The Queen, a film directed by Stephen Frears
with Helen Mirren in an Oscar-winning performance as Britain's Queen Elizabeth
II, is meant to be the cinematic account of the composed well, chilly response
by the queen to the death of Princess Diana in a car crash in a Paris tunnel
in 1997, which enraged the hysterical British masses.
But, in fact, the movie is about the way Prime Minister Tony Blair ends up
saving the monarchy. The head of the New Labor government (played by Michael
Sheen) explains to Her Majesty that she needs to contain the threatening populist
wave by demonstrating to her subjects that she feels their pain.
Blair's political instincts put him at odds with his wife and advisers, who
spurn the Royals. But the savvy PM understands that if you start questioning
the legitimacy of the reign of the queen, you are in danger of sliding down
a dangerous slippery slope that could threaten all of Britain's traditional
institutions. Hence, by helping to save the monarchy, Blair is really protecting
the interests of the entire British establishment. If Blair was seen by many
as being responsible for saving Queen Elizabeth II, the conventional wisdom
in Washington now is that former United States Secretary of State James Baker
has taken it upon himself to save U.S. Iraq policy, and by extension, the political
fortunes of President George W. Bush.
Baker, a longtime personal friend and political ally of the Bush dynasty, has
been appointed by Congress as co-chair of the Iraq Study Group (ISG), a high-level
panel of prominent former officials charged by Congress with taking a fresh
look at America's policy on Iraq.
His panel, which is co-chaired by former Democratic representative Lee H. Hamilton
is scheduled to issue its report some time after the 2006 midterm elections.
And everyone in the U.S. capital the Bush administration, Congress, the media
are now holding their breath waiting for the words of wisdom to be dispensed
by the U.S. capital's ultimate wise man.
In a way, if Baker succeeds in drawing up constructive ideas for getting the
U.S. out of the quagmire in Mesopotamia, he will not only be protecting America's
geo-strategic position and saving the political legacy of Bush the Second; he
will also be helping to save that very elusive creature, the American establishment.
"The Establishment," according to Wikipedia, is a slang term, popularized
in the 1960s and 1970s to refer to the "traditional ruling class elite
and the structures of society they control."
Many Americans, who pride themselves on a relatively open political and economic
system ("My child could grow up to be president"), insist that, unlike
Britain and Europe, the U.S. doesn't have such a rigid political ruling class.
Conspiracy theorists imagine that decisions in Washington, especially when
it comes to issues of war and peace, are made by the members of a small cabal
associated with the Pentagon, the big corporations, the Council on Foreign Relations,
and the Trilateral Commission.
The reality is, as the developments leading to the war in Iraq have demonstrated,
the major decisions in U.S. foreign policy are made by a relatively small elite
of policymakers, led by the White House and shaped by powerful bureaucrats,
lawmakers, lobbies, and pundits.
While these influential political players include Republicans and Democrats,
conservatives and liberals, they all seem to share a common interest in the
aftermath of the Cold War in maintaining U.S. global political, economic, and
If anything, the war in Iraq and its aftermath have exposed a debate among
leading members of this establishment.
On the one hand, realist internationalists such as James Baker, Zbigniew Brzezinski,
and other public figures with ties to the administrations of Bill Clinton and
George H.W. Bush have argued that the U.S.' leading position in the world and
the Middle East can be secured only by playing a leadership role in multilateral
structures and through cooperation with allies.
On the other hand, neoconservative ideologues
such as Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle and their patrons (George W. Bush,
Richard Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld) have advocated a unilateralist diplomatic and
military strategy to protect American global hegemony.
This has been a dispute over means, not goals, between those members of the
American establishment who are willing to permit allies to set some constraints
on U.S. policies in order to achieve core American interests, and those who
argue that the American Gulliver cannot allow himself to be constrained by the
weak and useless Lilliputians who are bound to follow him if he only projects
his power. The 9/11 terrorist attacks provided an opportunity for the neoconservatives
to apply their preferred strategy in the Middle East and worldwide.
And for a while, in the aftermath of the initial military victories in Afghanistan
and Iraq, it seemed as though the realist internationalists such as Baker and
Brzezinski had lost the debate and were being marginalized within the establishment.
