squared, and skip the oddballs with their strange
hunches, the sorts who might actually have a knack for recognizing the shock
of the future lurking in the present. Don't
pay any mind, for that matter, to FBI agents reporting the truly strange
in the present – like, say, "a 33-year-old French citizen of Moroccan descent"
at a flight school who wants to learn how to fly a commercial jet, but not
how it takes off or lands.
What the Global Trends documents represent, then, is not a deep dive into
the mysteries of the future, but a series of belly flops by an unbearably obese
IC into a barely grasped present. Let 18 intelligence outfits proliferate and
one thing is guaranteed: in some future, maybe even tomorrow, no matter how
powerful you are, you won't know what hit you.
If I were the next president, I might prefer to skip the IC, spend a few nights
with a little science fiction, peer into the darkness, muster some commonsense,
and take a wild guess or two.
[Note on Readings: The Global Trends reports are all on line. You can
read them by clicking here: Global Trends 2010,
Global Trends 2015,
Global Trends 2020.
You can read both of Thomas Fingar's recent speeches by clicking here
(.pdf file – and fair warning, despite his billing as the "top analyst" in
the U.S. Intelligence Community, they are almost unbearably banal, soporific,
and remarkably incoherent). Finally, I wrote about Global Trends 2020 when
it came out in 2004. For any of you who might find that of interest, click
here.]
Copyright 2008 Tom Engelhardt