As the “failure” or “partial success” of an apparent atomic bomb by North Korea reverberates around the world, with many automatically judging the test a failure, ignored is the Bush administration’s concept of “usable nukes,” or “mini-nukes." The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea may have just tested its own mini-nuke, which would be the ultimate deterrent to neoconservative aggression. Labeling the test a failure buys the Republican Party more time politically by implying that Bush can stop the development of North Korea’s nuclear program before it is a serious threat to American interests – and delaying the revelation of yet another neoconservative foreign policy disaster until after the midterm elections.
The Argument for “Failure”
Early nuclear bomb program designs are virtually always assumed to be gun-type fission weapons. This design, though inefficient, is by far the easiest to build. They are so easy to build that the United States dropped the first one on Hiroshima without a field test. It has been suggested that North Korea had a working design 15 years ago and has been making improvements ever since. In an interview on The Daily Show with John Stewart, former secretary of state James Baker said North Korea "had a crude nuclear device even when I was Secretary of State." If the bomb is a uranium gun-type fission bomb, it would require a minimum of 20 kg of highly enriched uranium and would produce a minimum five-kiloton explosion if successful. The first nuclear test by any country is, for unknown reasons, assumed to be five kilotons or larger. If the blast in North Korea was less than one kiloton, and indeed a gun-type nuclear device, it would suggest the probability of a dud, where the chain reaction was not sustained. There is also the strong possibility that the device is a more dangerous type of bomb – a plutonium-based implosion bomb theoretically capable of fitting on one of the DPRK’s many threatening missiles, and small enough to be "usable" on a battlefield.
Theories
Several theories have been put forward to describe the small size of North Korea’s first nuclear test. The general consensus is failure, though the reported size of the blast, depending on the anonymous official quoted (or not), is anywhere from an equivalent of 200 tons of TNT, to 500 tons or more. This variation, and the tendency of news agencies to quote a middle figure, suggests that accurate intelligence about the nature of the blast is sparse. Here are some current leading theories:
(1) The yield could be higher than claimed – up to the level of the Hiroshima bomb, as Russian sources have said. The U.S. government and its allies could be trying to minimize the political fallout, hoping the American electorate won’t realize the full extent of the damage caused by an intentional failure of diplomacy. Moreover, the Bush administration’s refusal to hold direct talks is likely tied to its support of wasteful spending on a missile-defense system that won’t work, imperiling the American people and those within striking distance of Kim Jong-Il’s substantial missile capability. The cost to U.S. taxpayers will be partially offset by the many countries that will purchase the American/Japanese technology and hardware to satisfy their own state-terrorized citizens and domestic neoconservatives.
(2) Estimates could falsely indicate a small yield, given the unpredictability of seismic measurement due to differences in geology between known desert test sites and unfamiliar mountain caves in Korea.
(3) It could be that the bomb “fizzled," or failed to sustain a full chain reaction. The bomb could have malfunctioned as a result of poor design and limited experience. At first this seems the most reasonable explanation, considering the size of the blast, but it relies on an assumption that North Korea is not capable of creating a properly designed bomb after 15 years of development. With the aid of A.Q. Kahn, the father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb, North Korea is likely to have extensive bomb-making know-how, experience, raw materials, and hardware.
In addition, China was informed about the test less than an hour in advance, which indicates a level of confidence bordering on certainty. What if it failed completely? It would have been politically safer to announce that the test would go ahead soon, then wait for the successful test before saying anything more.
It is also possible that a difficult and more sophisticated larger-yield design was tested to gain maximum nuclear knowledge to offset the diplomatic risk and cost. This would be considered a technical failure, but still a tremendous breakthrough. Rumors have also circulated about a North Korean thermonuclear bomb – an extremely unlikely worse-than-worst-case scenario.
(4) The yield is intentionally small. This is a likely scenario for several reasons: Estimates on the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the DPRK are based on suspected plutonium stock from fuel rods extracted from DPRK reactors. The gun-type bombs mentioned above can only be made with uranium-235 – not plutonium-239. North Korea is believed to have enriched unknown quantities of uranium, so it is possible the test is a gun-type bomb, but the apparent focus on, and desire for, plutonium suggests a different bomb design – the more challenging, efficient, lighter, potentially smaller, yet maybe much more destructive – missile-mountable implosion design. North Korea is believed to possess enough plutonium for four to 13 bombs.
A plutonium-based implosion bomb can be made much smaller than a gun-type atomic bomb – even shoulder-fired in advanced programs (see the Nuclear Posture Review for notes on mini-nukes). Primitive gun-type bombs or large, primitive implosion bombs would be unusable due to their size and weight and would be unlikely to achieve anything but a show – which is also a possibility. The test may have been carried out in response to the threat of military action by the U.S. If this is true, North Korea needed to test a bomb that works outside the mineshaft, probably one that sits nicely atop a medium-range missile, for maximum effect. A smaller plutonium-implosion weapon would do just that, even in the early stages of a successful nuclear program. A small, usable bomb is the worst-case scenario for the enemies of the DPRK and would apply significantly more pressure on the international community than an undeliverable larger bomb, even if the motive was to secure concessions of food and supplies for the Korean winter.
Another explanation for the low yield is that there may simply be too little plutonium to waste on a mineshaft before a U.S. election, with neoconservatives on the loose and constantly looking for a confrontation.
What’s Next?
Neoconservatives and other hawks maintain that Kim Jong-Il is a madman whose goal is to acquire a nuclear arsenal and ICBMs to obliterate American cities, perhaps to punish Hollywood for making the movie Team America: World Police. Hawks always project what they would do – needlessly slaughter millions of innocent people in the name of job security – onto others. A more logical course for Kim Jong-Il would be to only use nuclear weapons on military targets, only in self-defense, and never on the Korean Peninsula, since North Korea desires a unified Korea where wealth can be “transferred” to the North. The North is also capable of defeating the South with conventional and chemical weapons, though food and fuel shortages in the hermit kingdom might be the determining factor in a war. Unfortunately, both Kim Jong-Il and George Bush have the personalities, views, and policies that could lead to the Korean War resuming in earnest – this time with nukes.
The nukes would be best suited to maintaining air supremacy over the peninsula by attacking U.S. carrier divisions and airfields in Japan or any other country in range. Since World War II, air supremacy has led to victory in many conflicts. An onslaught of conventional and small nuclear missiles could break through the considerable defenses of the U.S. Navy and inflict serious losses on each carrier group in range. Diplomacy and isolationism are starting to look really good – they have for a long time, but sadly, the neocons have other plans…
The real goal of the Bush administration’s Korea policy might be to create a "situation" and a need for missile defense. Republican House Majority Leader John Boehner wasted no time campaigning: “This reckless move by North Korea, coupled with their attempted missile test in early July, highlights the importance of a U.S. missile-defense shield capable of protecting America against madmen with weapons of mass destruction.” Two things are wrong with this statement: The missile shield is unlikely to ever shoot down anything but civilian aircraft, and while the American people need protection, it is from America’s elected madmen who would unleash economic mass destruction on the entire world. Boehner continued, “It is time for Democrats to recognize the need for missile-defense technologies and abandon their long-standing policy of voting against missile-defense programs.” Removing neoconservative Republicans and hawkish Democrats on Nov. 7 would be a far better defense against tyranny and totalitarianism.
