By ALAN W. BOCK
Senior editorial writer

The mixed results in Iraq, which include some genuine enthusiasm at least for the forms of democracy, the turbulence in Lebanon, the return of cautious Israeli-Palestinian optimism in the wake of Yasser Arafat's death, along with developments in Saudi Arabia and Egypt - all these things suggest that some kind of change is stirring in the Middle East. Gilles Kepel, a French scholar who heads Middle East studies at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris, makes an interesting case in his 2004 book "The War for Muslim Minds" that decisive developments will come in Europe rather than the Middle East.

Why? These days teeming slums surrounding London, Paris and other European cities are home to millions of Muslims, most of them recent immigrants. They are fertile ground for jihadist recruiters who urge people to reject the laws of the place where they live and wage war against the "land of unbelief." They are also home to second-generation residents who have never lived in a predominantly Islamic country and have tasted some of the personal freedom and economic opportunity of democratic societies.

Will those who have absorbed some Western values provide some leaven and perhaps reformation in the Islamic community worldwide (made more possible by the Internet, which Kepel believes is incredibly significant, for good and ill)? Or will the jihadists, inspired by sometimes romanticized memories of how Islam spread 14 centuries ago, become the predominant bearers of Islamic values and aspirations?

Kepel allows himself to be cautiously optimistic that "a new generation of Muslim thinkers will emerge - men and women with a universalist perspective, freed from the straitjacket of authoritarianism and corruption, emancipated from subservience to their rulers and from the rage of rebellion that endorses jihad, excommunication, and violence."

Such a happy development will require European governments to work at integrating Muslims into their political systems, which will be hard and meet resistance. If it happens, however, it will probably do more to reduce the threat of terrorism than anything the United States might do.

In developing his thesis, Kepel offers realistic and fairly even-handed explanations, in terms of the perceived self-interests of the parties involved, for the failure of the Oslo Israeli-Palestinian accords. That provided a ready-made cause for Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida, who despite some successful attacks in the 1990s had failed to stir the great Muslim masses to rise up against their corrupt and authoritarian governments. That failure was part of the rationale for al-Qaida to strike at the "faraway enemy" on 9/11.

Along the way we get a succinct thumbnail analysis of the neoconservatives who came to dominate American policy after 9/11 and a thoughtful discussion of why al-Qaida, despite setbacks, remains a resilient organization - mainly because it's more a database in cyberspace than a geographically based outfit. Saudi Arabia's many dilemmas in the wake of 9/11 (15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi Arabians, remember) get a probing chapter.

Kepel offers insights into the ethnic-religious divisions in Iraq that explain so much about why the occupation has not been very successful (it was published before the January elections). But the heart of the book concerns Europe, and he gives us a persuasive overview of the Muslim communities in Germany, France, Great Britain and Spain, illuminating the tensions between jihadism and assimilation with telling details and anecdotes. The terrorists have been able to pull off attacks, most notably in Madrid in March 2004. But he notes of European Muslims that "their children were born in Europe, for the most part, and hold citizenship in a European nation. They were educated in European schools, they speak European languages, and they are accustomed to European social practices." The outcome is far from certain, but they could be the next big thing in Islam, and Islam and the world could be the better for it.