Well, now that you’ve seen the Frontline expose, entitled "Bush’s
War," based upon documentary videos and more than 400 extended interviews
with major participants and media sycophants, you may yet have a few unanswered
Chief among them is the question many of those major participants and media
sycophants have asked (or certainly ought to have asked): Namely,
"How could George Tenet, then Director of Central Intelligence, and
publisher of the 2002
National Intelligence Estimate – which judged 'with high confidence' that
Iraq was 'continuing,' perhaps even 'expanding' its 'nuclear programs' – have
sat behind Secretary of State Colin Powell, who was making the
case before the UN Security Council for a declaration of war to 'disarm'
Iraq, smugly confident that the Iraq Survey Group, which would be in the vanguard
of American invasion forces, would quickly find incontrovertible proof that
Saddam Hussein had somehow acquired – or soon would acquire – nuclear weapons?"
After all, Mohamed ElBaradei – Director-General of the International Atomic
Energy Agency – had already publicly discredited both of the specific nuclear
"smoking guns" of Tenet’s 2002 NIE, namely "yellowcake from Niger"
and "aluminum-tubes" for Uranium-enrichment.
On March 7, ElBaradei formally
reported to the Security Council that;
"After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found
no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapon program
Okay, Tenet’s 2002 NIE on Iraq – which was the basis for the Congressional
authorizing the use of U.S. armed forces against Iraq – had been totally discredited
by the inspectors sent into Iraq by the Security Council.
So there would be no Security Council resolution authorizing Bush to invade
Hence, Bush was going to have to prove to Congress that it was "necessary"
to invade Iraq, in order to "defend" America from the "smoking
gun in the shape of a mushroom-shaped cloud."
So, on March 17, Bush addressed the nation thusly;
"Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt
that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal
weapons ever devised.
"The danger is clear: Using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear
weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated
ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in
our country or any other."
Then, three days later Bush announced
to the world that we and our "allies" had already begun the invasion
"The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not
live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons
of mass murder."
The job of finding those "weapons of mass murder" that "Slam-Dunk"
Tenet had assured Bush and Cheney, members of the White House Iraq Group, and
(presumably) Congressional Leaders was entrusted to a CIA-sponsored Iraq Survey
Group, headed for some mysterious reason by David Kay, a political scientist,
who had labored as a UN bureaucrat from 1986 until late 2001, when he mysteriously
was appointed Deputy Director of the IAEA Action team on Iraq, a position he
held very briefly and from which he may have been fired.
Of the 400 plus interviews upon which "Bush’s War" is allegedly based,
those with David Kay are key.
Kay relates that within days of arriving in Iraq to be Tenet’s personal envoy
and to direct the activities of the ISG, Kay began sending Tenet emails, expressing
his doubts that they were going to discover the stuff, particularly the nuke
stuff, that "Slam-dunk" had assured Kay he would find.
So, within a few months Kay found himself back at CIA headquarters, in Virginia,
consigned to an "office" containing many boxes "in storage,"
with a "non-working telephone," assigned a secretary "who rarely
ever showed up."
Before long Kay found himself out of a job and on January 28, 2004, testifying
before the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Kay testified he had apparently been selected to direct the ISG because he
"came not from within the [Bush-Cheney] administration" and was known
for having "a sometimes regrettable streak of independence." Kay said
he had "absolutely no pressure" applied, either prior to, during or
after his tenure as ISG director.
Senator Kennedy then asked Kay what access he had to "intelligence"
reports before going to Iraq to direct the ISG.
David Kay replied "I had full access to everything in the intelligence
community with regard to Iraq."
And, of course, David Kay had "full access" to every report made
by the IAEA about Iraq’s nuclear programs, going back to the discovery in 1991
that Iraq had pursued programs that never amounted to much, but ought to have
been declared, and weren’t.
Hence, David Kay (and all members of the Senate Armed Services Committee) knew
that virtually everything of a nuclear nature contained in even the classified
2002 NIE had been totally discredited.
So, what was it that David Kay expected to find (and that Slam-Dunk Tenet expected
him to find) within a few days of arriving in Iraq in the vanguard of our invasion
force that Kay didn’t find and soon realized he was unlikely to ever
Well, harken back to the publication of a book – State
of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration by
James Risen – that President Bush allegedly attempted to prevent.
According to Risen, back in 2000, under President Clinton, the CIA sent a "Russian
defector" to IAEA headquarters in Vienna with slightly modified "technical
designs for a TBA 480 high-voltage block," a semi-critical component of
certain "Russian-designed" nuclear weapons, with instructions to give
them to the Iranian delegate to the IAEA.
Why would the CIA do such a thing? Perhaps so "Slam-dunk" Tenet could
at some future time sit there smugly behind some future Secretary of State,
secure in the knowledge that a future Iran Survey Group would quickly
find "evidence" in Iran’s files of nuclear-weapon collaboration with
But what if the Iranians destroyed – as they apparently did – the "evidence"
Tenet thought he planted there?
Okay, next time, plant the actual semi-critical components of Russian nuclear
weapons, themselves, not just the designs, somewhere in Iraq where the Iraqis,
themselves, would be unlikely to accidentally find them? Then tell David Kay
where to look?
Nah; that’s too Hollywood.