Many pundits have faulted the Bush administration for promoting
"nation-building" in Iraq as opposed to just securing U.S. interests in
Mesopotamia.
But some of those who have called on the administration to abandon
its Wilsonian scheme still insist that Americans should "stay the
course" in Iraq to ensure that it doesn't fall under the control of
another tyrant or degenerate into a civil war.
These realists need to turn their narrative of the Iraq war on its head.
The U.S. invasion of Iraq wasn't part of a nation-building scheme.
Ironically, beginning with the first gulf war and ending with the
ouster of Saddam Hussein, U.S. policies interrupted and eventually
ended a process of nation-building led by Saddam.
Idealist pundits who in recent years have compared nation-building
to a holy mission to be undertaken by the United States and its league
of democracy crusaders would probably take issue with the notion that
the Evil Tyrant of Baghdad was, well, a nation builder.
But to suggest that a bloody tyrant like Saddam and his fascist
Baath party were engaged in nation-building is only to affirm that they
were following in the footsteps of some of the most brutal but
effective nation-builders of the 20th century: Hitler, Stalin and Mao.
In fact, since "Iraq" was nothing more than a geopolitical invention
of the British imperialists and the "Iraqi nation" was a fictitious
entity, the only way to bring together the mishmash of tribal, ethnic
(Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans) and religious (Sunnis, Shiites, Christians)
groups and turn them into a viable nation-state was through an
authoritarian centralizing political power in Baghdad.
Previous attempts at holding together the Iraqi state involved
applying a variety of phony and authentic identities (Arab, Muslim,
Assyrian) to unify these rival groups against real and imagined outside
threats (Iranian, Israeli, American).
Through the control of the military and the security services, and
by nationalizing the economy, Saddam and his tribal and political
cronies were pursuing the Middle Eastern modus operandi of
nation-building favored by other autocrats such as Kamal Attaturk and
the Shah of Iran.
There are only two realistic choices open to the "Iraqi people" in
the post-Saddam era: either restart nation-building or take the road
towards self-determination along ethno-religious lines (the Kurds, Arab
Shiites and Arab Sunnis). It's difficult to make an argument why either
of these two alternatives does or does not reflect American values or
squares with U.S. interests.
Americans cannot deny any people the right to decide whether they
want to live together or separate. Figuratively speaking, the
English-speaking and French- speaking Canadians are still married, but
the Czechs and Slovaks got divorced. We can certainly hope that that
decision over whether to separate or remain together would be made
through peaceful means (e.g. Czechoslovakia) and not war (e.g.
Yugoslavia).
But even civil war along the lines of what took place in Yugoslavia
shouldn't confront us with a moral obligation to intervene on behalf of
one or more parties in such a conflict in Iraq.
Indeed, U.S. experience in the Balkans demonstrated the moral ambiguity involved in taking sides in a civil war.
Forget morality, respond some realists.
U.S. interests would be served by maintaining the territorial
integrity of Iraq since the disintegration of the country into two or
three states would lead to intervention by the Turks, the Iranians and
the Syrians, who are opposed to Kurdish independence.
Equally important are considerations about how a breakup of Iraq
would benefit Iran and could lead to the emergence of another Shiite
state.
Indeed, proponents of a long-term occupation often argue that the collapse of Iraq could ignite a general Middle Eastern war.
Such nightmare scenarios assume that U.S. military power in the
region can help maintain the balance of power and can forestall these
events.
But it was an American-led war that ended up threatening the status quo in the region and making such scenarios possible.
The United States should permit the regional players to protect
their respective interests and reach accommodations by using a mix of
diplomatic influence and military force, on the understanding that the
United States retains its authority and ability to protect our security
and vital interests.
Such an approach would force the Kurds to consider the interests of
the Turks and leave open the possibility that Iran may or may not
emerge as regional hegemon.
Realists favoring a long-term military presence in Iraq will then
have to explain why core U.S. national interests would be harmed by
such developments.