Sandbagging the EU

Last November, the governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom – supported by the European Union – and the Islamic Republic of Iran forwarded to the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency an agreement they requested he circulate to all IAEA member states.

The agreement began with the Europeans (E3/EU) recognizing “Iran’s rights under the NPT [Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons] exercised in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty, without discrimination.”

That is, they reaffirmed Iran’s “inalienable right” under the NPT to acquire and operate – subject to the IAEA Safeguards regime – nuclear fuel-cycle facilities.

But President Bush claimed in his 2005 State of the Union Address, “We are working with European allies to make clear to the Iranian regime that it must give up its uranium-enrichment program and any plutonium reprocessing.”

Far from making Iran “give up” those programs, the E3/EU and Iran are engaged in negotiations on “a mutually acceptable long-term arrangement” that would (a) “provide objective guarantees that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes,” but would (b) “equally provide firm guarantees on nuclear, technological, and economic cooperation, and firm commitments on security issues.”

Firm commitments on security issues?

Wow!

Furthermore, the E3/EU-Iran agreement provides for a resumption of negotiations between Iran and the EU on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement. The E3/EU also pledged to “actively support the opening of Iranian accession negotiations” at the World Trade Organization.

Now, the U.S. strenuously opposes a EU-Iran Trade and Cooperation Agreement. It would contravene the sanctions we unilaterally impose – or threaten to impose – on companies doing business with the country Bush has designated “the world’s primary state sponsor of terror.”

The U.S. has also prevented Iran from becoming a member of the World Trade Organization.

So, one of Secretary Rice’s missions last week was not to “work with” the Europeans. It was to “sandbag” them, undermining – if possible – the E3/EU-Iranian negotiations

The IAEA is not a party to the E3/EU-Iranian agreement. Nevertheless, the E3/EU declared in the agreement that it “will henceforth support the director general reporting to the IAEA Board as he considers appropriate.”

This means that Iranian compliance with its Safeguards Agreement constitutes compliance with the E3/EU-Iranian long-term arrangement.

Last week, Condi the Sandbagger repeated the charge frequently made by Likudniks, in and out of various governments, that Iran is using its IAEA Safeguarded programs as a “cover” for pursuing an illegitimate nuclear weapons program.

“We have believed all along that Iran ought to be referred to the Security Council. …

“It is obvious that, if Iran cannot be made to live up to its international obligations, the IAEA statutes suggest Iran would have to be referred to the UN Security Council.”

Well, now that she’s secretary of state, maybe Condi better have another look at the IAEA statute. And read carefully the E3/EU-Iranian agreement of last November. And read especially carefully ElBaradei’s recent reports on Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors.

The NPT bestows on the IAEA the responsibility for verifying that a state is living up to its NPT commitments. When the IAEA’s inspectors detect possible or actual noncompliance with a Safeguards Agreement – or with the NPT, itself – the director general reports that to the Board. The Board can then decide – by a two-thirds majority – whether or not to refer the director general’s reports to the UN Security Council for possible action.

Thus far, so far as ElBaradei is concerned, Iran is living up to its international obligations.

Iran is even in compliance with the Additional Protocol, which is not obligatory, since it is not yet in force. Moreover, ElBaradei has reported to the IAEA Board that Iran is in compliance with its voluntary suspension of uranium-enrichment activity – which is serving as a confidence-building measure for the E3/EU-Iran negotiations.

Therefore, with ElBaradei reporting that he can find no indication whatsoever that Iran is pursuing – or intends to pursue – a nuclear weapons program, it is inconceivable that the IAEA Board would vote to refer the completely unsubstantiated Likudnik charges to the UN Security Council for possible action.

And even if the U.S. chose to end-run the IAEA and take the ridiculous Likudnik charge that the Iranian Safeguarded nuclear program constitutes a threat to the peace in the Mideast, it is certain that China would veto any Security Council resolution proposed by Bush-Rice to impose sanctions on Iran, much less authorize the use of force.

Author: Gordon Prather

Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy implementing official for national security-related technical matters in the Federal Energy Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Department of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant for national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. -- ranking member of the Senate Budget Committee and member of the Senate Energy Committee and Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather had earlier worked as a nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California and Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico.