[Reprinted with author’s permission.]<\/p>\n
Will the election of Iranian president Hassan Rowhani encourage Washington and its European allies to abandon thoughts of regime change and move towards a resolution of their dispute with Iran over the latter\u2019s nuclear program? While Rowhani will not take office until August, he has already indicated that he welcomes renewed engagement with \u201cthe West.\u201d At the same time, he has made it clear that Iran will not be deflected from pursuing what it sees as its right to develop a civilian nuclear energy program. The ball is thus in President Obama\u2019s court; and the options under consideration now in Washington are reflected in some of the essays linked below that assess the meaning of the Iranian election.<\/p>\n
Whether or not a settlement with Iran is actually within reach will also depend on the course President Obama sets for US policy toward the conflict in Syria. It will obviously not be conducive to building diplomatic confidence if the United States carries out its plans to arm the Syrian rebels, or moves to establish a \u201cno-fly zone\u201d over some or all of Syria, or insists that peace negotiations at Geneva are only possible if Iran is refused a place at the table. Yet all of these negative developments (and more) now seem likely, and the possibility, portended by Rowhani\u2019s election, of ending the US conflict with Iran over its nuclear could easily be lost.<\/p>\n
Yet the concept of \u201clikely\u201d seems to be vanishing from the political scene. Who would have predicted that our political landscape would be so altered by Rowhani\u2019s election, by Edward Snowden\u2019s revelations, by the uprisings against Turkey\u2019s Erdogan or Egypt\u2019s Morsi, etc.? As \u201cunlikely\u201d as it may seem, perhaps the great many rational reasons why it is in the interests of the leaders of the United States to reverse course and work for a peaceful outcome in Syria and with Iran may prevail. Stranger things have happened.<\/p>\n
Once again I would like to thank those who you who have forwarded this newsletter or linked it on your sites. Previous \u201cissues\u201d of the Iran War Weekly are posted at WarIsACrime.org<\/a>. If you would like to receive the IWW mailings, please send me an email at fbrodhead@aol.com. <\/p>\n Best wishes, —- One of the most overlooked and under-discussed aspects of the Iranian nuclear program, at least from an Iranian point of view, is the double standard that\u2019s applied to it: while Israel has an estimated 100-200 nuclear weapons that it has concealed for decades, Iran is treated like the nuclear threat \u2014 and Iran doesn\u2019t possess a single nuclear weapon. Adding insult to injury, Israel is usually the first, loudest and shrillest voice condemning Iran and demanding \u201ccrippling sanctions\u201d while deflecting attention away from its own record. <\/p>\n (Video) Why the United States Can\u2019t Have an Effective Iran Policy Without Accepting a Truly Independent Islamic Republic Iran nuclear chief: Tehran will press ahead with uranium enrichment program<\/a> —- Iran will press ahead with its uranium enrichment program, its nuclear energy chief said on Friday, signaling no change of course despite the victory of a relative moderate in the June 14 presidential election. <\/p>\n INTERPRETING IRAN\u2019S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION<\/strong> —- Some 10 days after the June 14 election of Hassan Rowhani as president, Iran watchers are still debating what his victory means, and whether Iran’s politics might hold other new and intriguing surprises. The debate is not merely an academic exercise. On the contrary, in a town where analysis, advocacy, and prescription are often tightly bound, it should come as no surprise that that post-election effort to make sense of Iran’s perplexing politics has become an analytical football. One casualty of this situation is the misguided conclusions that are now being drawn in some circles about the supposed link between sanctions, Iranian internal politics, and the prospects for a negotiated solution to conflict over Iran’s nuclear program. <\/p>\n (Audio) An Interview with Ervand Abrahamian —- Following a short segment with the AP\u2019s Brian Murphy, Prof. Abrahamian talks about the election and answers caller\u2019s questions. (Abrahamian\u2019s latest book is on the 1953 coup in Iran.)