Hallelujah! The International Atomic Energy Agency
has, once again, verified "the non-diversion of declared nuclear material
in Iran." It seems the Iranians continue to provide the IAEA access to
all "special nuclear materials" as proscribed by the Treaty
on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and all relevant nuclear material
accountancy reports, as well as access to all activities involving said materials.
So, let the dancing in the streets commence!
But wait a minute.
Even though compliance by Iran is the principal and only conclusion of the
report [.pdf] entitled Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 and 1747 in the
Islamic Republic of Iran the neo-crazy media sycophants at the New
York Times don't even mention it in their "report" on the
Well, if they don't even mention the IAEA report's principal conclusion that
Iran is compliant with its NPT Safeguards Agreement what do Elaine Sciolino
and William Broad report?
That Iran has not suspended its uranium-enrichment activies, "contrary
to the decisions of the Security Council"?
"VIENNA, Nov. 15 A new report says Iran has made new but incomplete
disclosures about its past nuclear activities, missing a key deadline under
an agreement with the IAEA."
Missed a "key deadline"?
Nowhere in the IAEA report does Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei even suggest
that Iran has missed a "key deadline" previously agreed to by Iran
and the IAEA. Furthermore, far from complaining about "incomplete disclosures,"
ElBaradei reported that Iran has provided "sufficient access" to individuals,
and has "responded in a timely manner" to questions, and provided
"clarifications and amplifications" on issues raised in the context
of the "work plan."
ElBaradei even reports not unfavorably the Iranian-supplied justification
for the secretive manner in which they have pursued the civilian nuclear power
fuel-cycle which both the IAEA
Statute and the NPT assure them is their inalienable right.
"According to Iran, in its early years, the Atomic Energy Organization
of Iran (AEOI) concluded a number of contracts with entities from France, Germany,
the United Kingdom and the United States of America to enable it to acquire
nuclear power and a wide range of related nuclear fuel cycle services, but after
the 1979 revolution, these contracts with a total value of around $10 billion
were not fulfilled.
"Iran noted that one of the contracts, signed in 1976, was for the development
of a pilot plant for laser enrichment.
"Senior Iranian officials said that, in the mid-1980s, Iran started working
with many countries to revitalize its nuclear programme to meet the State's
growing energy needs. Taking advantage of investments already made, Iran said
it focused its efforts initially on the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power
plant, working with entities from, inter alia, Argentina, France, Germany and
Spain, but without success.
"At that time, Iran also initiated efforts to acquire research reactors
from Argentina, China, India and the former Soviet Union, but also without success.
"Parallel to the activities related to nuclear power plants, Iran started
to build supporting infrastructure by establishing nuclear technology centres
in Esfahan and Karaj.
"However, apart from uranium conversion technology acquired from an entity
in China, Iran was not able to acquire other nuclear fuel cycle facilities or
technology from abroad.
"As a result, according to Iran, a decision was made in the mid-1980s
to acquire uranium enrichment technology on the black market."
Now, bear in mind that the IAEA's primary mission is to facilitate the fullest
possible transfer for peaceful purposes of nuclear materials and technology
from the "have" states to the "have-not" states. True, the
IAEA is required to ensure "insofar as it is able" that the technology
and materials so transferred are not diverted to a military purpose. But, Bonkers
Bolton to the contrary, that's not IAEA's primary mission.
Furthermore, the "have" states are obligated under the IAEA Statute
and under the NPT to facilitate that transfer for peaceful purposes.
Hence, that history of Iran's attempts to obtain their "inalienable"
rights under the IAEA Statute and NPT if verified by the IAEA constitutes
an indictment of the IAEA's long-term abdication of its primary mission. To
say nothing of an indictment of the perverse stewardship of "have"
states, such as the United States.
So, how's ElBaradei's verification of Iran's story going?
"To assess the detailed information provided by Iran, the Agency held
discussions with senior current and former Iranian officials.
"The Agency also examined supporting documentation, including Iranian
legislation, contracts with foreign companies, agreements with other States
and nuclear site surveys.
"Bearing in mind the long history and complexity of the program and the
dual nature of enrichment technology, the Agency is not in a position, based
on the information currently available to it, to draw conclusions about the
original underlying nature of parts of the program.
"Further light may be shed on this question when other aspects of the
work plan have been addressed and when the Agency has been able to verify the
completeness of Iran's declarations."
Okay, Sciolino-Broad didn't even mention the principal conclusion of ElBaradei's report, nor did they appear to understand the potential dynamite of ElBaradei's ongoing assessment of the truth of Iran's allegations. So, what did Sciolino-Broad focus on.
"The agency's report also confirmed for the first time that Iran has now
crossed the major milestone of putting 3,000 centrifuges into operation, a tenfold
increase from just a year ago. In theory, that means that Iran could produce
enough uranium to make a nuclear weapon within a year to 18 months."
In whose theory?
What neo-crazy crackpot told gullible [or complicit?] New York Times'
reporters that gas centrifuges could produce uranium at all, much less produce
weapons-grade almost pure Uranium-235?
Uranium-enrichment plants don't "produce" uranium, they "cast
out" the Uranium-238 istopes from the uranium-hexafluoride fed them.
What ElBaradei "verified" was that Iran had finished installing eighteen
164-machine cascades and that uranium-hexafluoride had been fed into all 18
cascades. ElBaradei also reported that the "feed rate" as well as
the enrichment level both of which the IAEA "audits" have remained
But Sciolino-Broad did get one thing right. ElBaradei did complain that Iran's
"cooperation has been reactive, rather than proactive."
Whatever that means.