Besides improving Washington's image in South and
Southeast Asia, the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush is hoping
to achieve something more concrete from its aid efforts in the aftermath of
the Dec. 26 tsunami that killed over 175,000 people along the coasts of the
Indian Ocean.
In particular, it is reviving its hopes of normalizing military ties with Indonesia,
the world's most populous Muslim nation, whose strategically located archipelago,
critical sea lanes, and historic distrust of China have long made it an ideal
partner for containing Beijing.
Since early this month, U.S. sailors have been working with the Indonesian
armed forces (TNI), as well as national and international humanitarian groups,
to rush relief supplies to the hundreds of thousands of people whose homes and
livelihoods were destroyed in Aceh province. Another 100,000 are believed to
have been killed by the tsunami.
The site of a long-running secession movement, Jakarta closed off Aceh to foreigners
18 months ago as part of a major counterinsurgency campaign. But the disaster
is now seen as having created the possibility for a military rapprochement between
the Indonesian and U.S. militaries, whose ties were cut after the TNI and militias
organized by it rampaged through East Timor in 1999.
Despite reports of serious human rights abuses by the army in Aceh, the Bush
administration would clearly like to renew those ties, beginning with training
programs designed to restore the once-close personal and professional relations
between the two militaries.
"Cutting off contact with Indonesian officers only makes the problem worse,"
said Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, who served as U.S. ambassador
to Jakarta in the 1980s, during a visit last weekend.
He stressed that the advent of Indonesia's first directly elected president,
retired general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who received extensive U.S. military
training himself, makes it a particularly opportune moment.
The feeling is clearly mutual, particularly within the Indonesian military.
However, divisions also exist between reformists, who want to make the institution
more professional, and more traditional elements that see the military as a
means to gain political power and amass wealth.
Wolfowitz and his allies at the Pentagon depict Yudhoyono and his civilian
defense minister, Juwono Sudarsono, as reformists whose influence on the TNI
could be enhanced by the full restoration of relations.
"I think if we're interested in military reform here, and certainly this
Indonesian government is and our government is," he told reporters in Jakarta
Sunday, "I think we need to possibly reconsider a bit where we are at this
point in history going forward."
But critics here find the administration's new drive to restore ties both somewhat
unseemly, in light of the tsunami disaster, and very premature.
In addition to reports that some TNI units have not only been lackadaisical
about getting relief supplies to those who need them, but may also be selling
some of the emergency food aid that has been rushed to the region, they point
to renewed efforts over the past two weeks by senior officers to reassert control
over foreigners in the province as evidence that the military cannot be reformed
as presently constituted.
Rights activists here have also charged that the TNI has withheld food and
other relief from civilians suspected of supporting the secessionist insurgency,
the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).
Indeed, the government announced last week that soldiers must accompany all
international aid workers outside the capital, Banda Aceh, and Meulaboh, the
hardest-hit coastal city, to protect them from the rebels. This despite the
fact that GAM has guaranteed the security of all aid workers, including U.S.
and other foreign troops, working in areas where the insurgency was active.
"The TNI is reverting to its usual behavior, partially reinstating recently
loosened restrictions on aid workers and journalists," said John Miller,
spokesperson for the East Timor Action Network
(ETAN), which has strongly opposed the restoration of military assistance to
Indonesia for more than a decade.
He also charged that the military had facilitated the entry into Aceh of "Indonesian
jihadists" whom Miller identified as the Islamic Defenders Front
(FPI) and Laskar Mujahedin under the guise of providing emergency relief,
a charge that is certain to make an impression on a Congress that has proved
surprisingly resistant to Bush's efforts to get restrictions on U.S. military
cooperation with the TNI lifted during the president's first term.
Last week's declaration that all foreign troops should leave by March 26 was
also seen as inspired by the more conservative and nationalistic forces in the
TNI. Although the civilian government distanced itself from the deadline, the
move was taken even by right-wingers in Congress here as motivated by a still-powerful
and resentful army that did not deserve renewed U.S. military aid and cooperation.
The TNI's performance in Aceh to date, according to Dan Lev, an Indonesia expert
at the University of Washington in Seattle, has been less than impressive and
demonstrates that Yudhoyono, Sudarsono, and the new army chief, Gen. Endriartono
Sutarto, who is also seen as a professional, "have a lot of work to do
in reconstructing both the Indonesian state and the TNI."
"On the ground," he said, "the U.S. servicemen are doing what
needs to be done," but Wolfowitz's and other U.S. officials' public statements
about renewing the relationship at this time have been largely counterproductive
in terms of Indonesian public opinion.
"It signals to Indonesians that this was a political response as much
as a humanitarian one, and shows them that the American government is simply
opportunistic," he told IPS. "Given the suspicion about American purposes,
the Bush administration really ought to shut up for awhile."
As for restoring links with the TNI, Lev said Congress is right to insist on
the government first enacting thoroughgoing reforms, including drastically reducing
the size of the army, shedding its economic interests, and ridding it of its
territorial commands.
Washington should also work harder for a political settlement in Aceh where
"the military's efforts to resolve a political problem with military force
just makes things worse," according to Lev.
There has been some evidence in recent weeks that the government has explored
the possibility of resuming negotiations with the GAM that were broken off in
2003, but the TNI is believed to oppose those efforts.
Congress first voted to restrict to restrict Indonesia from receiving International
Military Education and Training (IMET), a State Department-administered program,
in 1991 after a massacre of civilian demonstrators in East Timor Indonesian
troops. Ties were then severed altogether in September 1999.
Despite lobbying by the administration, Congress extended a ban last November
both on IMED and on certain kinds of military sales to Indonesia until a number
of human rights conditions were met. In the early stages of the humanitarian
operations, the administration permitted the Indonesians to buy previously banned
spare parts for C-130 transport planes provided they were used exclusively for
humanitarian purposes.
Since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the administration has opened
new avenues to provide aid to the military, mainly through "anti-terrorist"
assistance, joint naval exercises, and some military training programs not under
the State Department's control.
But some critics in the U.S. mainstream media are now urging caution in going
any further than that.
"President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a former general himself, needs to
make sure his generals understand that they are accountable to him as the democratically
elected leader and that the human needs of Aceh's people must be Indonesia's
most compelling concern," the New York Times said in an editorial
Monday.
"Until that change is internalized, there can be no dropping of America's
limits on military ties with Indonesia."
(Inter Press Service)