<\/p>\n Also useful \u2013 Farideh Farhi, \u201cShould Iran\u2019s Election Really be Discounted?<\/a>\u201d Lobe Log [June 8, 2013] ; and Ali Gharib, \u201cWho’s Dismissing the Iranian Elections?<\/a>\u201d The Daily Beast [June 17, 2013] <\/p>\n WHAT TO EXPECT FROM ROWHANI\u2019S PRESIDENCY —- Rouhani’s repeated emphasis on direct outreach to Washington may now have a chance for real traction among the ultimate decision-makers in Iran \u2014 the ruling clerics and the powerful Revolutionary Guard. They have long opposed bilateral talks, insisting they would do no good. But the lack of major blowback to Rouhani’s speech in mid-May signaled that the idea is no longer a taboo for the establishment, even if it is not yet entirely convinced. Another sign came from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who in March hinted he would not stand in the way. <\/p>\n Iranian Foreign Policy After the Election: Realists and Islamic Idealists Face Off<\/a> [pay wall] —- As Iranians head to the polls today, much of the world is focused on the country\u2019s domestic politics, particularly given the unrest that followed the last presidential election. A question that has gotten less attention is how the choice of president will impact the country\u2019s foreign policy. But in Iran, like in other countries, domestic politics play a big role in foreign policy. The election has exposed the choices available to decision-makers and the political limits they face. <\/p>\n President-Elect of Iran Says He Will Engage With the West<\/a> Also useful \u2013 Peter Jenkins, \u201cDid Hassan Rowhani Dupe Europe in 2003?<\/a>\u201d Lobe Log [June 30, 2013]; and Seyed Hossein Mousavian, \u201cIt is time for security cooperation between the Gulf states and Iran<\/a>,\u201d Asharq Al-Awsat [UK] [June 28, 2013] <\/p>\n US RESPONSES TO ROWHANI\u2019S ELECTION<\/strong> —- In the aftermath of Hassan Rouhani\u2019s surprise victory in the Iranian presidential elections, there has been a cascade of pessimistic commentary suggesting that the replacement of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad by the former senior nuclear negotiator will not stop Iran\u2019s alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons. Rouhani has made a start by promising greater transparency for the Iranian nuclear program and will hopefully take pro-active steps such as finally opening the military site at Parchin to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The P5+1, for its part, should be using the time before Rouhani\u2019s inauguration on Aug. 14 to prepare a new detailed offer trading verifiable limits on the nuclear program for step by step sanctions relief. The US Congress should refrain from passing new legislation until Rouhani has had time to influence Iran\u2019s negotiation strategy; there will always be opportunities to impose new penalties if, after six months, the talks remain stalled. The focus now should be on increasing negotiating flexibility on both sides instead of what appears to be a concerted campaign to disparage Rouhani politically and personally. <\/p>\n Giving Advice to President Obama —- America finds itself exactly where Iran was four years ago. Back then, America had just elected a new, articulate president who offered hope and promised a new approach to the world and Iran. His election was a direct rejection of the foreign policy of his predecessor, President George W. Bush, whose favorite tools of statecraft appeared to be military force and confrontational rhetoric. The question Iran grappled with in 2009 was whether this new president \u2014 Barack Obama \u2014 really represented change or if it was merely an act of electoral deception. Today, the roles are reversed. Iranians have elected a new, articulate president who is promising both the Iranian people and the world community hope and a new approach. His election is seen as a direct rejection of his predecessor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad\u2019s confrontational policies and rhetoric. Iranians wanted hope and change and they went to the ballot boxes to obtain it. <\/p>\n U.S. should tread lightly on Iran<\/a> —- One shouldn\u2019t have any illusions about what the election of Rohani represents. He is a dedicated member of the Iranian regime, and a strong supporter of Iran\u2019s nuclear rights. Negotiations between the Iran and the P5+1 will not suddenly become easy. But the fact that the most moderate choice prevailed in Iran\u2019s presidential