Sunnis and Shi'ites are now sliding toward a civil
war, and the Bush administration has shown no interest in trying to avert
it. With Congress
growing increasingly restless over the absence of an administration exit
strategy, opponents of the occupation could take the offensive by offering a
clear alternative policy of using U.S. influence to encourage a Sunni-Shi'ite
peace settlement.
The Bush administration hopes that the media will continue to reassure Americans
that it is working to head off civil war by including the Sunnis in the coming
negotiations on drafting a new constitution. But those negotiations will not
settle the fundamental Sunni-Shi'ite power struggle. Neither Shi'ites nor Sunnis
believe that a constitution alone will determine the distribution of power in
Iraq. Each side views Iraqi politics as a zero-sum game with the organs of state
repression as the key to power.
Thus, the primary arena for defining the power relationship between the two
sides is the struggle over control of the military, the intelligence agencies,
and the secret police. In that contest, there is little space for an accommodation
between two factions sharing a political culture that is Hobbesian rather than
Jeffersonian. But the Bush administration has made no effort to work on creating
a solution that would reassure both sides.
Instead, it has exerted its power to put the key elements of the repressive
apparatus of the state under former Ba'athist foes of the Shi'ites. Almost as
soon as the policy of "de-Ba'athification" was initiated by the Bush
administration in May 2003, the CIA
began recruiting former Saddamist military and secret police officers to
help track down insurgent leaders and ultimately to support
the destabilization of Iran. But the "re-Ba'athification" policy
accelerated in spring 2004 when the administration realized that militant Shi'ites
with close ties to the Iranian mullahs would
probably win the direct elections.
The secret police organization organized by the CIA was led by a former
Ba'athist who had collaborated with the CIA to overthrow Saddam, and staffed
primarily with Sunnis from the old regime. The administration used interim
prime minister and longtime
CIA asset Iyad Allawi to place
ex-Ba'athists in key military, interior ministry, and intelligence
posts and to bring the Shi'ite-controlled de-Ba'athification campaign to
a virtual halt. During the three months of negotiations on the formation of
a government, U.S. officials pressured the Shi'ite leaders both privately
and publicly
to abandon plans to purge these Ba'athists from security organs. The CIA
refused to relinquish its control over the Iraqi secret police organization
or the files left behind by Saddam's secret police to the new government.
Instead of trying to find a solution that would reduce tensions between the
two communities, the Bush administration exacerbated the problem by pushing
for ex-Ba'athist domination of much of the international security apparatus.
In doing so, they were nudging the Sunnis and Shi'ites toward civil war.
Opponents of the war have not focused on the administration's hostility toward
peace in Iraq, largely because of the popular belief that it is impossible to
negotiate with dozens of unknown guerrilla leaders who have no political demands.
Last week, however, the former
electricity minister in the interim government, Aiham Alsammarae, revealed
that he had been meeting with leaders of two insurgent groups, the Islamic Army
and the Mujahedin Army, which he said are interested in negotiating with both
American and Iraqi officials about ending the armed conflict in return for withdrawal
of U.S. troops and meeting other Sunni political demands. Then, a spokesman
for the new prime minister confirmed that the government, too, has had "preliminary
contacts" with "some insurgent groups." In a later
interview, Alsammarae said the two groups were close to appointing representatives
to meet with the government.
The real problem is not that it is impossible to negotiate with insurgent leaders
but that the Bush administration does not want the negotiations to include the
issue of U.S. withdrawal. Publicly, the administration continues to reiterate
its commitment to an indefinite occupation. And Anglican Canon Andrew P. B.
White, who met with Shi'ite and Sunni leaders earlier this year with Pentagon
encouragement, told me in April he was not permitted to discuss the possibility
of a U.S. military withdrawal as part of a peace agreement in his discussions
with Sunnis.
This refusal to negotiate over withdrawal reinforces the inclination of hardline
Shi'ite leaders to reject compromise with the Sunni insurgents, and it will
certainly discourage many insurgents from joining the negotiations. It is another
way in which the Bush administration encourages the slide into civil war.
Given its broader interests in destabilizing Syria and Iran and its distrust
of the Shi'ite leaders, of course, the administration does not see such a war
as an unwelcome prospect. It would give the CIA opportunities to work with anti-Iranian
Sunnis and make it easier to check the power of the Shi'ites. Essentially, the
Bush strategy involves using Shi'ites, Sunnis, and Kurds to oppose the armed
resistance, while using Sunnis to counterbalance the Shi'ites.
Despite the cynicism of the Bush administration toward civil war, there
has been virtually no political debate on that issue. Many politicians
in both parties are still arguing the United States can't withdraw because it
would lead to a civil war. But that could change very quickly if opponents of
the war were to seize the opportunity to offer a clear alternative policy proposal
aimed at averting civil war in Iraq.
The alternative policy could require that the new Shi'ite-dominated government
offer to negotiate a reasonable political-military settlement with the Sunni
insurgents, including the laying down of arms by a large proportion of insurgent
organizations and an end to the occupation. It would also declare the U.S. readiness
to withdraw completely under such an agreement. If such an offer is not forthcoming
within a reasonable time, the policy would call for setting a timetable for
complete U.S. withdrawal. That policy would give the government a strong incentive
for crafting a realistic position and beginning a negotiating process. It would
also reinforce the tendency among Iraqi nationalists in the resistance to think
seriously about negotiating for an alternative to a long, bloody, and uncertain
war.
There is no guarantee that such a policy would prevent a civil war. At this
stage of Iraqi history, a peaceful settlement between newly empowered Shi'ites
and the beleaguered Sunnis may not be possible. But the Bush administration
policy promises to make U.S. troops part of a civil war for years to come. Opponents
of the Iraq adventure should be able to exploit that fact to pull the softest
segment of political support for the occupation in Congress away from the administration
and begin the inevitable process of unraveling of that support.