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There are rumors going around<\/a> that President Obama “is preparing to send lethal weaponry to the Syrian opposition,” although he has said no such thing publicly.<\/p>\n Nevertheless, the rumors are sparking a new debate on the wisdom of directly arming the Syrian rebels. I say “directly” because Washington has been arming the rebels through proxies<\/a> like Saudi Arabia and Qatar for a very long time as it is. In fact, just acknowledging this should pull the rug out from under those who think arming the rebels directly is even remotely a good idea.<\/p>\n Simply increasing the amount of weapons the Syrian rebels receive will prolong the conflict and probably make things a lot worse before they get better. Indeed, foreign meddling is a big reason<\/a> the conflict has gone on so long in the first place.<\/p>\n \u201cA continuous supply of weapons to both sides\u2014whether from Russia, Iran or the Gulf States\u2014only maintains the parties\u2019 perception that fighting is a better option than negotiating,\u201d Dr. Florence Gaub, a researcher at the NATO Defense College,\u00a0writes<\/a>\u00a0at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. \u201cThis explains why, in terms of statistical probability, an external supply of weapons lengthens a civil war.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201cSyria indeed has become an arena for outside meddling, but the meddling has been far more effective at sustaining the fighting than ending it,\u201d said a\u00a0report<\/a>\u00a0last year from the International Crisis Group.<\/p>\n So if rebels get more of the same kinds of weapons from the US that they’ve been getting from the Gulf states, no positive appreciable change will come because the facts on the ground will not change. But what if the Obama administration sends what policy wonks call “decisive” aid, like\u00a0antitank weapons and surface-to-air missiles? Will that tip the balance in favor of the rebels and against the Assad regime?<\/p>\n Probably not. As Wired<\/em>‘s Spencer Ackerman reports<\/a> “few strategists consider that realistic. Assad has a variety of advantages \u2014 an adaptive military estimated at over 50,000; complete air superiority;\u00a0chemical weapons<\/a>\u00a0\u2014 that he will retain even if Obama opens a new arms pipeline.” The rebels can’t overcome those advantages with newer and better weapons, according to Ackerman.<\/p>\n Beyond making interventionists feel better, boosting arms to the rebels won’t do anything but make the situation worse. And history bears this out<\/a>. As\u00a0Prof.\u00a0Eva Bellin and Prof. Peter Krause<\/a>\u00a0in the Middle East Brief from Brandeis University\u00a0found in their study<\/a>\u00a0of the Syria situation, \u201cThe distillation of historical experience with civil war and insurgency, along with a sober reckoning of conditions on the ground in Syria, make clear that limited intervention of this sort will not serve the moral impulse that animates it. To the contrary, it is more likely to amplify the harm that it seeks to eliminate by prolonging a hurting stalemate.\u201d<\/p>\n These are the strategic reasons not to directly arm the rebels. But there are other reasons, like, for example, that the rebels can’t be trusted.<\/p>\n It’s no secret that the strongest fighting force in the rebel opposition is Jabhat al-Nusra, an off-shoot of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Do we want to help bring them to power? Beyond the\u00a0ties to officially designated\u00a0terrorist organizations<\/a>, many of the rebels have\u00a0committed \u00a0war crimes<\/a>. Is Washington prepared to back these people?<\/p>\n Advocates of intervention like to claim that there are at least some rebels of an acceptable caliber<\/a>, who haven’t committed crimes, don’t have ties to terrorist groups, and want a secular political transition post-Assad. But realists don’t buy it.<\/p>\n