One year after invading U.S. and British forces
consolidated their control over Iraq, the administration of President George
W. Bush appears to be back at Square One, if not in negative territory, over
how to ensure that control in the short to medium term.
The problem, however, is that the administration lacks any comprehensive
strategy and remains internally divided over precisely what to do.
Neo-conservative hawks centered in the Pentagon and Vice President Dick
Cheney's office and their allies outside the administration remain strongly
opposed to giving the United Nations a major substantive role in any aspect of
the occupation or abandoning plans to ensure that their Iraqi collaborators,
notably Iraqi National Congress (INC) leader Ahmed Chalabi, retain power in any
The administration's latest policy revision was confirmed in Baghdad on
Friday with the announcement
by Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) chief Paul Bremer that the
"de-Ba'athification" policy he carried to Iraq almost 11 months ago had been
"poorly implemented" and needed to be reviewed.
The plain meaning of his remarks, despite his continued insistence that the
policy "was and is sound," was that thousands of former senior and mid-level
members of the Ba'ath Party of former President Saddam Hussein will now be
brought back into the government, especially the military and the police,
presumably to secure the stability and order that some 160,000 US and British
troops and their auxiliaries from the ever-shrinking "coalition of the willing"
have been unable to impose.
Bremer's announcement followed by just a few days another by Bush himself
that United Nations special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi will be given the lead to
determine the shape and composition of a new transitional authority that will
replace the current Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) from Jun. 30, when "limited
sovereignty" will revert to Iraqis, until elections for a new government can be
held, hopefully in January 2005.
The hope is that Brahimi's and the U.N.'s imprimatur on the interim
government will provide it with the international – and, more important, an
Iraqi domestic – acceptance and legitimacy that have also eluded the widely
While both steps have been in the works since last year, the past month's
setbacks – especially the unprecedented violence that has taken the lives of
more than 100 US troops and more than 1,000 Iraqis in Fallujah, parts of Baghdad
and the predominantly Shia south – made them all the more urgent.
Suddenly the administration, which was in the process of drawing down its
troops from 150,000 to about 100,000 by the Jun. 30 transition date, was facing
what many now call popular uprisings in both the "Sunni Triangle" and among the
majority Shiite population, whose acquiescence in the U.S.-led occupation has
long been seen as absolutely indispensable to the success of Washington's Iraq
US efforts to suppress the insurgency in Fallujah were, by all accounts,
politically disastrous. With hundreds of Iraqis – including women and children –
killed in the fighting, the city quickly became a rallying cry for both Sunnis
and Shias but also nationalists and Islamists fed up with the CPA's incompetence
and the humiliations of occupation.
"I am convinced now (that the CPA) created a situation where Iraqis are in
total psychological revolt," Gailan Ramiz, a
U.S.-educated political scientist in Baghdad, told the Christian Science
Monitor this week.
That U.S.-trained and supervised Iraqi military and security forces by and
large failed to back up coalition troops during the fighting has added to the
sense that Washington's hopes of transferring security duties to Iraqis and
withdrawing most of its forces to discreet bases away from population centers
were based on wishful thinking.
US generals in Iraq admitted this week that as much as 10 percent of Iraqi
security forces worked with or joined the rebels, and that an additional 40
percent simply melted away or refused US orders. Other analysts say those
estimates are low.
"The 'Iraqization' security plan must be thoroughly reexamined," noted
analysts Jessica Mathews and Marina Ottaway of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace (CEIP), who wrote in the Financial Times this week
that Washington's political and security strategy is now "in tatters."
The problem is that the US reaction – including Bush's delegation of
authority to Brahimi and Bremer's recruitment of former Ba'athists – appears
driven more by ad hoc emergencies than an overall strategy for both stabilizing
the country and implementing a credible "exit strategy."
As a result, each policy issue is likely to be the subject of major internal
fights between the "realists," based in the State Department, the uniformed
military and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the neo-conservative
hawks around Cheney and Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld, fights of the kind
detailed in reporter Bob Woodward's new insider account, Plan
"Without a really well-thought-out strategy that has the support of all the
major players, the administration is going to have a really hard time getting
anywhere," said one State Department source who asked not to be identified. "I
see lots of room for sabotage by one faction or another if they don't get what
Indeed, neo-conservative forces, such as the editorial page of the Wall
Street Journal and former Defense Policy Board Chairman Richard Perle,
concerned about reports that Brahimi is unlikely to recommend Chalabi – who has
led and championed an aggressive de-Ba'athification campaign – to a position in
the interim government, are loudly complaining that the Algerian diplomat is the
spearhead of a U.N.-State Department-CIA plot to take control of the transition.
They also worry that greater U.N. influence could result in a less aggressive
military policy toward Iraqi insurgents.
The lack of a comprehensive strategy was underlined in the reaction of
Republican Senator John McCain, who emerged from a closed briefing with National
Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice muttering "There is no plan."
Three days of hearings on Iraq policy on Capitol Hill this week, which
culminated in testimony by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc
Grossman, also confirmed to many analysts that the administration is engaged in
wishful thinking and ad hoc planning.
Pressed for details, Grossman repeatedly stated that the shape and leadership
of the interim government will be determined by Brahimi next month – less than
60 days before the scheduled transition – but that Washington will remain in
charge of all security and military forces and oppose any attempts by the new
body to pass new laws or amend existing ones during the interim period.
noted by David Ignatius of the Washington Post, "The big problem with
the new Iraqi policy is that it's at war with the old one."
At a time when the administration appears to be embracing a more
U.N.-centered approach, it is also imposing strict limits on the ability and
power of any new authority to depart from policies put in place by the CPA and
the neo-conservatives' favorites on the IGC.
Democrats also suggested that the proposed "limited sovereignty" framework
risked a major backlash by Iraqis, who have been told that real sovereignty
would be returned to them as of Jun. 30.
Iraqis are "going to wake up (on Jul. 1) and there's going to be 160,000 (US)
troops and a US ambassador pulling the strings," noted
Sen. Joseph Biden. "How does that take the American face off 'the
That point was echoed by British professor Toby Dodge, an author of two
recent books on Iraq, who also warned in testimony this week, "there is so much
uncertainty in a very uncertain and disturbed country that Jun. 30 may well add
to our problems, not detract from them."