A JARRING PROPHESY
Observers
of NATO’s war on behalf of the Albanians in Kosovo, and the more
recent American duplicity in Macedonia, have been fearful of the potential
backlash that would come were the US to desert its bastard offspring,
the KLA/NLA. All the way back in March 2001, the following disturbing
prediction was made:
"When
we throw in the possibility that various cells of Osama Bin Laden’s
terrorist international are operating in this part of the world, the
process of retribution against American assets will increase if America
moves against the Greater Albania project."
This
remarkable prophesy may soon be tested, in the aftermath of 11 September.
Will the US, as Bush has warned, "make no distinction between
the terrorists and those who harbor them"? Indeed, if Bush does
strike against Bin Laden’s entire network, what will become of
the Albanians?
BIN LADEN AND
THE US – TOGETHER AT LAST IN ALBANIA
The
fact that the CIA armed
Bin Laden to fight the Soviets, with the help of Pakistan and
the Afghan drug trade, is old news, and makes for especially bitter
reading now. For years, the Albanian
operations of Bin Laden and other radical Muslim terrorists have
also been widely reported. In this article I attempt to trace some
of the major points in this huge and still widely unknown movement,
from the events of today back as far as 1992, when the Islamic reawakening
in Albania enhanced conditions for widespread terrorism.
One
of the only good results of the bombing of Serbia was an increased
awareness of Islamic terrorism in the Balkans. Albania was soon
implicated. On 4 May 1999, the Washington Times reported,
citing new reports from US intelligence and Jane’s Defense
Review, that the town of Tropoje, Albania was a"common staging
area" for Bin Laden’s and the KLA’s forces, and thus
"a center for Islamic terrorists." US intelligence also
acknowledged that Bin Ladin’s al-Qaeda had "both trained
and financially supported" the Albanians, and that the Kosovo
border had been infiltrated by Bosnian, Chechen and Afghan mujaheedin,
in "…crossings (which) originated in neighboring Albania
and, according to the reports, included parties of up to 50 men."
The Jane’s report added that "…documents found
last year on the body of a KLA member showed that he had escorted
several volunteers into Kosovo, including more than a dozen Saudi
Arabians. Each volunteer carried a passport identifying him as a Macedonian
Albanian."
A combination
of chaos
and poverty in Albania paved the way for Bin Laden to move in.
The Times of London quoted Fatos Klosi, the head of the Albanian
intelligence service, who said that bin Laden sent terrorists to Kosovo.
Using the front of funding a "humanitarian agency," bin
Laden muscled into Albania as far back as 1994.
The
Times report gets even better:
"Klosi
said he believed terrorists had already infiltrated other parts of
Europe from bases in Albania. Interpol believes more than 100,000
blank Albanian passports were stolen in riots last year, providing
ample opportunity for terrorists to acquire false papers."
A short
time before this, a French national on trial for murder in Albania
claimed to have been a member of bin Laden’s Albania cell, and
had come "to recruit and arm fighters for Kosovo."
The
general anarchy and upheaval in Albania over the past decade has made
it an easy target for wealthy Islamic terrorists: weapons can be acquired
with ease; high unemployment makes for high recruitment; and all assistance,
whether economic, military or "humanitarian," is gladly
accepted.
THE "HUMANITARIAN
ORGANIZATION" FRONT
Bin
Laden’s kind offer of "humanitarian help" in 1994 has
been used repeatedly ever since to fund terrorism in Albania. Many
terrorists have posed
as "humanitarian workers" since. Secret KLA training camps,
which the CIA and SAS also used, were created in Northern Albania
by Iran and other countries "using Islamic educational institutions
and projects for the development of rural communities as a front."
Back in 1999, "a Saudi government audit acquired by US intelligence
showed that 5 of Saudi Arabia’s top business executives ordered
the National Commercial Bank (NCB), the kingdom’s largest, to
transfer personal funds along with $3 million diverted from a Saudi
pension fund to New York and London banks. The money was diverted
into the accounts of Islamic charities, including Islamic Relief and
Blessed Relief, that serve as fronts for Bin Laden."
AN OFFER THEY COULDN'T REFUSE
Mighty
generous of the Saudi executives, don’t you think? The actual
truth of this incident tells another story, and one that anti-Arab
Americans should remember: these guys are just as afraid of bin Laden
as we are.
It is
well-known that bin Laden has a personal vendetta against the Saudi
government, which he views as corrupt and unabashedly pro-Western.
Over the past few years, he has built his economic base not only through
contributions from rabid fanatics, but by "collecting" from
unwilling businessmen representative of the hated Saudi regime. In
this practice, Bin Laden has become the terrorists'
Godfather – extorting from wealthy Arab businessmen. In the above
"donation," for example, "intelligence sources say
the businessmen, who are worth more than $5 billion, were paying bin
Laden ‘protection money’ to stave off attacks on their businesses
in Saudi Arabia."
Apparently,
bin Laden tried to "collect" in a similar way from Albania
in late 1999, when he made an unsuccessful request for asylum. This
report, of 17 November, 1999, alleged that the attempt stemmed
from the fact that bin Laden "had ‘bought’ several
key politicians who have looked away from the activities of his supporters
in Albania." The report went on to quote an Albanian newspaper,
Koha Jone, which reported that a 42-year-old Jordanian businessman,
resident in Albania since 1992, had just been arrested by the CIA
in connection with bin Laden. Even if the Albanians could keep bin
Laden out, they couldn’t control their protégé,
as they had found out only a few months before, in July 1999, when
US Secretary of Defense William Cohen canceled a trip to Albania,
out of fear of assassination
from bin Laden’s gang.
CHIEF AMONG ENEMIES
A long
list of nationalities are represented in these and other documents
relating to Albania and Kosovo: Islamic terrorists are cited as being
from Egypt, Jordan, France, Bosnia, Macedonia, Saudi Arabia, Chechnya,
Afghanistan, Lybia, Pakistan… This indicates that bin Laden certainly
couldn’t have run Albania by himself. He was aided all along
by another old friend of the United States – Iran.
IRAN IN ALBANIA: IDEOLOGY AND TERRORISM
A report
of 22 March, 1998 in the Times of London confirmed that bin
Laden and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards had signed a pact (on 16
February in Teheran) consolidating their operations in Albania and
Kosovo, hoping "to turn the region into their main base for Islamic
armed action in Europe." This was the unfortunate but logical
outcome of almost a decade of a growing Iranian presence in Albania,
and a growing radicalization of the Albanian "freedom fighters."
At the
1994 summit of Islamic countries in Jeddah, an agreement had been
reached to "help the ‘brothers in the Balkans’ with
all available means, including military aid…. The Balkan peninsula
was chosen as a beachhead for an organized penetration of Islam into
Europe." Italy was used as the base for two failed attempts to
assassinate the Pope in 1997 (first in Sarajevo, and later, in Bologna),
attempts which the Iranian secret services allegedly masterminded,
using "a suicide group of 18 terrorists from Turkey, Moslem Bosnia,
and Iran."
One
excellent
article details the development of Iran’s terrorist cells
in the Balkans. Command centers are found in both Muslim and non-Muslim
countries. At the end of 1997, Iranian diplomat Mahmud Nurani, a Hezbollah
veteran, was put in charge of the Rome cell involved in the attempts
on John Paul II. At the same time, Kurban Ali Najeff Abadi, a close
friend of Ayatollah Khameni, was installed in Albania. The consolidation
of Iranian influence, in both legal and extralegal concerns, was expedited
by Albania’s descent into anarchy in 1997 (during which, incidentally,
mafia gangs and the nascent KLA robbed the Albanian military of much
of its US-donated weaponry). Albania "desperately needed aid,
regardless of its origin," and crime, kidnapping and smuggling
were rampant. And so:
"Iranian
intelligence circles deemed that Albania was ‘ripe’ and
could accept the introduction of extremist Islamism which was to take
place on two levels, according to Teheran’s plan. Publicly, Iran
and its Islamic partners (were) to build a comprehensive financial
support system ranging from banks and financial institutions to economy,
and including numerous humanitarian organizations… secretly,
a broad network was created to establish the intelligence-operative
base destined to cover entire Europe, going primarily through the
Balkans and Italy."
