Fellow Antiwar.com columnists (and friends) Alan
Bock and Ivan Eland
have recently written about Pakistan, so I hope readers will forgive me for
piling on. But it's hard to ignore Pakistan at the moment. On Saturday, a truck
bomb killed more than 50 people including two U.S. Marines and the Czech
ambassador and injured several hundred others in an attack on Islamabad's
Marriott Hotel. In Peshawar on Monday, Afghanistan's
top diplomat was abducted by gunmen (his driver was killed in the ambush).
Also on Monday, Pakistani
troops reportedly fired warning shots at two U.S. helicopters that flew
into Waziristan from Afghanistan just a few days after Pakistani President
Asif Ali Zardari (the widower of assassinated former Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto) proclaimed,
"We will not tolerate the violation of our sovereignty and territorial
integrity by any power in the name of combating terrorism." Pakistani
Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas was a little more blunt: "In case it [a U.S.
cross-border raid] happens again in this form, that there is very significant
detection, where it is very definite, no ambiguity across the board, on the
ground or in the air: open fire."
Clearly, Pakistan presents a dilemma for the United States.
On the one hand, the Pakistani government previously under Pervez Musharraf
and now under Zardari claims to be an ally in the war on terrorism. Yet the
government is either unable or unwilling (or a combination of the two) to seriously
hunt down Osama bin Laden and other senior al-Qaeda leaders who flew the coop
in Afghanistan and are thought to be hiding out in Pakistan. In fact, even
though bin Laden and al-Qaeda were given safe harbor in Afghanistan by the
Taliban regime, taking up residence in Pakistan without the blessing of the
Pakistani government may be a better situation for al-Qaeda. The so-called
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
that comprise some 10,000 square miles (about the same size as Massachusetts)
are inhabited primarily by Pashtun tribes that are fiercely independent and
for all practical purposes not under control by the central government
in Islamabad. So bin Laden and company are relatively free to take refuge in
the FATA and likely have the sympathy (if not support) of many inhabitants.
Although the Pakistani government recently stepped up military operations
against militants in the North West Frontier
Province (NWFP), public support for such action is less than overwhelming.
Indeed, the Musharraf government was ousted at least in part because many
Pakistanis viewed the regime as simply doing America's bidding. So there are
real limits on what any government in Islamabad can accomplish. But does that
mean the United States should sit idly by, knowing that the perpetrators of
the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks are alive and well in Pakistan?
Full-scale military operations are certainly out of the question. The last
thing the United States needs to do is invade another Muslim country to lend
credence to the claim that we are waging a wider war against Islam. But the
kinds of military operations being staged are hardly helpful. To begin, over-reliance
on helicopter gunships and Predator drones demonstrates the U.S. fascination
with air power and high technology as solutions to every problem (it's as if
the U.S. military has seen too many movies and believes what Hollywood puts
up on the big screen such as the ending to Syriana).
Yet these are exactly the wrong kind of weapons needed for what amounts to
a good, old-fashioned, find-a-needle-in-a-haystack manhunt. As has been demonstrated
in Afghanistan, air strikes even if they are carefully targeted all too
often result in civilian casualties. The result is increased anti-American
sentiment and more sympathy and support for al-Qaeda and its ilk.
The more appropriate military action is to conduct discrete commando operations
against specific targets. Officially, Islamabad may not be able to openly sanction
covert U.S. military operations in Pakistan. However, unofficially, such actions
must be coordinated with the new Zardari government even if they have to
be publicly criticized and denounced by Zardari. But the key to conducting
such operations is reliable intelligence. Just as air strikes that kill civilians
are counterproductive, so are commando raids that hit the wrong target such
as the Sept.
3 raid in Musa Nika village in South Waziristan that resulted in 20 civilians
killed. The incursion was in response to a rocket attack on a convoy in Afghanistan,
but according to one Pakistani official, "By the time they got there the
guy with the rocket had moved."
There are no easy and clearly satisfactory solutions to the situation in
Pakistan. But this much should be clear: The United States must pay attention
to Pakistan and craft a workable counterterrorism policy, because the terrorist
threat to America there is real (for example, the UK
plot to use improvised liquid bombs to blow up U.S.-bound airlines had
links traced to Pakistan) unlike the phantom menace of Iraq.
SIDEBAR
Another issue with Pakistan is the roughly $1
billion per year in military aid provided by the United States. The original
intent of U.S. military aid to Pakistan through a program called Coalition
Support Funds created shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks was to reimburse
Pakistan for the cost of military operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
However, most of that money has been used to buy heavy arms, aircraft (including
U.S. F-16 fighter jets), and other equipment ill-suited for counterinsurgency
operations and more appropriate for a conventional war with India. This is
déjà vu all over again. Previously, the U.S. funneled
money to the mujahedeen to resist the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan via
Pakistan with very little oversight or accounting. The result was blowback
in the form of al-Qaeda. Now we're giving more money to Pakistan (with very
few questions asked) intended to fight al-Qaeda, but al-Qaeda may be growing
stronger in Pakistan because the money is being used to bolster Pakistan's
military strength vis-à-vis India.