Author: Mel Gurtov

Taiwan has returned as a troubling issue in US-China relations. It is no longer merely a case of verbal jousting over the island’s autonomy versus Chinese claims of sovereignty.

The new round of US-China tensions over Taiwan actually began in the Trump administration, when the administration authorized new arms sales to Taiwan, an official visit to Taiwan by a senior US official (Alex Azar, secretary for health and human services, the highest-level visit since 1979), and strong statements of support for Taiwan.

Early on in the Biden administration, the Chinese responded with pressure of its own: repeated violations of Taiwan’s air defense zone by their military aircraft and regular coastal patrolling by China’s coast guard and naval vessels, all justified as reactions to US naval maneuvers near Taiwan and closer political ties.

US media reported internal debate in the administration about whether and how to clarify the "strategic ambiguity" that has long existed in US declaratory policy regarding Taiwan’s security. Some officials argued for a stronger verbal commitment to Taiwan’s defense, others for directly warning Beijing or increasing military aid to Taiwan. A US Senate bill, the Strategic Competition Act of 2021, calls for bringing Taiwan within the compass of US regional defense plans.

Continue reading “War Over Taiwan? Avoiding a US-China Miscalculation”

The war in Afghanistan, America’s longest, has cost about 2,300 US lives, over 20,000 wounded, and about $1 trillion. Now, thanks to the persistence of the Washington Post, we have an abundance of interviews which, like the Pentagon Papers, reveal the enormous wastefulness, ignorance, and deceit that make Afghanistan, like Vietnam, a chapter in the history of failed US interventions.

In my October 2015 blog, “Truth and Consequences,” I cited a report at the time that Richard Nixon had complained to Henry Kissinger about the US failure to win the Vietnam War given all the firepower at its disposal. But that’s not what Nixon said publicly. I concluded: “We are now witness in Afghanistan to the same scenario: public lies, private doubts.” I also identified some of the problems with the US war effort in Afghanistan that the Post documents now reveal – problems that should have led Obama to deliver on his promise to withdraw US troops. Instead, he continued the failed effort and passed Afghanistan on to Trump. Both presidents had plenty of bipartisan support from people who, as in Vietnam, use “resolve” and “commitment” to justify the sacrifice of blood and treasure in a country they barely know. “Afghanistan is blessed with a substantial number of lobbyists who seem incapable of thinking beyond war,” I concluded in my blog.

Vietnam Syndrome

Decision making on Afghanistan, the interviews tell us, parallels that in Vietnam in several specific ways. Here are some symptoms of this seemingly chronic illness drawn from the Post interviews:

Continue reading “The Afghanistan Pentagon Papers”

For the first time in quite a few years, direct US-North Korea dialogue seems within reach thanks to North-South Korea talks involving Kim Jong-un and top officials of the Moon Jae-in administration. Whether or not North Korea’s complete and verifiable denuclearization, which has long been the chief US demand, will actually be on the table much less be agreed upon remains to be seen, of course. Kim Jong-un surprised the South Korean delegation by apparently indicating a willingness to discuss denuclearization. But most media reports neglected to mention that Kim wants concessions in return-concessions that his father and grandfather have long sought in return for surrendering a deterrent to feared American attack.

From what I can piece together, here is the North Korean position as reported in US and South Korean publications.

North Korea wants:

• Recognition as a "serious partner for dialogue"
• Summit meeting with ROK and resumption of exchanges
• Security assurances, namely, "eliminating the US military threat to North Korea and a guarantee of its security."
• Normalization of relations with the US

In return, North Korea

• Is willing to discuss denuclearization
• Will refrain from threats to South Korea: North Korea "will not attempt any strategic provocations, such as nuclear and ballistic missile tests."
• Will not demand as a precondition for talking that US-ROK joint exercises scheduled for April be canceled.
• Will not test missiles or a nuclear weapon during talks with the US.

Continue reading “Getting to ‘Yes’ With North Korea”

In recent months Donald Trump has shown no hesitation to comment critically on political developments in Iran, Pakistan, Venezuela, and North Korea. He supported protests in Iran against "the brutal and corrupt Iranian regime." He deplored the many years of US military aid to Pakistan, for which "they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. . . . No more!" His criticisms of the Maduro government in Venezuela were accompanied by the threat to use the "military option," reminiscent of what Trump had once said when talking about Mexico. And of course his personal insults directed at North Korea’s Kim Jong-un are now legendary.

Such interference is now taken for granted, for in Trump’s world, relying on diplomacy and abiding by the principle of noninterference in others’ affairs have no currency in Washington. Of course trying to destabilize other countries, even to the point of seeking regime change, has been part and parcel of US foreign policy for a long time. The difference now may be the constancy of Trump’s interference, and the undiplomatic language he uses.

Continue reading “Dubious Partnership: The US and Saudi Arabia”

Specialists on North Korea have cited many reasons over the years for why China cannot be relied on to stop the DPRK from continuing its nuclear and missile buildup. The reasons are by now quite familiar, and have mostly to do with China’s fear that pressuring Kim Jong-un’s regime will destabilize it and produce a chaotic situation adverse to China’s security interests. Yet US administrations have consistently proposed that China is the key to resolving the standoff with North Korea – that if only Beijing would exploit its economic and political leverage with Pyongyang, Kim will be forced to knuckle under.

Today’s news that Secretary of State Rex Tillerson had, perhaps unintentionally, revealed ongoing US efforts to coordinate with China on the removal of North Korea’s nuclear weapons in the event of a political collapse in Pyongyang further undermines the notion that China has usable leverage. North Korean experts read the newspapers! They have surely known for a long time – and today’s news only reinforces it – about US-China consultations on North Korean nukes. Now Tillerson has confirmed them, saying "We’ve had conversations with the Chinese about how that [removing the nukes] might be done." US sources may say that their Chinese counterparts have resisted reaching an agreement that would avoid a clash should both armies move into North Korea in the wake of a collapse. But the North Koreans have no reason to believe that, and every reason to think this is further evidence of Chinese-American collusion to undermine their regime and occupy their country.

Continue reading “An Unfortunate Revelation on Securing North Korean Nukes”

Possibly, just possibly, a new momentum for direct US-North Korea discussions is developing.  Secretary of State Rex Tillerson provided some of it when, in a talk at the Atlantic Council December 12, he for the first time proposed talks without preconditions – a significant departure from previous remarks, echoed by other senior US officials, in which he insisted on North Korea’s cessation of weapons tests and lowering of tensions before any kind of talks might begin.

Tillerson’s proposal was almost a plea to Pyongyang to respond to an opening, perhaps in recognition that other US officials have lately suggested that time is running out before the US makes a military response to North Korea’s ongoing nuclear and missile tests.  Here’s what Tillerson said:

We’ve said from the diplomatic side, we’re ready to talk anytime North Korea would like to talk. We are ready to have the first meeting without precondition. Let’s just meet, and we can talk about the weather if you want. Talk about whether it’s going to be a square table or a round table, if that’s what you are excited about. But can we at least sit down and see each other face to face, and then we can begin to lay out a map, a road map of what we might be willing to work towards.

Continue reading “Momentum for Talks With North Korea?”