Trashing the IAEA Again

When asked about the passage last week of the International Atomic Energy Agency Resolution on the implementation of its Safeguards agreement with Iran, President Bush replied

"The Iranians agreed to suspend – but not terminate – their nuclear weapons program. Our position is they ought to terminate their nuclear weapons program."

What nuclear weapons program? The Iranians vehemently deny that they have – or ever had or intend to have – a nuclear weapons program.

Nevertheless, the neo-crazies – in and out of government – have been working overtime to convince you that Iran does have an active nuke program.

The neo-crazies all hope that you don’t know that the IAEA has just finished a two-year go-anywhere, see-anything search – similar to the one they were conducting in Iraq in the months before Bush "preemptively" launched Gulf War II – for evidence of a nuke program.

The IAEA search was intrusive and exhaustive. They investigated every intelligence tip made to them, no matter how unreliable the source. They even investigated tips passed on to them by the Pentagon. The whole world now knows how unreliable those tips can be.

Result in Iran? The IAEA found no evidence whatsoever of a nuke program.

The IAEA came close to thwarting the neo-crazies in Iraq, giving the lie to their reports of a revitalized Iraqi nuke program. The IAEA may well thwart them in Iran.

So, Bush is continuing the propaganda campaign to discredit the IAEA – with respect to the effectiveness of their Safeguarded programs in North Korea, Iraq, and now Iran – that the neo-crazies began shortly after the end of the Gulf War I.

Perhaps it would help you decide whether Bush is attempting to deceive you – or is simply illiterate – to read, for yourself, excerpts from that IAEA resolution:

"(c) Noting specifically the Director General’s assessment that Iranian practices up to October 2003 resulted in many breaches of Iran’s obligations to comply with its Safeguards Agreement, but that good progress has been made since that time in Iran’s correction of those breaches and in the Agency’s ability to confirm certain aspects of Iran’s current declarations,

"(d) Also noting specifically the Director General’s assessment that all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and that such material is not diverted to prohibited activities, but that the Agency is not yet in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,

"(e) Recalling the Board’s previous requests to Iran to suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities as a voluntary confidence building measure, […]

"(h) Recognizing that this suspension is a voluntary confidence building measure, not a legal obligation,

"(i) Recognizing the right of states to the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power, consistent with their Treaty obligations, with due consideration for the needs of the developing countries,

"(j) Stressing the need for effective safeguards to prevent nuclear material being used for prohibited purposes, in contravention of agreements, and underlining the vital importance of effective safeguards for facilitating cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, […]

"1. Welcomes the fact that Iran has decided to continue and extend its suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, and underlines that the full and sustained implementation of this suspension, which is a voluntary, non-legally-binding, confidence building measure, to be verified by the Agency, is essential to addressing outstanding issues;

"2. Welcomes the Director General’s statements of 25 and 29 November 2004 that the above decision has been put into effect, and requests the Director General to continue verifying that the suspension remains in place and to inform Board members should the suspension not be fully sustained, or should the Agency be prevented from verifying all elements of the suspension, for as long as the suspension is in force;

"3. Welcomes Iran’s continuing voluntary commitment to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol, as a confidence building measure that facilitates the resolution of the questions that have arisen, and calls on Iran once again to ratify its Protocol soon. …"

Bush to the contrary, there is no mention anywhere in the Resolution of a "nuclear weapons program," either in Iran or elsewhere. And there is no suggestion that Iran is not now in full compliance with its existing Safeguards Agreement.

On the contrary, the resolution acknowledges that Iran has voluntarily suspended – as a confidence-building measure – activities that it has an inalienable right to pursue under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Author: Gordon Prather

Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy implementing official for national security-related technical matters in the Federal Energy Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Department of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant for national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. -- ranking member of the Senate Budget Committee and member of the Senate Energy Committee and Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather had earlier worked as a nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California and Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico.