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When
The Terror Goes Down To Georgia: Some Thoughts On The
Caucasus Imbroglio
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When
The Terror Goes Down To Georgia: Some Thoughts On The
Caucasus Imbroglio
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The indictment is read- but what
of it?
"According to our information, a few dozen mujahedin fighters from Afghanistan have appeared in the Caucasus region," acting US ambassador to Georgia, Phillip Ramler, told the Achali Versiya newspaper." The American ambassador had a more specific location in mind: Georgia's lawless Pankisi Gorge, on the northern border with Chechnya. Unsurprisingly, this accusation was rejected in Tbilisi: "…Georgian Intelligence Service chief Avtandil Ioseliani said he has no information concerning the presence of Afghans in Pankisi. "If Mr. Remler has such information, let him share it with us," Caucasus Press quoted Ioseliani as saying." What's the truth of the matter? Caucasian conflicts, and their outcomes, are hard to predict at even the sanest of times. Especially now, gripped as we are in the delirium of ever-expanding war, answers are especially hard to come by. Yet there are some things we can say with reasonable certainty. The terrorism charge, first of all, is not entirely untrue. In the area referred to by the article (the rugged Pankisi Gorge), thousands of Chechen refugees and/or fighters have set up shop. Yet don't forget the fine print beneath the glaring headline ("Al Qaeda fighters hiding in Georgia''): the total number of mujahedin present, according to the article, is "a few dozen." From the shrill warnings and rows of photos the FBI has been releasing lately, there may indeed be more mujahedin hunkering down in Detroit. Besides, no matter how "evil" they are, the Pankisi mujahedin can do little harm to America from one of the most inaccessible and inhospitable places in the world. In short, the FBI is better off sticking to Salt Lake City, at least for this week. Elastic borders, stretched further still The last time I wrote about the war on terror, I raised certain points about the rationale behind naming Iran as a key source of "evil." I speculated that the designation might have something to do with anti-Iranian sentiment in both the "New" Afghanistan and in Russia. Here I will consider the topographical ripple effect of this idea, indicated by the new terrorism charges against Georgia. Russia, it seems, is the key player here. Bush and Co. have worked hard to bring Russia on board as an ally in the war on terror. That they've largely achieved this goal is quite extraordinary, especially considering the negative factors at play – for example, the rapid encroachment of American military bases into Russia's Central Asian backyard. One important factor keeping Russia on board is the potentially lucrative expansion of oil sales to the West – at the expense of the "axis of evil," and its Middle Eastern kinsmen. Russia's main problem is Chechen separatists, who occupy the mountainous region just north-east of Georgia. For years, America's disdain for Russian military exploits against Chechnya polarized relations between the two powers. After September 11th, however, the Chechen war was held up by Russia as a prime example of radical Islamic terrorism – which to some extent was true. Since 1997, when Chechen refugees began pouring over the Chechen-Georgian border, Russia has accused Georgia of sheltering terrorists. This strong-arm tactic has been part of a more complicated power play involving politics, economic control, and the Russian-supervised Abkhaz separatists in West Georgia. After September 11th, Georgia appeared quite afraid of Russia, and the possibility of an "anti-terrorism" invasion. It would seem obvious that Georgia's "official" addition into the register of mujahedin-related states vindicates Russia's accusations; it is too early to tell, however, if this will end up in Russia's favor. After all, Georgian sovereignty has been repeatedly backed by the West, and Georgia even aspires to join NATO. Last year's historic NATO-Georgian military operations showed this blossoming partnership. All things considered, being considered a "terrorist haven" might turn out to be a bonanza for Georgia. It could lead to an influx of American training, weapons, and know-how, with the additional bonus of cleaning up the Chechen threat once and for all. As even Georgian commentators admit, this task is too difficult for them to attempt alone. The epicenter of conflict: the Pankisi Gorge It's not surprising that the Pankisi Gorge comes up when accusers label Georgia a "haven for terrorism." A wild and mountainous no-man's land on the Chechen border, Pankisi is one of the most dangerous places in the entire Caucasus region. It is a hideout for militants, a thieves' den, and a royal road for traders in drugs and other contraband items. Kidnappings – of foreigners and Georgians alike – are common. Although its inhospitable geography has always been a contributing factor to