IRAN IN ALBANIA: THE ECONOMIC FRONT
The
intersection of these two interests, economic control and the ideological
control necessary for terrorism, came in 1998, at the meeting of the
Iranian Supreme Economic Council. This meeting was dedicated exclusively
to Albania, and it both reconfirmed and extended the policy of Islamic
entrenchment developed since 1991. Meeting with influential figures
such as Mohsen Nurbakan, head of the Iranian Central Bank, the Council
suggested a "long-term plan" to promote Iran’s main
objectives in Albania: the formation of a "commercial operative
base" near the "heart of Europe"; the strengthening
of a "strategic axis" between Sarajevo and Tirana; and the
installation of a headquarters for Iranian intelligence operations
on Greece, Austria, Italy, and Europe in general.
The
implementation of Iran’s plan has brought Albania into the fold,
and made it a staging post for Islamic terrorism in Europe. Financial
dependence on Arab banks represents "the exclusive source of
hard currency input into Albania." Iranian banks have in this
way "penetrated all segments" of Albanian society and economy,
"thus fully legalizing the Iranian presence in all spheres of
financing."
That
this was done for reasons beyond sound business strategy was clear,
from the instructions of Mr. Nurbakan to the banks; they were "to
invest in Albania, regardless of poor profit and business risk factors."
In other words, the banking presence was a "legitimate face"
for Iran’s intelligence: "officials of the Iranian financial
intelligence are deployed in all Teheran’s institutions in Albania
and cooperate closely with the operatives of the Intelligence Affairs
Ministry regarding the financing of terrorist training camps, purchase
of arms and military equipment, ‘money laundering’ and other
activities."
Yet,
one many wonder, how did ostensibly Europe-oriented Albania get involved
so heavily with radical Islamic movements? The answer is that the
process has been complex, and years in the making.
THE SECRET WAR: RESCUING THE ALBANIANS FROM GODLESSNESS
Albania
is and has always been a very poor and backward country. Under Communism,
there was little knowledge of the outside world, to the extent that
the few Albanians who made it out without being shot by border guards
would gaze in wonder at a city such as Athens, not knowing what planet
they had stumbled upon. This unfortunate lack of worldliness has aided
Islamic extremists. In the next two sections I make extensive use
of an excellent study by M. Vickers and J. Pettifer, Albania:
from Anarchy to a Balkan Identity (1997). This close study of
the country’s recent development, while very sympathetic to the
Albanian cause, details the steps which have brought Islamic terrorist
organizations to Albania.
In 1967,
Albania was declared the world’s first atheist state. When this
prohibition was ended in 1990, Albania became an evangelical free-for-all.
Although many religions were represented- including the Mormons, Jehovah’s
Witnesses, and others, the chief ones (in terms of Albania’s
historical religious demographics) were the Roman Catholics, Greek
Orthodox, and Muslims. The quick growth of Islam was due partly to
its traditionally high profile (a relic of Ottoman
days), and partly to a heavy influx of money from wealthy Arab countries.
The Albanians, many of whom were too young to have experience of religion,
were naïvely eager and curious, as was gleefully noted: "Islamic
Relief reported that Albanian Muslims were like a dry sponge, ready
to soak up anything given to them." (Page 104)
THE GOLDEN CARROT
The
chaotic, impoverished state of Albania in the early 1990’s meant
that it was easy pickings for deep-pocketed Islamic proselytizers.
They were willing, at a time when the US and EU still were not, to
invest in the country. Countries such as Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait wanted to bring in hardcore religion. The golden carrot
they dangled was to bring Albania into the fold economically:
"In
October 1992 a delegation from the Islamic Development Bank (IDB),
headed by its chairman Ahmed Mohammed Ali, visited Tirana to lay the
groundwork for Albania to join the bank. Ali told President Berisha
that it was willing to invest in Albania and develop cooperation in
all areas of the economy, including agriculture, education and transport…
The delegation also discussed plans to build an institute to train
teachers in Arabic and five schools; to dispatch a first contingent
of Albanian students to undergo higher education in IDB member countries;
and to promote book publishing." (Page 105)
Eight
months prior to this, a delegation from the Turkish Islamic community
had arrived in Tirana, to discuss with then-president Alia the role
of religion in Albania, and the strengthening of religious cooperation
between the two countries. In 1992, Albania and Turkey consolidated
for the first time a defense pact which now involves millions of dollars
of aid yearly from the latter to the former.
