
DG ISI visits Russia
The News (Pakistan)
4 Sep 2000
By Nasim Zehra
ISLAMABAD: The government sent Director General Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Lt General Mahmud to Moscow last week. He met his counterpart Nikolai Patrushev, chief of the Russian Federal Security Service (successor organisation to KGB), and Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev.
Islamabad's request that General Mahmud call on the Russian President Vladmir Putin was declined because Putin was on an official trip to Japan and also perhaps because Moscow might have concluded that more confidence-building steps should precede a meeting with their head of state.
The last senior level contact took place when former prime minister visited Moscow in early 1999. General Mahmud's visit is also the first high level Russian-Pakistani contact since Putin assumed power.
ISI chief's trip followed detailed reviews, held within the GHQ and the Foreign Office, of the current status of Pakistan-Russian relations. Mahmud's trip was an acknowledgement by the Pakistani government of the need to arrest the downward spiral in which Russian-Pakistan relations have now been caught for a long time.
From Moscow's perspective Islamabad has been directly and indirectly responsible for the three specific factors that have contributed towards Russia's deteriorating security environment; the survival of the Taliban government, Taliban's alleged role in spreading so-called Islamic militancy in Central Asia and Taliban's alleged support for the Chechens fighting the Russian army. Pakistan is thus blamed for facilitating the birth of what Moscow claims is the destabilising nexus in Central Asia with its impact extending to the Russian territory -- the terrorism, Osama, drugs and Taliban nexus.
Moscow views the terrorism factor as a major security threat. It is still trying to manage its own Muslim problem in the Caucasus, is determined to rout out what it labels as terrorism in Central Asia. For example recently while responding to the news of 200 well-trained Islamic rebels attacking the southern border regions of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Moscow has offered to provide new military supplies to Central Asia. Politically Moscow cannot afford the spread of Islamic militancy given the destabilizing impact it would have on Russia's Muslim zones, economically too it seeks to retain control over its former states as it competes with western powers for control over Central Asia's vast local natural gas and oil reserves.
The Taliban have indeed become Moscow's favourite punching bag. Instead of recognizing the inextricable linkage between the mostly repressive governments of Central Asian and the birth of extremism and militancy, Moscow conveniently places all blame on the Taliban. End August the Russian Defence Minister Sergeyev and the defence ministers of six other former Soviet republics met in the Astrakhan region of southern Russia and drew up joint plans to boost security in the region. Moscow has also directly threatened the Taliban with air-strikes on terrorist camps.
Interestingly, despite all the anti-Taliban rhetoric, Moscow, like other regional states, has established direct contact with the Taliban. In early August reportedly direct Russian-Afghan talks took place in Ashkabad. More are likely to take place.
From Islamabad's perspective there have been two areas of concern vis-a-vis Moscow. One, while remaining in complete denial of the current ground realities in Central Asia and of the elements that the anti-Soviet mujahideen resistance unleashed in the region, holding Islamabad responsible for encouraging spread of terrorism in Central Asia. Moscow's cheer-leader role in projecting the Pakistan government regionally and internationally as a supporter of terrorism has been fairly damaging for Pakistan.
Two the recent multi-billion defence deals between Russia and India under which huge amounts of weaponry and defence equipment will be sold to India. Such huge amounts of defense equipment Islamabad argues will be extremely destabilizing for the South Asian region.
Also the qualitative improvement in Moscow-Delhi's strategic relationship is also being viewed as directly undermining Pakistan's security. Statements coming from Delhi and Moscow during June and July when senior Russian and Indian ministers made exchange trips special reference was made to the need to collaborate and jointly tackle the problem of terrorism.
For Islamabad, this common ground between India and Russia, could translate into a real security threat especially in the absence of bilateral dialogue on areas of mutual concern. Hence, the Mahmud mission. Given the areas of concern, largely of security nature, the choice of the DG ISI was an appropriate one. He is the key man on Afghanistan -- the core issue for Russia. Mahmud has met with Mulla Umar personally and is in constant contact with the Afghan government. He is also directly involved in tracking Pakistan's own religious political parties and therefore has direct interaction with these groups. As the Musharraf government attempts to re-establish state authority without hounding any of the religious parties , Mahmud is the appropriate man to reassure Moscow that to the extent any state can vouch for the movement of its own citizens, Pakistan's groups will function within the Pakistani territory.
Islamabad hopes that Mahmud's trip is the beginning of a more such senior level meetings required for confidence-building purposes between Moscow and Islamabad. By early October Moscow will be dispatching a senior envoy, the Russian presidential spokesman, to Islamabad for high level dialogue with the Pakistanis. Subsequently by year end, Islamabad hopes that Pakistan's Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar could visit Moscow.
Initial reports on the Mahmud visit indicate that frank and detailed discussion between Mahmud and his Russian hosts has made Moscow realize the need for regular and constructive engagement with Pakistan on areas of mutual concern.
Opting for constructive and constant dialogue is important for both Russia and Pakistan. There is no gain for Russia in externalizing its domestic problems. The Chechen problem for example is largely Russia's home-made problem and no amount of invoking the Taliban, terrorism and Osama concoction rid Russia of the Chechen problem. It may only earn it some short-lived propaganda advantage.
Moscow needs to engage with the Taliban and the other Islamic groups in Central Asia and Islamabad can play the mediator's role to facilitate the dialogue. Also direct dialogue is important for building trust between the two countries which can help improve bilateral ties and also contribute towards the stability of the volatile but strategically important region.