lawlessness, Pankisi became really bad from 1997 on, when an influx of Chechen refugees and militants surged into the area. The situation has gotten worse, as one commentator avers: "… (the Gorge) has become home to 7,000 documented Chechen refugees and a number of rebels who escaped from the Chechen conflict. This juxtaposition of rebels and criminals is hurting the Gorge's chances for stability. Some suspect that drug lords and organized criminals, aware of this effect, are working to keep refugees and bandits in the area." Despite continuing Russian demands, the Georgian government has done little to eradicate the Chechen threat in the Gorge. For some time, they denied the presence of any militants whatsoever; but worsening conditions have required Tbilisi to take some form of action. Yet the degree to which the Georgians act has always been a delicate – and dangerous – matter. According to Georgian analyst Irakli Aladashvili, in an article appearing in Army and Society in Georgia, the situation is highly explosive: "…the Georgian government sent 500 troops in November 2000 to patrol the Gorge. They set up checkpoints and bases across the Akhmeta district and Mtskheta-Mtianeti region. The government also exploded two roads to minimize evaders. But by and large it has avoided bearing down on the Pankisi Gorge with any real force: "the Georgian government fears that such an operation may turn the Gorge into a 'second Chechnya' and cause immense problems to Georgia." This view was recently confirmed by a Georgian Interior Ministry official: "If any shot is fired in Pankisi," he said, "Georgia will find itself involved in another Caucasus war." This is an unsavory prospect to politicians who might end up bereft of both a portfolio and a country, should a regional war ensue. Yet the chronic instability of the Pankisi Gorge has become more urgent – and especially for the government, which is perceived as lax and uncaring. Indeed, it is no longer just the Russians who are fed up with Chechen banditry. Locals have started to block roads, make protests, and form noisy veterans' groups, which lobby on behalf of Georgian sovereignty and stability in the area. Their presence is starting to have an effect on the highest reaches of power: Schevernadze met with one of the groups on 18 January, and promised to improve security. Yet though he said that the veterans' goals were "achievable," there is little trust from the side of petitioners, until something concrete happens. This in turn brings up the question of just who will make something happen: will it be the Russians, the Georgians, or – the Americans? The Chechen drug trade – destabilizing Georgia Key to this may be the role played by Islamic-terrorism-related drug traffickers in Pankisi. First of all are the Chechens, who import raw heroin from Afghanistan. The same piece from Army and Society in Georgia reveals the Chechen role in processing the raw goods: "Drugs (mainly heroin) are produced at special plants in Chechnya and then smuggled into Georgia through cross-border mountain routes. Drug dealers sometimes offer drugs for free, especially to youngsters in Georgian villages in order to make them addicts." This has been confirmed in recent years by the dramatic upsurge in drug addiction among rural villages of Pankisi. The Chechen destabilization of Georgia through drugs was scornfully attested by Khizri Aldamov, representative of the Chechen exiles: "If the Chechens are the sellers of drugs," he said, "then the Georgians are the buyers." The negative effects of Chechens in the Gorge are perhaps most strongly felt in terms of drugs, one of the many outrages which have driven Georgians to protest against their government. One such dissenter is Mikhail Saakashvili, a member of parliament and something of a gadfly on the Georgian political scene. In a recent interview, he dissected leading Georgian officials and businessmen according to their various schemes, ploys, and animosities. Most of all, however, Saakashvili is concerned with exposing Georgia's role in a cross-continental drug trade which begins in Afghanistan and ends in the West. When we consider America's recent equation of drugs with terrorists, an interesting possibility emerges from Saakashvili's frank testimonial: "The source of the drugs starts out in Afghanistan, mostly in the region that the Northern Alliance controlled prior to the war with the Taliban. The US and their allies may not want to hear this, but we expect this business to increase in Georgia with the defeat of the Taliban forces. It was the Uzbeks and Tajiks that had the export business under control with their connections with transit points such as Tashkent [Uzbekistan], Osh [Kyrgyzstan] and other Central Asian routes. Also, many of those responsible for enforcing the laws and international agreements to combat the drug trade are directly involved in making substantial money from keeping things as they were. The current political and economic situation in Georgia is perfect for the drug business to develop without barriers. We have created an ideal situation for drug dealing in terms of territories that are out of control, and our strategically important location. We have immediate access to seaports and thus the shortest routes to the West. Right now the West is more involved with larger issues and drugs appears to be secondary. This is a mistake." If the Western focus is indeed a "mistake," it might be a short-lived one. The Bush Administration's equation of drug dealing with terroristic weapons-purchasing makes it more likely that the Western approach may change. Despite Saakashvili's concerns, the drug war has always been a prime factor in American foreign policy: just think of Colombia. By linking Chechen-controlled Georgia with Afghan fighters and Afghan heroin, the US is building a case for intervention. In this light, the tragic events of September 11th have become a golden opportunity. The drug war and the war on terror, converging harmoniously Remember, the US was quite pleased with the Taliban – back when the group was destroying Afghan poppy fields. After all, the US did not try to stop the Taliban from detonating the Bamayan Buddhas, for the simple reason that the poppy destruction scheme was succeeding. It was only after September 11th that the Taliban fatally compromised itself. Now that the precedent has been set, and caution thrown to the wind, not only terrorism but drug trafficking will be targeted. Interestingly enough, the US has not shown the same enthusiasm for fighting drugs or terror in the Balkans as it has in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The reason for this is that the mujahedin presence in say, Macedonia or Kosovo, is an embarrassment to be avoided by the Americans. And therefore, the role of Albanian drug traffickers – who are closing in on controlling up to 90% of Europe's heroin supply – also goes uninvestigated. The clear implication of this follows: wherever Islamic terrorism is, the drug trade is attacked. And wherever Islamic terrorism is not, there the drug trade is ignored. This is perhaps what separates US policy towards "freedom fighters" in the Balkans and their counterparts in the Caucasus. For the Albanian in Kosovo and Macedonia, fighting for "equal rights" has masked other motives – like the preservation of smuggling routes. To this rather coarse end, they have employed Western ideals and rhetoric – a ploy which has not been entirely unsuccessful. Yet the Albanian experience is entirely different from that of minorities in Georgia. The US has not (yet) intervened directly in any of the latter's disputes, and therefore it has nothing to be embarrassed about (as in Kosovo). Pro-western sources say, quite frankly, what could be claimed for the Balkans too – that each "independence movement" is fundamentally and fraudulently connected with illegal mafia activity: "The drug business is the glue that connects the breakaway regions such as South Ossetia, Abkhazia and other parts in the Northern Caucasus." Chechnya, of course, is meant by the phrase "other parts." If Washington is bent on eliminating Chechen support for Al Qaeda – and the scourge of heroin with which Chechens ravage the Georgian populace – it should make sure that it is not exposing itself to potentially messy, overextended intervention. That is, the kind of intervention which will come back to destabilize and embarrass it for years – as has happened so tragically in the Balkans.
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Previous articles by Christopher Deliso on Antiwar.com In
Macedonia, Terrorism Remains the Law But
Would It Be an Evil Axis? Economics
and Politics in Macedonia: an Interview with Dr. Sam Vaknin Macedonians
and the Media Secrets
of the Blue Café On
the Front Lines in Tetovo Interview
with Ljube Boshkovski A
Connection Between NATO and the NLA? The
Legacy of War: Kidnapped Persons in Macedonia The
Day's Disturbances and Developments in Macedonia
Crisis in Macedonian Government –
Albanian Hackers Deface Macedonian Website
Partition: Macedonia's Best Lost Hope? Important
Notice to Readers of the Macedonia Page Selective Democracy Comes
to Macedonia Macedonia Capitulates With a Friend Like
Pakistan Afghan-Americans Oppose
Interventionism, Seek Unity The Afghan
Quagmire Beckons Suddenly,
Terrorists Are Everywhere Turkey's
Eclipse: Chechnya Comes Home
To America A Quiet Battle in the
Caucasus: Georgia Between Russia & NATO Central Asia: The Cauldron
Boils Over Bin Laden, Iran, and the
KLA The Macedonian
Phrase-Book: Writing NATO's Dictionary of
Control Barbarism and the Erasure
of Culture Macedonian Endgame: The
Sinister Transformation of the Status Quo by Christopher Deliso
Christopher Deliso is a journalist and travel writer with special interest in current events in the areas of the former Byzantine Empire – the Balkans, Greece, Turkey, and the Caucasus. Mr. Deliso holds a master's degree with honors in Byzantine Studies (from Oxford University), and has traveled widely in the region. His current long-term research projects include the Macedonia issue, the Cyprus problem, and the ethnography of Byzantine Georgia. |