Russia and the Making of a Multipolar World

The G-8 summit is taking place at a fortuitous global moment when Russia and the United States are facing challenges of different natures. Russia is struggling to emerge as a superpower. In the pursuit of that objective, it is encountering a lot of problems. However, things are looking up for Russia, since the chaos of a multipolar world is resurfacing after its disappearance at the end of the Cold War. The United States, on the contrary, is struggling to sustain its own political dominance of global affairs in order to prolong the duration of the unipolarity. This is a foreboding moment from the American perspective.

In the U.S.-dominated unipolar world, there was at least a semblance of order, which the Bush administration destroyed by invading Iraq while escalating the level of confrontational rhetoric toward North Korea and Iran, and by not remaining focused in Afghanistan after it dismantled the Taliban government. It seems that the forces of disorder and chaos are gaining an upper hand in Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Lebanon.

Scanning the globe from the U.S. perspective, one does not find reasons for much optimism. George W. Bush's global war on terrorism (GWOT) began with the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan to dismantle the Taliban-al-Qaeda terror nexus. The forces that had the gall to attack the lone superpower had to be destroyed. Bush was quite justified in that judgment.

The transnational terrorist attacks established a very dangerous precedent, which stated that no powerful armed forces were needed to catch the mighty Gulliver off guard, especially on his own home territory, where such an attack was least anticipated. The Lilliputians then got even bolder than before in challenging him elsewhere in the world.

Al-Qaeda started to write new chapters on terrorism, a concept that was seen during the Cold War years in the Maoist insurgency, or the insurgencies led by Che Guevara or Fidel Castro. However, the Maoist insurgency had a spotty record of catching on only in certain areas of Asia and Africa, whereas al-Qaeda-led conflicts were to flare up in different parts of the Islamic world.

America's response had to be overwhelming. It went into Afghanistan and dismantled the Taliban-created disorder. However, Bush never understood that when one disorderly regime is destroyed, it has to be replaced with a regime that is effective in creating a new order. Otherwise, a newly created mayhem follows its own logic. One type of disorder only leads to another type of chaos. The government of Hamid Karzai failed miserably in that task. Now it seems that the Taliban are making a comeback in southern Afghanistan.

Bush had other fish to fry. He moved on to Iraq in order to dismantle the regime of Saddam Hussein. He succeeded in achieving that objective. Winning a military victory against a fifth-rate military power is easy for the lone superpower. Ruling the conquered country, especially a Muslim country, is next to impossible. Americans should have never forgotten the lesson that it learned during its Vietnamese adventure: Third World countries are hard for an invading power to rule .

In the post-9/11 era, the Islamists became highly effective in hawking their war with the U.S. as one of Christian Crusaders against the land of Islam. The Iraqi insurgency emerged as the chief source of mayhem and chaos in Iraq.

So, both in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is facing the prospects of getting bogged down by the growing insurgency. Some of these are the cohorts of the same forces that attacked the United States on Sept. 11, 2001. It might be their religious zeal or any other passion that is driving them toward victory, no matter the cost. Consequently, attempts to stabilize those countries are endless uphill battles.

In the same period, North Korea and Iran decided to pursue nuclear programs to safeguard their respective vital interests: the survival of their regimes. They had to be particularly serious about that objective because George Bush threatened their governments through his doctrine of regime change.

To be sure, there is a world of difference between the approaches of Pyongyang and Tehran to their respective nuclear programs. The former is suspected of possessing several warheads, while the latter has not yet reached that advanced stage of nuclear weapons development. In the meantime, it insists that the purpose of its nuclear program is purely peaceful.

What is important about North Korea and Iran is that they refuse to cooperate with the U.S. preference for initiating a multilateral dialogue to bring an end to their respective nuclear programs. Both of them want direct talks with the U.S. After all, it is the United States that is threatening their survival through its public condemnation of them, by using such phrase as "the axis of evil," and by insisting on its right to pursue the doctrine of preemption and regime change.

In the meantime, North Korea initiated its own version of brinkmanship by firing a number of ballistic missiles. The purpose was to recapture the U.S.' attention, which then appeared, from Pyongyang, too focused on resolving the nuclear conflict with Iran.

Iran is suspected of supporting the bizarre action of Hezbollah of Lebanon crossing Israel's borders to kill and kidnap its soldiers. Israel's response has been more disproportionate than anticipated by Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah.

By systematically destroying the civilian infrastructure of Lebanon in order to force the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah, Israel is also busy creating political disorder in that country, something the Islamist forces fervently pursued in Afghanistan and Iraq. A further weakening of the already weak Lebanese government would only further strengthen Hezbollah.

Like the United States in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, Israel does not understand that its enormous military advantage would be pretty much wiped out under the escalating chaos stemming from its systematic destruction of Lebanon's civilian infrastructure.

The United States and Israel are falling prey to the tactics of the insurgents in Afghanistan, Iraq, and now in Lebanon. By extracting disproportionate response from these actors, the insurgents are in reality "leveling the playing fields." The capabilities of the militarily superior actor are diminished as civilian losses pile up. The mayhem created as an outcome of the use of overwhelming force is just what the insurgents desire.

The cumulative effects of these multiple chaotic theaters of operation – Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon – are emerging in the creation of multiple imbroglios for the lone superpower and its major client state, Israel. The options for these countries are to either continue using overwhelming force and create even more chaos, or to minimize the chances of disorder and immediately seek a political solution. However, the very nature of the political solution sought – disarming the insurgents in Afghanistan, Iraq, and now in Lebanon – is not acceptable to the other side.

From Russia's point of view, the escalation of this chaos is not a bad thing, in the sense that it is eroding America's strategic dominance in the Middle East and South Asia. Russia has a lot of influence over Iran and some over North Korea. Russia's ally, China, has much sway with North Korea. However, neither power is interested in really helping out the U.S.

From their perspectives, the lone superpower, if freed from the growing escalations and uncertainties related to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, would continue its policies of "containing" them in Eastern Europe, the Transcaucasus region, and South and Central Asia. It would also carry on with its own agenda of democratizing the Middle East, which for Russia and China is a euphemism for enhancing America's hegemony in that region.

At least for now, Russia and China enjoy a palpable advantage in Central Asia stemming from the Uzbek decision to close the K-2 (Karshi-Khanabad) airbase to the U.S. military. However, America still maintains its presence in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, a reality that it is fully capable of turning toward its further strategic advantage in that region with the passage of time.

So it is not at all in the interest of Russia to do very much to reduce chaos in any of the aforementioned countries. At best, it will issue lukewarm and perfunctory statements urging moderation on the part of all parties involved, but will not take concrete actions beyond that.

In the wake of Iran's refusal to be time-bound in its response to the comprehensive package offered by the Perm-5 plus one, it is interesting to see how far Russia (and China) will allow the UN Security Council to proceed in the direction of imposing sanctions. The United States, the UK, and Germany are thought to be leaning heavily toward punitive sanctions.

The chances are good that neither Russia nor China will be too earnest in pressuring Iran in that direction, their public posturing to that effect notwithstanding. However, one should keep in mind the role of potentially escalatory aspects of the Lebanese crisis. If Israel decides to expand the scope of that conflict by attacking Iran or Syria, then all bets are off in terms of how far this conflict will escalate. Under such a scenario, Russia is likely to be considerably more forthcoming than it is now in de-escalating the conflict, for it does not wish to totally alienate the United States.

In the calculation of President Vladimir Putin, Russia has more to gain by keeping its differences with the United States at a manageable level. Such an international strategic environment would be most conducive for chipping away at the American-dominated unipolar global order.