But the failure of the unilateralist U.S. project in Iraq and the Middle East
no weapons of mass destruction and no Saddam-Osama ties; the anti-occupation
violence and the civil war; continuing opposition from regional partners and
international players and rising anti-American sentiment have made it clear
that the neoconservatives are the ones losing the debate and gradually being
Ironically, the invasion of Iraq coupled with the ensuing effort to export
American values to the Middle East exposed the major threat that neoconservatism
posed to the American establishment by strengthening the forces that challenge
U.S. primacy Iran and its Shi'ite allies in Iraq and Lebanon, Syria, and the
radical Hamas in Palestine while eroding America's ability to resolve the
nuclear crises with North Korea and Iran and manage its relationships with great
powers like the European Union, Russia, and China. The most important concern
of the American establishment is the impact that a disastrous outcome of the
war in Iraq would have on the attitudes of the American public toward continuing
the U.S.' leadership role in the world.
A costly U.S. defeat in Iraq followed by the collapse of that country, a bloody
civil war, and possible intervention by outside regional players could devastate
America's position in the Middle East and produce pressure from voters to reduce,
and perhaps even end, the expansive American military engagement in the region,
followed by similar demands to reassess U.S. intervention in other parts of
the world. And that kind of rising isolationist sentiment could challenge the
core beliefs and interests of the American establishment, whose members Republicans
and Democrats alike continue to regard Washington as the modern-day Rome,
the central and dominant player in the global system.
Moreover, all the major potential presidential contenders in 2008, including
Democrat Hillary Clinton and Republican John McCain, supported the decision
to go to war in Iraq, and a devastating blow to that undertaking could strengthen
the position of antiwar, populist figures in both parties who might decide to
join the race to the White House.
Indeed, savvy Democrats like Hillary Clinton recognize that if one starts questioning
the decision to go to war in Iraq, the next thing you know, doubts arise about
the central tenets of U.S. foreign policy. Before you know it, the American
public is sliding on a dangerous slippery slope, a process that could threaten
the entire American establishment.
So it is not surprising that Baker and Hamilton,
two traditional realist internationalists, are being called to the rescue by
the Hillary Clintons and John McCains of Washington.
According to some reports, the ISG will probably draw the outlines of a plan
similar to a Bosnia-like partition of Iraq, providing wide political autonomy
to the Shi'ite south, the Kurdish north, and the Sunni area, including arrangements
to divide the country's energy resources among the three regions.
Baker and his colleagues are also expected to call for U.S. negotiations with
Iran and Syria as part of an effort to involve other regional players in securing
the stability of Iraq, and the launching of an international initiative to resolve
the other critical Middle East problems: Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, and the
Iran nuclear crisis.
Both Democrats and Republicans hope that the adoption of such a plan by Washington
would create the conditions for gradual withdrawal of American troops from Iraq
as Iraqi military and police forces provide security and make it possible to
begin the economic reconstruction of that country.
In that context, such a process coupled with progress in the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process, the integration of Hezbollah into Lebanon's political system,
and the possible transformation of Iran into a responsible regional and international
actor could mark the beginning of the end of the Bush administration's neoconservative-driven
strategy and a return to the more "Empire-Lite" approach that had
been advanced by presidents Clinton and Bush Sr.
The U.S. would be able to maintain a leadership position in the Middle East
by working with global powers (EU, Russia, and China) and regional allies (Turkey,
the moderate Arab states, and Israel) while co-opting rivals like Iran and Syria
and trying to bring peace to the Holy Land, Lebanon, and Iraq. But it's quite
possible that it is getting too late to save American positions in the Middle
The Bush administration may have unleashed powerful, destructive forces in
the Middle East that cannot be restrained and contained anymore. It may be impossible
to close Pandora's box.
At the same time, other global players, such as the EU and Russia, may not
have enough incentive to help Washington stabilize its position in that region
and may prefer to leave the U.S. twisting in the wind.
And one cannot dismiss the possibility that even if the Baker commission presents
a realistic plan for Iraq, President Bush will not be ready to change the course.
After all, Tony Blair was able to save Queen Elizabeth II only because she wanted
to protect the British monarchy and establishment. Is Bush ready to be saved
by Baker? Inquiring minds in the American establishment want to know.
Copyright © 2006 Singapore Press Holdings Ltd. All rights reserved.