A month
later, "a Kuwaiti delegation presented the beleaguered Alia administration
with an ambitious investment plan and, in return for promises of economic
aid, asked for permission to build several mosques. It was then that
major construction of mosques began in earnest in Albania." (Page
102)
SPRING, 1992: A MASSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF MOSQUES BEGINS
By 1990,
Turkish authorities had already started renovating mosques from the
Ottoman period. The Kuwaiti initiative of 1992, which wedded religion
with cash, continued this trend aggressively. It was the beginning
of an ambitious new building program funded entirely from without.
Mosques for the citizens of Tirana, Shkoder, Durres and Kavaja were
promised by four sheiks of the Alislamic Aluok Foundation, based in
the Netherlands, who visited Tirana on 23 April.
In addition
to Middle Eastern governments, expatriate groups from Europe and the
US funded the rebirth of Islam in Albania. At first, these new mosques
were many more than demand required, and often strangely incongruous
with their surroundings:
"In
the Muslim village of Koplik – which is no more than a cluster of
two-room cottages with small courtyards, joined by a series of dirt
paths which in winter are churned into a sea of swirling mud by the
hooves of cows and horses – an enormous newly-built yellow-painted
mosque stands in the square, paid for by the Saudi Arabian government.
Looking majestically out of place, it stands alone in an inhospitable,
poor and miserable locality. The inside is richly carpeted and Korans
are piled high along the walls. The opulence of Koplik’s mosque
is in marked contrast to the church recently opened not far away in
a Catholic village, which is in a bleak former agricultural building.
It had no seats and the people had collected little piles of stones
on which to sit, until in 1995 an Austrian-based charity furnished
the church with benches." (Page 100)
RADICALIZING THE ALBANIANS
Another
of the main purposes of the Islamic mission to Albania was to train
and radicalize the young generation:
"As
Albanian schools remained secular, children and young men were being
sent to Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Malaysia, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Egypt
to study Islamic theology. Islamic organisations helped to fund the
expenses of those Albanians wishing to make the trip to Mecca; in
1991 around 170 Muslims from Albania went on the haji; in 1992 the
figure was 300 and in 1993 over 400."
In this
period, Albania became known as a place of refuge for those radical
Muslims who were too hot for their own countries to handle, and "it
was well-known that there were several fundamentalists on the run
from Egyptian authorities who were living in Tirana." (Page 106)
EPILOGUE, OR, A BALKAN EPITAPH
There
is a lot more to be discovered about the Albanian connection with
bin Laden, and undoubtedly the next few weeks and months will turn
up some dirt. How the US will act remains to be seen. It is unlikely
that America will turn its back on its Albanian allies, as that would
mean admitting yet another embarrassing mistake of foreign policy.
However,
this should provoke some serious questions. First, how is it that
the US Defense Secretary cannot visit a country that is one of his
government's chief recipients of aid without fearing for his life
from bin Laden’s terrorists? And why, even though his request
was denied, did bin Laden even imagine that Albania would shelter
him? These unsettling questions tell of a darker reality behind America’s
prime "ally" in the Balkans.
Without
exception, all of the other Balkan neighbors fear and hate Albania,
with its American support and military aid, and its increasingly militant
Islamic nature. Although it’s hard to gauge to what extent radical
Islam has propelled the quest for a "Greater Albania," there
is no question that religion is now a key factor in uniting the fractious
Albanian groups – Kosovars, Gegs
and Tosks – who never liked each other much before 1990, and
who probably would never have developed strong feelings of unity,
without the imposition of the kind of radical Islam championed by
Osama bin Laden. It’s sad to say that the nurturing of radical
Islam in the Balkans may prove to be America’s most lasting contribution
to the region.
