Sandbagging the EU

Well, the media elite report that President Bush was dismayed by the reaction he got from the E3 [United Kingdom, France and Germany] of the European Union to his opposition to their agreement with Iran of 15 November, 2004, wherein:

  • The E3/EU recognize Iran’s rights under the NPT, exercised in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty, without discrimination.

  • Iran reaffirms that, in accordance with Article II of the NPT, it does not and will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons. It commits itself to full cooperation and transparency with the IAEA.

  • To build further confidence, Iran has decided, on a voluntary basis, to continue and extend its suspension to include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities,

  • The E3/EU recognize that this suspension is a voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal obligation.

  • Sustaining the suspension, while negotiations on a long-term agreement are under way, will be essential for the continuation of the overall process.

What would constitute an acceptable long-term agreement?

  • The agreement will provide objective guarantees that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. It will equally provide firm guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation and firm commitments on security issues.

So why have Bush and the Likudniks opposed it?

Well, for one thing, the Iranians have made it clear that they have no intention of permanently suspending uranium-enrichment activities. That’s all right with the E3/EU, but it’s not all right with Bush and the Likudniks.

And it is the IAEA’s job to provide "objective guarantees" that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. That’s good enough for the E3/EU, but it’s not good enough for Bush and the Likudniks.

Then there’s that part about the Iranians and the Europeans establishing normal nuclear, technological and economic cooperation. That means the Europeans ignoring the threat of US sanctions on European private sector entities that have prevented such cooperation in the past.

It also means overcoming US objections to Iran becoming a Member of the World Trade Organization.

So, in a reversal of US policy, Bush is considering dropping US opposition to Iran’s WTO membership if the E3/EU-Iran negotiations are successful. But Bush and the Likudniks would only consider the negotiations "successful" if the Iranians agree to permanently suspend uranium-enrichment activities, which they have no intention whatsoever of doing.

Then there’s that part about the Europeans providing Iran "firm commitments on security issues."

Now, obviously, the EU cannot provide such guarantees. Hence, there is no possibility that the negotiations will be successful unless Bush guarantees that US or Israeli Likudniks won’t attack Iran’s IAEA-safeguarded nuclear-energy facilities.

Nevertheless, senior US officials have argued that the US must at least appear to form a united front with Europe – just as we appeared to form a united front with Europe in the months leading up to our invasion of Iraq – so as to prepare the diplomatic ground for "joint action" in the event that the negotiations are not "successful."

The US would drop its opposition to Iran starting talks on accession to the World Trade Organization, would waive sanctions on European sales of commercial aircraft and spare parts, and possibly offer some kind of security initiative.

But, in return for such concessions, the US would demand from the EU a firm commitment to take action – or allow the Likudniks to take action – if Iran ever resumes development of a uranium-enrichment capability.

In other words, Bush and the Likudniks get to define "success" as Iran’s permanent suspension of nuclear-enrichment-related activity.

Now, that is obviously not the French definition of "success." It is not even the German definition. True, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in a joint press-conference with Bush said "Iran must not have any nuclear weapons. They must waive any right to the production thereof, and they must renounce the right to even close the fuel cycle.”

But renouncing the right to "close the fuel cycle’ is not the same thing as renouncing uranium-enrichment. Thanks to President Carter, we have never "closed the fuel cycle." We have never allowed US reactor owners to have their "spent fuel" – which is not "spent" at all, but contains 2/3 of its original "burnable" fuel – reprocessed.

The Iranians have suspended their efforts to develop a "spent fuel" reprocessing capability, and they have never said they would not suspend that permanently. In fact, in the case of the Bushehr nuclear power plant nearing completion, the Iranians have just signed an agreement with the Russians that obviates the need for Iran to "close the fuel cycle."

That ought to satisfy the E3/EU.

Author: Gordon Prather

Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy implementing official for national security-related technical matters in the Federal Energy Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Department of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant for national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. -- ranking member of the Senate Budget Committee and member of the Senate Energy Committee and Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather had earlier worked as a nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California and Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico.