Gen. David Petraeus, touted by the Bush administration
as the potential savior of the Iraq debacle, is like a lot of officers these
days, a four-star general with relatively little combat experience.
He led the 101st Airborne Division during the initial invasion of Iraq and later
was posted with it in the Kurdish area – by far the most peaceful area in Iraq.
Other than that, his experience has all been peacetime duty, with a lot of that
as an aide to various officers.
No doubt about it, Petraeus is a bright man. Courtesy of the taxpayers, he holds
a master's degree and also a doctorate from prestigious universities. He graduated
from West Point. Lately, the press has credited him as the author of the Army's
Field Manual on counterinsurgency. Actually, he co-authored it with Marine Lt.
Gen. James Mattis.
Furthermore, Petraeus is unlucky. During a live-fire exercise, one of his soldiers
tripped and accidentally shot Petraeus in the chest. Later, while sky diving,
his parachute tangled, and he broke his pelvis. His other Iraq assignment was
to reorganize and train the Iraqi army. Obviously, he didn't do such a hot job,
because three years later, it is still unable to defend the country.
Now as the top field commander, he's in charge of what the Bush administration
calls a "new strategy." This consists of posting Americans with Iraqis
in various little outposts around Baghdad. The idea is to provide security for
what the Army calls the "good guys." Problem is, to qualify as a good
guy, you have to rat out your neighbors. Other Iraqis see these good guys as just
traitors and collaborators.
Insurgents, as has been the case historically, will simply go to ground while
American forces are around and will cause mischief in other places. So when you
hear Petraeus or the Bush administration brag about the surge strategy working,
just remember the one question they've never answered is, "What happens when
the U.S. forces leave?" The other unanswered question is, "How long
do you intend to keep combat soldiers in Baghdad?"
In short, Petraeus' counterinsurgency strategy is the same one we used in Vietnam,
where it failed miserably. The only counterinsurgency campaign that I can recall
being successful was one carried out by the British in Malaysia. That took about
10 years, and the British were aided by the fact that most of the insurgents were
Chinese, who were not especially liked by the other citizens.
The insurgents in Iraq are mainly Iraqis. We are viewed as a foreign occupational
army. The Iraqis want us out. Every time our guys kick in a door, shoot somebody
or arrest a "suspect," we simply create more enemies. Polls taken by
the University of Maryland consistently show that regardless of what sectarian
or ethnic group is polled, a majority wants us out.
Interestingly enough, 144 members of the Iraqi parliament signed a petition demanding
that the U.S. set a timetable for withdrawal. For some reason, American news organizations
paid little attention to it. The man who made the announcement said that it will
be presented to the speaker and then will be put up for a vote.
It also appears that conflict, at least within the parliament, is not between
Shi'ites and Sunnis but between separatists, backed by the U.S., and nationalists,
who want a strong central government in charge of Iraq's plentiful oil supply.
The separatists want us to stay, of course, while the nationalists want us out.
We should back the nationalists and get out.