Thirteen colonies fought off one of the most powerful,
expansive and brutal empires in the history of the world in the late 18th
century, creating a new nation based on anti-imperial principles and the notion
that people have a right to self-determination. For about a hundred years, the
United States, whatever its faults and unwise excursions, stuck fairly closely
to the tenets of its founders – most importantly, the principles of peace and
nonintervention.
In the late 19th century, the philosophy of imperialism began to take
root, but it was kept at bay by a rich American tradition and pervasive ideology
of nonintervention, largely embraced by both political parties and most national
politicians.
Many scholars believe that the Spanish-American War was the first step on the
road to empire. A little over a century later, we see that the sacrifice of
nonintervention as a policy has brought the United States into a state of perpetual
war, including its engagement in the two World Wars, the Cold War, Korea and
Vietnam, as well as smaller disastrous and bloody interventions throughout Latin
America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, culminating in the global
war on terror that we now see, which the War Party assures us will last our
entire lives and never fully succeed in destroying the vague metaphorical enemy "terror." The Bush administration has been arrogantly aggressive
and frighteningly reckless in its engagement of the War on Terror, and, unfortunately,
Bush's most likely replacement
appears to be equally hawkish, notwithstanding any insincere and superficially
moderate rhetoric he might spout about "leading alliances" and planning
to "win the peace."
Some hawks refer to ours as a benevolent empire; others deny that it is an
empire at all. To understand the issue, we need some sort of analysis of whether
or not the United States has in fact become an empire; whether or not, if it
has become an empire, this is a good thing; and whether or not the U.S. government
has so far succeeded or failed in the ostensibly laudable foreign policy goals
of which the American interventionists speak so highly. It would also be good
to know how U.S. foreign policy has unfolded into its current form, what costs
America has incurred in its wars, and what history might teach us about the
present and future state of global affairs.
Ivan
Eland's new book, The
Empire Has No Clothes: U.S. Foreign Policy Exposed (Oakland, Calif..: The
Independent Institute, 2004), addresses all these questions well in its
nonpartisan critique and history of failed U.S. interventions over the last
century. Perhaps most importantly, it addresses the question: Is the U.S. an
empire?
Well, not to split hairs, but it depends on what your definition of "empire"
is. Eland explains the distinctions between different empires and different
definitions of the term, drawing upon the competing definitions offered by various
scholars. Perhaps formally, America is not technically an empire in the narrowest
sense of the word. It doesn't resemble all modern empires in every manner: "The
American empire – with its alliances and military bases spanning the entire
globe – most closely resembles Sparta in the 400s BCE, before and during the
Peloponnesian War." (29)
In other words, the United States is definitely a warfare state with hegemonic
designs and tendencies. All that remains of the controversy is whether this
is good or not. If the goal is to impose democracy throughout the world, Eland
shows that the United States has more often than not been unsuccessful, and
has, in fact, frequently intervened in ways quite contrary to this supposed
goal. Surely, the two World Wars didn't make the world as safe for democracy
as advertised. And since then, we have seen "the Eisenhower administration's
CIA-sponsored coup against the more independent Mohammed Mossadegh to restore
the more U.S.-friendly Pahlevi dynasty in Iran; … the Nixon administration's
CIA-sponsored coup against the newly elected socialist Allende government in
Chile" and other foreign policy adventures that, whatever else one can
say about them, undermined democratically elected governments. (31) Moreover,
imposing self-rule from the top down is self-contradictory.
Interventionists often counter that, in spite of its missteps, the U.S. government
must maintain a permanent war footing for its own security. Eland discredits
these assertions, showing clearly how it is U.S. intervention that has incited
terrorist attacks on Americans in and out of America. He also does an impressive
job blowing holes in the "democratic peace theory" espoused by so
many intellectual hawks, showing that, on top of the U.S. government's counterproductive
and failed attempts to institute democracy by force, the theory itself is deeply
flawed: "Sometimes democracies behave more aggressively than oligarchies
and dictatorships. … In fact, democratic Athens was more aggressive than oligarchic
Sparta. … As the Athenians assembled a powerful force to conquer Melos, the
Melians attempted to make a moral case for peace. The Athenians slaughtered
all the men, sold the women and children into slavery, and colonized the island."
Eland goes on to give other, more recent, examples – from the War of 1812 to
the American Civil War, from the "British atrocities during the Boer War
in South Africa" to "the Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1947 and
1981" – to show that democracies, few and new as they are, have often been
aggressive both toward each other and toward non-democratic states. (40-41)
The U.S. government has also largely failed to impose free markets, in the
real sense of the term, and to establish order, stability, and humanitarian
aid in nearly all of its foreign military endeavors. Even taking as a given
the disparate goals of interventionists from across the political spectrum –
whether they are encouraging free trade with Europe or bringing aid and stability
to Somalia and Haiti – U.S. imperialism has had very few successes.
"Conservatives should be against Empire," writes Eland, because unnecessary
foreign entanglements and interventions lead to a poorer economy. Seeing as
how "the United States accounts for nearly 40 percent of the world's military
spending but only about 30 percent of global GDP," the U.S. government
is milking taxpayers dry for a destructive foreign policy that transfers wealth
from Americans to defend foreigners, and yet has done this altruistic act incompetently,
to say the least. (105) The U.S. warfare state has frequently fostered nationalization
of the economy, attacks on economic liberty, and confiscatory levels of taxation.
Inevitably, war equals big government, which conservatives claim to oppose.
"Liberals should be against Empire" because leftist humanitarian
missions are almost always total failures, they make matters worse, and, indeed,
they usually involve ulterior motives. "For example, the Spanish-American
War was justified on the grounds of freeing Cubans from Spanish aggression.
Yet Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico did not achieve genuine independence
after the war. In fact, in Puerto Rico, the United States replaced an autonomous,
elected government with press censorship and military rule." (132-133)
More recently, we have seen Clinton's intervention in Kosovo yield disastrous
results: "[I]n the year before the NATO bombing campaign, the number of
Kosovar Albanians killed by Serbs was only about 2,500. In contrast, during
the eleven weeks of Allied bombing, with no longer anything to lose, the Serbs
slaughtered 10,000 Kosovar Albanians." (140) Eland also shows how, in addition
to their failures abroad, foreign interventions lead to erosions of civil liberties
at home, which liberals claim to oppose.
Indeed, as Eland points out, "all Americans should be against Empire."
As a result of a century of aggressive foreign interventions, America has an
imperial presidency, a seriously injured constitutional structure with Congress
no longer serving to curb the Executive power, blowback terrorism, and more
war and clumsy interventions, bound to fail, all to reverse the problems of
past interventions.
Eland touches on numerous important and subtle points in The
Empire Has No Clothes. He exposes how, in spite of rhetorical
differences, Republican and Democratic administrations have had nearly identical
foreign policies of failure and aggression throughout the years. He explains
how U.S. intervention in World War I paved the way for global despotism in the
20th century and the horrendous bloodshed of World War II. He punctures
the ludicrous myth that Americans are attacked because of their freedoms, laying
out "the fact that other Western nations have free societies – both politically
and economically – but are much less threatened … than the United States,"
mainly because of differences in foreign policy. (196) Americans must realize
that "empires have always been hated. This was as true of the Spaniards
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as it was of the Americans and Soviets
in the twentieth century." (209)
Eland also takes on the military industrial complex, widespread mythologies
surrounding the Cold War, and the very concept of nation building. Most importantly,
Eland outlines a sane, reasonable American foreign policy of peace and nonintervention,
rather than the bullying and global policing that has made America poorer and
more vulnerable, with very little to show for it in terms of international successes.
Of course, the author discusses the War on Terror and the Iraq war as well.
Eland documents how, "having created a monster" in Iran, "the
United States, in an attempt to cage it … create[d] another one" in the
form of Saddam Hussein. "To contain Iran, the United States, although ostensibly
neutral in the war, secretly helped Saddam win" by providing "Iraq
with key intelligence, military planning, and billions of dollars in loans."
As an even more chilling modern example of a "cure being worse than the
original problem": "[In] a U.S. attempt to entrap the Soviet Union
in an unimportant backwater … the Carter administration aided the radical Mujahadeen
opponents of the Soviet-supported Afghan government. … Unintentionally, the
United States helped train and fund those who attacked the USS Cole,
the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and, of course, the World Trade Center
and Pentagon on September 11, 2001." (89-90)
But Eland's book goes beyond our most immediate foreign policy debacles and
threats, and far beyond the fleeting trivial non-controversy represented in
the "choice" offered to American voters this year. Transcending partisan
biases and trivialities and modern misconceptions, Eland puts current international
crises in historical, economic, and philosophical context. The
Empire Has No Clothes is a must read, accessible and useful to
readers across the ideological spectrum, and its lasting importance will be
equally compelling regardless of which interventionist candidate of whichever
faction of the War Party wins the election this Nov. 2.