Antiwar.com Blog

The Secret Downing Street Memo
On Sunday, May 1st (fittingly), the Sunday Times reported the existence of a top secret memo from Number 10 Downing Street dated July 23, 2002. It is definitive proof that the “bad intelligence” that fooled the American people and our congressmen into invading Iraq was absolutely, positively, outright lies.

We have all know for some time from Bob Woodward, Paul O’Neil and Richard Clarke that the decision to invade Iraq was made long before the war (in fact, long before September 11th), but now here is absolute proof that the Bush/Blair administration knew good and well that they would have to make up their excuse. That is, “fix the intelligence,” or as those of us in the private sector would say, “lie.”

Please take special note of our government’s willingness to fake an Iraqi casus belli in “Option (b) Running Start.”

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL – UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER’S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam’s regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun “spikes of activity” to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)

For CIA veteran Ray McGovern’s analysis, click here

Saturday on the Weekend Interview Show, I’ll be talking with Ray McGovern of the Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity about the absence of intelligence and sanity in our government, and Antiwar.com’s own Gordon Prather will return in the second hour to explain all those complicated details surrounding the fight America is picking with Iran.

Update: Show’s over, Archives

The recent arrest of Pentagon analyst Larry Franklin on charges that he handed over vital U.S. secrets to Israel recalls the wave of stories about Israeli spies in the U.S. in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Weeks after the attacks, the Washington Post ran a story saying that at least 60 Israelis had been rounded up and deported back to Israel — under the same legal rubric that permitted the round-up of suspected Islamists. A year later, the London Telegraph reported:

“Up to 200 young Israelis, some of them former members of military intelligence units, have been arrested in America in the past year, a leaked government report disclosed yesterday.”

What were the Israelis up to? In December 2001, the Fox News network ran a four-part series that started out with this jaw-dropping statement:

“There is no indication that the Israelis were involved in the 9-11 attacks, but investigators suspect that they Israelis may have gathered intelligence about the attacks in advance, and not shared it. A highly placed investigator said there are ‘tie-ins.’ But when asked for details, he flatly refused to describe them, saying, ‘evidence linking these Israelis to 9-11 is classified. I cannot tell you about evidence that has been gathered. It’s classified information.'”

Writing in The Scotsman, Neil Mackay told the shocking story of how a group of Israeli agents were apprehended hours after 9/11:

“There was ruin and terror in Manhattan, but, over the Hudson River in New Jersey, a handful of men were dancing. As the World Trade Centre burned and crumpled, the five men celebrated and filmed the worst atrocity ever committed on American soil as it played out before their eyes.

“Who do you think they were? Palestinians? Saudis? Iraqis, even? Al-Qaeda, surely? Wrong on all counts. They were Israelis – and at least two of them were Israeli intelligence agents, working for Mossad, the equivalent of MI6 or the CIA.

“Their discovery and arrest that morning is a matter of indisputable fact. To those who have investigated just what the Israelis were up to that day, the case raises one dreadful possibility: that Israeli intelligence had been shadowing the al-Qaeda hijackers as they moved from the Middle East through Europe and into America where they trained as pilots and prepared to suicide-bomb the symbolic heart of the United States. And the motive? To bind America in blood and mutual suffering to the Israeli cause.”

The young Israelis worked for a moving company whose owner soon fled to Israel (just like Naor Gilon, the Israeli embassy official who met with Franklin, is hightailing it back home). Found in their possession was a large amount of cash, multiple passports, knives such as those used by the 9/11 hijackers, and “fresh pictures of the men standing with the smouldering wreckage of the Twin Towers in the background. One image showed a hand flicking a lighter in front of the devastated buildings, like a fan at a pop concert.”

An Israeli connection to 9/11? If their intelligence services were watching the hijackers and didn’t tell us, then their activities amount to complicity.

Go here to read the dozens of “mainstream” news stories about Israel’s vast spy operation in the U.S. — and its connection to the events surrounding the worst terrorist attack in American history.

A recent news story on the Franklin spy scandal reports that the current investigation into Israeli covert activities in the U.S. was begun “since at least 2002” — coinciding with the immediate aftermath of 9/11.

Go here to purchase the book that details of Israel’s cloak-and-dagger shenanigans on American soil — The Terror Enigma: 9/11 and the Israeli Connection.

This guy thinks so:

If the negative reaction it has incurred from both right and left is any indication, the LibDems’ distinctly liberal message seems to be paying off. The Conservative-friendly Telegraph has felt it necessary to editorialize to its readership that the LibDems aren’t sincere in their embrace of the market. George Monbiot, columnist for the lefty Guardian, warns left wingers that a vote for the LibDems will not only signal opposition to the war in Iraq and the Labour government’s abysmal record on civil liberties, but they will also be a vote “for the further deregulation of business.” And when the BBC’s website pondered where the LibDems stand in this election, it threw up its hands: “The question of whether the Lib Dems are now to the left of Labour is in the eye of the beholder.” …

Under Kennedy’s watch, a Liberal Democrat party that positions itself as the lone defenders of English civil liberty and peace, while unabashedly embracing a market economy, has scored phenomenal by-election upsets, snatching away safe Labour-held seats once thought to be impregnable. He sounds like a sincere convert. In a Guardian profile, Kennedy summons language to explicate his party’s core values that would stir any Classical Liberal heart: “The first guiding principle is a mindset, I think—a gut philosophical instinct—to see society in terms of the individual, first and foremost, rather than the interests of the state.”

Hear, hear!

Michelle Malkin has not one but two posts on the stunning silence emanating from the right wing of the “blogosphere” when it comes to the Larry Franklin-AIPAC spy caper. She writes:

“So far, the commentariat and blogosphere (both left and right sides) have been curiously quiet about the news that Pentagon official Larry Franklin was arrested for improperly passing classified information to AIPAC.”

She then goes on to cite “colleagues I respect and admire” who are “downplaying” Franklin’s treason. Why, even the New York Sun is “continuing to pooh-pooh” Franklin’s alleged actions.

I have news for Malkin: the New York Sun is to Israel what the Daily Worker was to the old Soviet Union.

Is that really such a big secret?

If you follow the links in Malkin’s post, you discover that those “colleagues” she “respects and admire” are none other than two of the biggest apologists for Israel on the American Right: David Frum and Joel Mowbray.

Malkin finds “the apologists and apathetic” to be “troubling,” but she ought to wake up and smell the friggin’ coffee — the so-called “conservative” movement has been functioning as Israel’s amen corner in the U.S. for quite some time now, and that she finds this troubling shows that she’s just not paying attention.

When it comes to the Franklin affair, we hear not a peep out of the usually loquacious Instapundit; the cat seems to have got Roger L. Simon‘s tongue; someone pulled the plug on Powerline, David Horowitz & Co. have nothing to say, and even Charles Johnson, the failed musician who has now taken up hate-mongering over at “Little Green Footballs” — usually barking at the moon at the least provocation — is maintaining an embarrassed silence about a spy who sold out America for Israel.

What gets me is that these are the same people who have the nerve to bray about “patriotism” — and habitually condemn others as less than loyal to this country. But only when it suits their political agenda.

Quiere Ud. que cubramos más las noticias de latinoamérica? Mándeme los links que tiene sobre el imperialismo (americano o otro), intervencionismo, guerra y guerrilla…y también unas otras cosas que cree que les interesen los hablantes de inglés. Claro que estoy buscando links en español que no pueda encontrar en inglés en otro lugar. Los resumaré en el inglés y los fijaré aquí en Antiwar.com una vez por semana — si recibo bastante noticias.

Gracias!