election reveals that there is an important debate taking place amongst Iran\u2019s ruling elite over the nature of Iran\u2019s relations with the world. Given the level of distrust that still exists between the U.S. and Iran, there\u2019s little the U.S. can do to empower its favored interlocutors. But, as the past has shown, there\u2019s a lot the U.S. can do to empower those most opposed to conciliation and compromise. Given the high stakes, the U.S. should be as careful as possible to do no harm, as a heightened congressional debate over the use of force against Iran would almost certainly do. <\/p>\n ISRAEL\u2019S RESPONSE TO ROWHANI\u2019S ELECTION<\/strong><\/p>\n Israel and the War Party Have Panicked over Rowhani\u2019s Election as Iran\u2019s President<\/a> —- Rowhani won the election in a landslide. Suddenly, the War Party and Israel had to face an Iranian president whose specialty is national security and Iran\u2019s nuclear program. A president who, as Iran\u2019s chief nuclear negotiator from 2003-2005, reached an agreement with the European Union for suspending Iran\u2019s uranium enrichment program, which Iran carried during that period, only to be scuttled by the Europeans because they got greedy and wanted an end to the program altogether; a President-elect who as a candidate declared on national television that it is possible for Iran to keep its nuclear program and negotiate a deal with the West and that, unlike what the Iranian hardliners had claimed, the crippling economic sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States and its allies are harming Iran and the Iranian people, and a moderate cleric who speaks about the release of the political prisoners, and a more open society. The War Party, Israel, and their Iranian allies panicked, and began a smear campaign. <\/p>\n Rise of new Iran president delays Israel’s military option by at least another year<\/a> STUXNET BLOWBACK<\/strong><\/p>\n Retired U.S. General Is Focus of Inquiry Over Iran Leak<\/a> —- The former second-ranking officer in the United States military, retired Gen. James E. Cartwright of the Marines, is a target of an investigation into the leak of classified information about American cyberattacks on Iran\u2019s nuclear program, a person familiar with the investigation confirmed Thursday night. <\/p>\n Also useful \u2013 Robert Windrem, \u201cThe worm that turned: How Stuxnet helped heat up cyberarms race<\/a>,\u201d NBC News [June 27, 2013] ; and Shane Harris and Noah Schachtman, \u201cObama administration’s infighting suddenly goes public<\/a>,\u201d [June 28, 2013] <\/p>\n CIVIL WAR\/INTERVENTION IN SYRIA<\/strong><\/p>\n Dangerous Inaccuracies: The Media and Syria<\/a> —- Every time I come to Syria I am struck by how different the situation is on the ground from the way it is pictured in the outside world. The foreign media reporting of the Syrian conflict is surely as inaccurate and misleading as anything we have seen since the start of the First World War. I can\u2019t think of any other war or crisis I have covered in which propagandistic, biased or second-hand sources have been so readily accepted by journalists as providers of objective facts. A result of these distortions is that politicians and casual newspaper or television viewers alike have never had a clear idea over the last two years of what is happening inside Syria. Worse, long-term plans are based on these misconceptions.<\/p>\n Syria\u2019s proxy war: Internal conflict turns into regional power play<\/a> —- As a US official wrote in a report by the International Crisis Group, \u201ca Syrian war with regional consequences is becoming a regional war with a Syrian focus.\u201d A new cold war is dividing the region, like the original, which set Nasser\u2019s Egypt, allied with the USSR, against Saudi Arabia and the US in the 1950s and 60s. But times have changed. Arab nationalism has declined, sectarian positions are hardening, and there is even doubt over the future of the states and frontiers created after the First World War. <\/p>\n (Video) Irish Politician: Stop \u2018Slobbering Over\u2019 Obama, the \u2018War Criminal\u2019<\/a> Hopes for Syria Talks Hinge on Kerry-Lavrov Meeting<\/a> —- The issue of who attends the conference has proved a sticking point, with the United States opposed to participation by Iran. A thornier problem is the role, if any, of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria.<\/p>\n Both sides agreed the peace conference should lead to the formation of a transitional government with full executive powers over all institutions of state, but the United States interprets that to mean a full transfer of powers from Mr. Assad. Russia, however, has insisted that only Syrians can decide his role. <\/p>\n Also useful \u2013 International Crisis Group, \u201cSyria\u2019s Metastasising Conflicts<\/a>,\u201d [June 2013]; Zbigniew Brzezinski, \u201cInterview on the Syria Crisis<\/a>,\u201d The National Interest [June 24, 2013] ; and James Carden, \u201cA Syria \u2018No-fly Zone\u2019 and Just War Theory<\/a>,\u201d Antiwar.com [July 1, 2013] . The website Syria Comment<\/a> has just posted two useful articles on Syria\u2019s economic crisis: <\/p>\n Inside Syria —- The Syrian conflict is a civil war with all the horrors traditionally inflicted in such struggles wherever they are fought, be it Syria today or Russia, Spain, Greece, Lebanon or Iraq in the past. For the newly appointed American National Security Adviser Susan Rice, David Cameron or William Hague to pretend that this is a simple battle between a dictatorial government and an oppressed people is to misrepresent or misunderstand what is happening on the ground. Evidence that both sides have committed supporters prepared to fight to the death is borne out by the estimate of some 100,000 dead published this week by the pro-rebel Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. It concludes that fatal casualties come almost equally from the two sides in the civil war: broadly 25,000 of them government soldiers, 17,000 pro-government militia, 36,000 civilians and 14,000 rebel fighters, though the last two figures in particular are probably understated. <\/p>\n Also \u2013 Patrick Cockburn, \u201cDeath comes to Straight Street in Damascus<\/a>,\u201d The Independent [UK] [June 27, 2013] <\/p>\n Al Qaeda’s Syria rift may lead to open conflict among jihadis<\/a> —- A rift between Syrian jihadis and their fellow fighters from al Qaeda’s Iraqi wing may lead to internecine war among some of the most effective rebel groups in combating President Bashar al-Assad.<\/p>\n Trouble has been brewing since April over what Syria’s Nusra Front regards as a power grab by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State of Iraq. Now, Baghdadi’s insistence that he will keep fighting as head of a united jihadi brigade in Syria, defying orders from al Qaeda chief Ayman Zawahri, has brought the two groups close to turning on each other. <\/p>\n US Policy in\/toward Syria<\/strong> —- What was most troubling about this latest shift in U.S. policy was the absence of a speech or briefing by the president, or a cabinet official, to clearly articulate why America is deepening its involvement in this Middle East conflict, what U.S. interests are at stake in the civil war, and what strategic objective the United States hopes to achieve. While some of these partially overlap, administration officials have put forth over a dozen objectives for the United States and its partners in Syria — in just the last 12 days. Never in the history of third-party interventions in civil wars has so much been asked of so little. This combination of maximalist and minimalist goals without a single clearly articulated strategic objective, or any degree of prioritization, should be troubling to all Americans. <\/p>\n U.S. begins shipping arms for Syrian rebels<\/a> —- The Central Intelligence Agency has begun moving weapons to Jordan from a network of secret warehouses and plans to start arming small groups of vetted Syrian rebels within a month, expanding U.S. support of moderate forces battling President Bashar al-Assad, according to diplomats and U.S. officials briefed on the plans. The shipments, related training and a parallel push to mobilize arms deliveries from European and Arab allies are being timed to allow a concerted push by the rebels starting by early August, the diplomats and officials said, revealing details of a new covert plan authorized by President Barack Obama and disclosed earlier this month. <\/p>\n More on arming the Syrian opposition \u2013 Matthew Schofield, \u201cEurope likely to stay on sidelines when U.S. ships arms to Syria rebels<\/a>,\u201d McClatchy [June 28, 2013] ; and Mark Mazzetti, et al., \u201cSending Missiles to Syrian Rebels, Qatar Muscles In,<\/a>\u201d New York Times [June 29, 2013] <\/p>\n On Syria: ‘Congress Must Accept Its Responsibility, Not