After Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called
in October 2005 for an end to the state of Israel, Israeli leaders began stepping
up talk of an "existential threat" to the country.
Likud Party leader Binyamin Netanyahu, who is now forming a new government,
has even used it support his argument that the Iranian president is threatening
a new "holocaust" against Jews.
Serious Israeli and Iranian analysts of Iran's national security policy,
however, have long viewed similar statements by Iranian leaders and its assistance
to Hamas and Hezbollah as having nothing to do with ending the Israeli state,
much less using military force to destroy it.
The Iranian condemnation of Israel and embrace of the Palestinian cause, according
to these analysts, have been largely a strategic ploy to turn Arab public opinion
against the Sunni regimes' policies of hostility toward Iran.
Shlomo Ben-Ami, who was Israel's foreign minister and minister of public
security from 1999 to 2001, observed in a lecture in Bologna in November 2007
that Iranian policy toward Israel has been misunderstood. Iran has been "more
an enemy of an Israeli-Arab reconciliation than of Israel as such," said
The U.S.-sponsored Oslo peace framework, which involved an Arab-Israeli peace
process, was a "nightmare" for Iran, Ben-Ami explained. "For
the Iranians, the best way to protect their regime," said Ben-Ami, "is
by rallying the masses in the Arab world against the leaders who are selling
out the interests of the Palestinians and the Muslims' most precious assets
in Jerusalem to the Jews."
Iran began to step up its anti-Israeli rhetoric and to reach out to the Palestinian
armed resistance group Hamas for the first time in response to the Oslo peace
process of the 1990s. Prior to Oslo, Iran had only minimal contact with Palestinian
resistance groups, according to Trita Parsi, author of Treacherous
Alliance, the most authoritative account of Iran-Israel relations.
Ben-Ami noted that Iran had no direct political dispute with Israel. The Israeli
threat to attack Iran's nuclear facilities in recent years, however, has
introduced a new factor in the equation.
University of Tehran professor Hossein Seifzadeh, who is now a fellow at the
Middle East Institute in Washington, agrees that Iran believed it had to play
the Islamic card which meant the anti-Israel card in the Middle East, in
order to gain a more favorable image among the populations of Sunni Arab states.
Iran's anti-Israel rhetoric and support for Hamas and Hezbollah has been a
successful exercise in public diplomacy in the Arab world, according to Seifzadeh.
In an interview with IPS, he said, "The whole image of Iran in the Middle
East has changed. Ten years ago, Iran was regarded simply as a Shia state."
Because of his high profile position on Israel and the Palestinians, however,
Ahmadinejad has now become "the most popular figure in the Middle East,"
according to Seifzadeh.
Another objective of Ahmadinejad's anti-Israel rhetoric appears to be
to reduce domestic Iranian opposition to possible negotiations with the United
States. Rejection of reaching agreement with the United States had been a red
line in Iranian politics prior to Ahmadinejad's presidency.
According to an Iran specialist who participated in a private meeting with
Ahmadinejad during his October 2007 visit to the United Nations, Ahmadinejad
explained his anti-Israel rhetoric as necessary to make an opening to the United
States acceptable politically in Iran.
The analyst, who asked not to be identified because the meeting was off the
record, quoted Ahmadinejad as saying, "I can't open up to the United
States unless I create an enemy who is even worse than the United States."
When asked if he couldn't have chosen to make Russia the enemy instead
of Israel, Ahmadinejad replied, "No, that wouldn't work," according
to the analyst.
That private comment is consistent with the ironic fact that the ultra-nationalist
Ahmadinejad has gone farther than any previous Iranian leader in publicly expressing
a willingness to negotiate with the United States provided that Washington
signals an end to its hostility toward the Islamic Republic.
But his own right-wing conservative and ultra-nationalist political constituency
has been strongly opposed in the past to a political agreement with the "Great
Satan." Ratcheting up the anti-Israel rhetoric was a way for Ahmadinejad
to reduce the political risk of such negotiations.
Dr. Hooshang Amirahmadi, a professor at Rutgers University and president of
the American Iranian Council, who has brought Iranian officials and former
U.S. officials together for informal discussions, said in an interview that
he would not be surprised at such a statement by Ahmadinejad. The Iranian president
has been eager to open talks with the United States, he said, adding, "His
concern with domestic politics has made him seem more radical on Israel than
he really is."
Conservative editor and political strategist Amir Mohebbian, a longtime supporter
of Ahmadinejad, referred to Iran's two-level policy toward Israel in an
interview in Tehran last December.
"As a slogan, Iran says we can't accept the reality of Israel,"
Mohebbian said, "but we have slogans and we have action. There is a difference
between the two."
Mohebbian, who no longer supports Ahmadinejad as the conservative candidate
in the next election, said a U.S.-Iran accord could "help the United States
solve the Israel-Palestinian issue," suggesting that Iran is ready to
sacrifice its public policy on ending the state of Israel as part of a settlement
with the United States that takes the pressure off the Islamic Republic.
Iranian financial and military support for Hezbollah and Hamas are portrayed
by Israel and the United States as evidence of the desire to eliminate the
state of Israel. Beginning around 1999, Iran gave Hezbollah thousands of rockets
that could be fired into Israel in case of an Israeli attack on either Lebanon
or Iran but not for offensive use by Hezbollah. The rockets were regarded by
Israel as a key element of the Iranian deterrent to U.S. or Israeli attack
on Iran's nuclear facilities.
But Iran's May 2003 secret proposal for U.S.-Iran negotiations on the
full range of issues appeared to propose to trading away Iranian support for
Hezbollah and Hamas as part of a broader negotiated agreement. It proposed
as a negotiating point "action on Hezbollah to become a mere political
organization within Lebanon" and "acceptance of the Arab League Beirut
declaration" (the Saudi proposal for a two-state solution in Israel-Palestine).
It also offered a "stop of any material support to Palestinian opposition
groups [Hamas, Jihad, etc.] from Iranian territory" and "pressure
on these organizations to stop violent action against civilians within borders
The proposed deal thus converted Iran's anti-Israel policy into negotiating
Every Iranian president since Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's death in
1989, including Ahmadinejad, has given itself such negotiating flexibility
by saying that Iran would support whatever solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict was acceptable to the Palestinians.
In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week, former
U.S. Ambassador Frank Wisner recounted a conversation some years ago with then
President Mohammad Khatami, in which he asked Khatami whether he realized how
dangerous Iran's arming Hezbollah could be in inviting a war with Israel and
possibly the United States.
Khatami answered, "You've got to remember we plan our defenses along
external lines," Wisner recalled. "We're trying to keep you from
putting your hand on our throat."
(Inter Press Service)