To consider whether U.S. President George W. Bush
is winning his "global war on terror" (GWOT) five years after al-Qaeda's
devastating 9/11 attacks on New York and the Pentagon, one has only to look
at the news of the past few days.
In Afghanistan, where the war began, NATO and U.S. forces are struggling to
cope with a resurgent Taliban whose guerrillas have killed some two dozen western
troops, including two U.S. soldiers in a suicide bombing in Kabul Friday, since
NATO's U.S. commander, Gen. James L. Jones, admitted Thursday that the alliance
was going through a "difficult period" and needs as many as 2,500
more troops, as well as additional aircraft, to bolster ongoing operations in
southern Afghanistan, significant parts of which have reportedly fallen under
the effective if not yet permanent control of the Taliban.
The government of neighboring Pakistan, meanwhile, has agreed to withdraw its
troops from northern Waziristan, effectively returning full control of the region
as it did in southern Waziristan last year to tribal militias
dominated by close allies of the Taliban.
The deal, which reportedly includes the government's releasing al-Qaeda suspects
in exchange for what is regarded here as the militias' highly dubious pledge
to stop cross-border attacks into Afghanistan, has revived a high-level debate
last engaged immediately after 9/11 over whether President Pervez Musharraf's
regime is, on balance, a help or a hindrance in Washington's anti-terrorist
The news out of Iraq, which both Osama bin Laden and Bush agree should be considered
the "central battlefield" in the war between the west and radical
Islamists, is hardly more encouraging.
Hopeful assertions by senior officials earlier this year that as many as 30,000
U.S. troops could go home by this fall if security improves have yielded to
the fact, confirmed by the Pentagon late last month, that there are now 140,000
troops in theater 10,000 more than the beginning of the summer
due to growing sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing in Baghdad.
Moreover, Thursday's report by the Baghdad morgue that the number of killings
last month fell only modestly from the all-time high of nearly 1,855 in July
contradicted the Pentagon's claim earlier this week that the additional deployment
had succeeded in cutting the death toll in half.
And when combined with reports of increased killings in nearby towns and villages,
it tended to confirm what senior U.S. military officers have been publicly suggesting
for the past month: that Iraq is indeed moving toward civil war which U.S. Forces
may be able to slow, but not stop.
Bush himself has seemed in recent appearances to recognize that Iraq is going
badly. After long insisting that the country was making "progress"
on a variety of fronts, Bush has dropped the word from his Iraq vocabulary and
focused instead on the potentially catastrophic consequences for the war on
terror if the U.S. withdraws.
Meanwhile, however, the impact of the Iraq war on Muslim "hearts and minds,"
on which the fate of that war his administration itself has said will depend,
has been devastating, according to recent surveys of opinion in Islamic countries
stretching from Morocco to Indonesia.
"As the slaughter [in Iraq] continues," according to an essay this
week by Alon Ben-Meir, an Israeli international relations professor at New York
University, "the Arab and Muslim world are increasingly enraged over the
plight of the Iraqi people, with hatred toward the United States reaching new
Adding to that fury, of course, was last month's war between Israel and Hezbollah,
depicted in a speech this week by Bush as a proxy battle between the United
States and Iran and an integral part of his "war on terrorism."
It succeeded not only in inflaming anti-U.S. opinion throughout the Islamic
world, including, significantly, the Shi'ite majority in Iraq, according to
most regional experts here, but also in weakening the Sunni-dominated governments
notably Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan that, as before 9/11, remain
Washington's only allies in the region.
While devastating Lebanon, whose 2005 "Cedar Revolution" had been
hailed by Bush as a landmark in his efforts to "transform" the Middle
East, the war effectively elevated Hezbollah to hero status including, significantly,
for the region's increasingly popular Sunni Muslim Brotherhood. It also bolstered
the positions of its chief sponsors, Syria and Iran, which, along with Hamas
and Hezbollah, Bush recently lumped together with al-Qaeda as "Islamic
To many critics, Bush's expansion of his terrorist target list beyond al-Qaeda,
and particularly to Iraq and perceived enemies of Israel, has been one of the
great strategic mistakes in the conduct of his war on terror by effectively
transforming what was originally a terrorist criminal conspiracy led by al-Qaeda
with the tacit support of the Taliban to a "wide war extending from Lebanon
through Afghanistan," as Amb. James Dobbins, Washington's top envoy in
negotiations during and after the Afghanistan war, recently put it.
"In a search for moral clarity, the administration has tried to divide
the Middle East into good guys and bad guys," he told an audience at the
New America Foundation (NAF) late last month. "America tends to treat Middle
East diplomacy as a win/lose or zero-sum game in which Syrian, Iranian, Hezbollah
or Hamas gains are by definition American losses and vice-versa."
"The result, of course, is the United States always loses, because if
you insist that the population of the region choose between Syria, Iran, Hezbollah,
and Hamas, on the one hand, or the United States and Israel, on the other, they
are going to choose the other side every time," said Dobbins, who currently
directs international security programs at the RAND Corporation.
In that context, Washington's enthusiastic support for Israel in its war against
Hezbollah could prove as counter-productive to its war against terrorism as
the decision to go to war with Iraq without U.N. approval.
Coming at a time when al-Qaeda had been successfully expelled from Afghanistan,
its operational capabilities severely reduced, and its top leaders either captured
or forced into hiding, the Iraq invasion, by appearing to demonstrate that the
United States was indeed bent on conquest in the heart of the Islamic world,
gave the group new life and new recruits and affiliates. It effectively sowed
dragon's teeth not only in the region, but among disaffected Muslims in Western
Europe, as well.
Washington might still have been able to limit the damage by engaging Syria
and Iran, as well as other regional powers, in efforts to stabilize Iraq after
the war as it had with Afghanistan's neighbors, including Iran, after
the ouster of the Taliban. But, given its drive for "moral clarity"
and over-confidence in military power, it rejected the two countries' overtures.
"Five years after 9/11, the United States is losing the war on terrorism,"
declared Flynt Leverett, who headed the Middle East desk at the National Security
Council during Bush's first term, at a forum at the libertarian CATO Institute
(Inter Press Service)