Abdicate It<\/a>‘ Is the US Playing With Gas in Syria<\/a>? Is the Eastern Mediterranean a new cockpit for conflict in this Long War? Since the start of this bonanza, NATO has toppled Libya, Syria is enflamed in civil war, and the longtime ruler of Egypt has fallen. Last year, Haaretz wrote that the Israeli Defense Force was quickly becoming the \u201cIsraeli Gas Defense Force,\u201d and that was before the Netanyahu government asked for a budget increase of $800 million dollars to create a Naval task force to patrol the gas fields. \u2026 It appears that Damascus will soon finally feel the full impact of the Western fist. Turkey and Israel will be key partners in this effort. Gas may be the reason why. <\/p>\n Opposition to US Intervention\/War<\/strong><\/p>\n A Statement on Syria<\/a> —- We would welcome an end to the violence in Syria, but we strongly oppose any diplomatic, not to mention military, intervention by outside powers that tries to dictate the shape of a future Syria or prevents the Syrian people from overthrowing the Assad regime. It is the Syrian people themselves who must make the decision as to how to defend themselves and their basic human rights, and what kind of society they hope to build. We stand in solidarity with their struggle and our hearts go out to them in their suffering. <\/p>\n Syria: Ten Reasons Why We Oppose Intervention<\/a> 10 Problems with the Latest Excuse for War<\/a> —- If you own a television or read a newspaper you’ve probably heard that we need another war because the Syrian government used chemical weapons. If you own a computer and know where to look you’ve probably heard that there isn’t actually any evidence for that claim. Below are 10 reasons why this latest excuse for war is no good even if true.<\/p>\n Voters disapprove of arming Syrian rebels<\/a> —- A sizable majority of Americans disapproves of the Obama administration\u2019s decision to send weapons to anti-government rebels in Syria. Overall, 66 percent of voters disagree with arming the rebels, according to a Fox News national poll released Wednesday. Twenty-four percent approve. The objection is widespread across demographic groups\u2026. <\/p>\n Also useful \u2013 Jeremy Herb, \u201cObama faces [congressional] backlash on Syria<\/a>,\u201d The Hill [June 30, 2013] <\/p>\n
\nFrank Brodhead
\n
\nOVERVIEWS AND PERSPECTIVES<\/strong>
\n\u201cDiamonds for Peanuts\u201d and the Double Standard<\/a>
\nBy Marsha B. Cohen, Lobe Log [June 30, 2013]<\/p>\n
\nBy Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, Going to Tehran [June 30, 2013]
\n—- A 2-part video interview with Gareth Porte<\/a>r<\/p>\n
\nFrom Reuters [June 28, 2013]<\/p>\n
\n
\nReal politics in Iran?<\/a>
\nBy Daniel Brumberg and Farideh Farhi, Foreign Policy [June 25, 2013]<\/p>\n
\nFrom Madison, Wisconsin NPR<\/a> [June 18, 2013]<\/p>\n
\nIran’s new president looks westward for nuke talks<\/a>
\nBy Brian Murphy, Associated Press [June 26, 2013]<\/p>\n
\nBy Farideh Farhi and Saideh Lotfian, Foreign Affairs [June 13, 2013]<\/p>\n
\nBy Thomas Erdbrink, New York Times [June 29, 2013]<\/p>\n
\nWhat Are Rouhani\u2019s Critics Afraid of?<\/a>
\nBy Barbara Slavin, Al-Monitor [June 23, 2013]<\/p>\n
\nWhy D.C. is wrong to discredit Iran\u2019s new president
\n<\/a>By Trita Parsi, Reuters [June 28, 2013]<\/p>\n
\nBy Matthew Duss and Lawrence Korb, Politico [June 28, 2013]<\/p>\n
\nBy Muhammad Sahimi, Antiwar.com [June 29, 2013]<\/p>\n
\nBy Amos Harel, Haaretz [June 18, 2013][pay wall]<\/p>\n
\nBy The New York Times [June 28, 2013]<\/p>\n
\nBy Patrick Cockburn, Counterpunch [July 1, 2013]<\/p>\n
\nBy Alain Gresh \u2013 July 2013<\/p>\n
\nBy John Glaser, Antiwar.com [June 28, 2013]<\/p>\n
\nBy Nick Cumming-Bruce and Michael R. Gordon, New York Times [June 25, 2013]<\/p>\n
\nReturn to Homs: An Atmosphere Poisoned By Fear<\/a>
\nBy Patrick Cockburn, Counterpunch [June 28, 2013]<\/p>\n
\nBy Mariam Karouny, Reuters [June 24, 2013]<\/p>\n
\n
\nObama’s ‘Alice in Wonderland’ Syria Strategy<\/a>
\nBY Micah Zenko, Foreign Policy [June 25, 2013]<\/p>\n
\nThe Wall St. Journal [June 27, 2013][pay wall]<\/p>\n
\nBy John Nichols, The Nation [June 27, 2013]<\/p>\n
\nBy Evan Taylor, Counterpunch [June 28, 2013]<\/p>\n
\nBy Thomas Harrison and Joanne Landy, Campaign for Peace and Democracy [June 2013]<\/p>\n
\nFrom Stop the War Coalition [UK] [June 27, 2013]<\/p>\n
\nBy David Swanson [June 20, 2013]<\/p>\n
\nBy Dana Blanton, Fox News [June 26, 2013]<\/p>\n