p>
Max
Weber must be smiling today, as his much-contested thesis on the Protestant
Work Ethic is proved once again in the arguments of those who support
a generalized American war against the Islamic world – as opposed to
a careful, ongoing hunt for Al-Qaeda terrorists. In pointing to the
political and economic backwardness of the countries we propose to
conquer as justification for war, these writers buck the multicultural
trend, suggesting that the cultures of Islamic countries are inferior,
stunted by their religiosity – why else would they be so poor? – and in
need of a "Reformation" and "Enlightenment."
And
there is something to what they say: Surely, the Moslems of Turkey
are better off in most ways than those of Kuwait or Saudi Arabia,
because the former enjoy a system which leaves religious practice
to individual choice. But secularizing revolutions such as Turkey's
are inevitably homegrown: No outside army or puppet guerrilla movement
imposed Kemal Atatürk's regime on the dying Ottoman Empire. In fact,
it emerged as part of a nationalist rebellion against Anglo-French
plans to carve up Asia Minor among the winning Allies after World
War I. (Some armchair warriors' plans to carve up Iraq come to mind....)
While
authoritarian in practice, Atatürk's regime made enormous strides
in modernizing Turkey and making space for prosperity and freedom,
without injuring the religious culture of its citizens.
True,
some fiercely illiberal regimes have been defeated and their nations
converted to liberalism under occupation: Imperial Japan and National
Socialist Germany, for instances. But each of those regimes was rooted
in a relatively recent seizure of power by a faction that claimed,
unjustly, to represent the nation's ancient traditions. (In Modern
Times, Paul Johnson demonstrates that the highly nationalist
Shinto promoted by Japan's militarists was in fact a 19th
century creation, like German Völkisch movement.)
Islam
runs deeper and stronger, and as the Turkish case suggests, can only
progress as a result of native developments that we cannot reliably
predict nor promote. I can find no instance of an Islamic nation that
has been successfully modernized and liberalized as a result of foreign
conquest. If we mobilize our nation for open-ended struggle against
the culture and religion of 1 billion Moslems, there is only one result
we can safely expect: the decline of personal freedom and economic
prosperity that always results when life is militarized. By extending
the "Warfare State" indefinitely into the future, we will perversely
be remaking our own society more in the image of those illiberal,
impoverished regimes we so rightly detest.
FIGHTING
THE NAZIS
This
profound insight permeated the works of the free-market economist
Wilhelm Röpke,
a key architect of the postwar
German economic "miracle." Röpke found refuge in Istanbul after
Nazi officials forced him into "early retirement" for having denounced
Hitler's new regime. (In fact, he'd been fighting the National Socialists
for years, spending his modest professor's salary to print anti-Nazi
election leaflets, which he handed out at the polls himself, warning
Germans not to return their country to "primeval darkness.") He left
Germany one step ahead of the Gestapo, and made his way to Istanbul.
Kemal
Atatürk was taking advantage of the exodus from Germany to build a
first-rate staff of exiled intellectuals at his new University of
Istanbul. Röpke's intimate friend and collaborator, Alexander Rüstow,
was already teaching there, working on his massive critique of illiberal
politics, Ortsbestimmung der Gegenwart (entitled Freedom
and Domination in the English version).1 Röpke was appointed Professor
of Economics, and founded The Institute for Social Sciences. The four
years Röpke spent on the Bosporus were productive ones, full of fellowship
with other German exiles. These included such notable thinkers as
Erich Auerbach – who wrote his majestic work of literary criticism,
Mimesis,
in Istanbul – and composer Paul
Hindemith, to name only the best known.2
FREEDOM
IN THE SHADOW OF MILITARISM
Röpke
had not always been a partisan of market liberalism. Like many idealistic
intellectuals of his time, he went through a youthful flirtation with
socialism. Appalled by the brutality, cynicism and regimentation imposed
upon German life by the Kaiser's regime and the war he waged, Röpke
saw in socialism a cogent, all-encompassing rejection of the corrupt
status quo – a system that had thrown millions of young men into
the trenches to no good purpose. As he recalled in later years:
"If
I was typical of those who went through the War in my wish to make
sure that it should not happen again, I think I was also typical in
the analysis I had made of it. We who were under a common obligation
to kill one another had a great deal more in common, too, and since
all of us on either side were roughly trained along the same lines,
our revulsion with war brought us pretty much to a single conclusion.
Our personal experience told us that a society capable of such monstrous
depravity must be thoroughly rotten. We had been educated just enough
to call this society 'capitalism.'
"...Our
protest against imperialism, militarism, and nationalism was a protest
against the prevailing economic and political system, which was a
feudal and capitalistic one. The protest and its attendant denial
made, the affirmation followed of itself: socialism."3
This
story is familiar to students of intellectual history. Our century
is littered with the names of men of brilliance in one field or another
who fell prey for a time to dangerous delusions in the realm of politics – out of idealism, ignorance, or disdain for bourgeois values. Most
were drawn to leftist versions of collectivism; a very incomplete
list includes W.H.
Auden, Stephen Spender, Pablo Picasso, Dalton Trumbo, Jean-Paul
Sartre and Jack London. Other modernist masters were drawn to the
far Right, such as Ezra
Pound, W.B. Yeats, T.S. Eliot, Charles Maurras, D.H. Lawrence,
Paul Claudel, Ernst Jünger and Georges Bernanos.
While
many of these thinkers quickly found their way out of these delusions,
others did not, and wasted their best years in pursuit of poisonous
utopias. Röpke, for his part, had emancipated his intellect well before
his 25th birthday. What moved him to secede from the tendencies of
his age? The particular stimulus that sent Röpke along another path
was reading the
work of Ludwig von Mises. In a talk given at the Mont Pelerin
Society four decades later, Röpke recounted Mises' influence as follows:
"[A]ll
the greater is the debt I owe him as a man who would be an entirely
different kind of economist and even of person, if, in the most formative
years of his life, he had not happened to come across a voluminous
book entitled Die Gemeinwirtschaft and later on, another book
bearing the title Theorie des Geldes und der Umlaufmittel....
[I]t was his book Nation,
Staat und Wirtschaft (1919) which set me on his track really
and which was in many ways the redeeming answer to the questions tormenting
a young man who had just come back from the trenches.... I would like
to stress, on the present occasion, how immense is my debt to Ludwig
von Mises for having rendered me immune, at a very early date, against
the virus of socialism with which most of us came back from the First
World War...."4
Röpke
was particularly devoted, even during his socialist period, to international
free trade – a divisive subject then and now. Looking at the pre-war
period, Röpke could see that the rise of economic nationalism had
prepared the way for the chauvinism and ensuing slaughter of the Great
War.5
THE MISERY OF
ARMY LIFE
Before
the breakdown of international relations, Europe enjoyed a period
Röpke considered the golden age of liberalism; the decades 1850 to
1895 saw a continent largely at peace, linked by cooperation in the
production of wealth, where national borders were permeated by the
free transfer of goods and currency, and producers and consumers of
many (even traditionally hostile) nationalities were knitted together
in a community of interest, the mutually profitable division of labor.
(Röpke was not of course blind to the many problems with the international
trading system of that era; but he would always insist on responding
to the known flaws of a proven system by reforming it, rather than
destroying it in favor of something untried.) With his trenchantly
logical mind, he could see that the attempts – increasingly popular
in the wake of the Great War – to transform nations into economically
self-sufficient entities and sever their remaining trade links could
only lead in one direction: towards mounting nationalism and another
monstrous war.
Röpke
further noted that, for all the internationalist rhetoric of the Bolsheviks
and other socialist movements, "nobody was immediately working for
world socialism." Whatever Marxist theory might prescribe about spontaneous
revolution taking place in many nations at once, rendering the nation-state
irrelevant, in fact leftist parties were trying to seize power in
particular territories, over which they must retain control and whose
economies they must coordinate – pending the global uprising, which
always promised to be just around the corner. In the meantime, they
must work – in Stalin's memorable phrase – for "socialism in one
country." Röpke grasped the import of this before many of his fellow-reformers:
"But
if socialism could only be achieved within a national framework, state
boundaries took on a new and primarily economic significance. Did
not the simplest logic make it clear that a socialist state, which
directed economic life within the nation, could not grant even so
much freedom to foreign trade as had the protective tariffs against
which we had protested? The deduction was this: there is only one
ultimate form of socialism, the national. With that, my generation
wanted nothing to do."6
But
here Röpke was mistaken. All too many members of Röpke's generation
were willing to embrace a nationalist socialism, in which the nationalist
element would gradually come to predominate over the original, wistful
fantasy of a working class solidarity that would render borders meaningless.
Of course, no one – least of all Röpke – would wish to equate the
humane idealists of the Social Democratic Party in Germany with the
National Socialist German Workers' (Nazi) Party or the German Communists.
But it is telling that parties with such vastly different agendas
could agree on one point: that the State, rather than private individuals
acting freely, should direct the flow of economic life.
This
told Röpke that all of these parties must be mistaken, and in the
same way. Albeit to different degrees and by different means, each
such collectivist philosophy elevated the State above the individual,
directing his economic activity – and thereby, the vast majority
of his time and effort – not by persuasion but by force. For Röpke,
this fact alone was devastating. As he recalled:
"Life
in the army had shown what it meant for the individual to exist as
part of an apparatus whose every function assumed lack of freedom
and unconditional obedience. ... [P]hysical degradation was also accompanied
by a spiritual one that worked to the total debasement of human dignity
in mass existence, mass feeding, mass sleep – that frightful soldier's
life in which a man was never alone and in which he was without resource
or appeal against the might (inhuman but wielded by man) that had
robbed him of his privacy."7
While
he would ultimately come to see some virtue in military life, Röpke
would never lose his disgust for the regimentation, anonymity and
depersonalization that military mobilization entails. Any philosophy
that proposed this wartime model for the whole of society in peacetime
was profoundly repugnant, both aesthetically and morally (indeed,
for the classically-minded Röpke, the two categories were never entirely
divorced).
Thus
from a rejection of nationalism and militarism, Röpke concluded that
he must reject any form of collectivist polity. As he came to believe:
"War
was simply the rampant essence of the state, collectivity let loose,
so was it not absurd to make one's protest against the dominance of
man over man take the form of collectivism? Not all the pacifist,
antimilitarist, and freedom-demanding statements of even the most
honest socialists could obscure the fact that socialism, if it was
to mean anything at all, meant accepting the state as Leviathan not
only for the emergency of war, but also for a long time to come."8