{"id":34286,"date":"2019-12-10T07:55:09","date_gmt":"2019-12-10T15:55:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.antiwar.com\/blog\/?p=34286"},"modified":"2019-12-10T07:55:09","modified_gmt":"2019-12-10T15:55:09","slug":"the-afghanistan-pentagon-papers","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.antiwar.com\/blog\/2019\/12\/10\/the-afghanistan-pentagon-papers\/","title":{"rendered":"The Afghanistan Pentagon Papers"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>The war in Afghanistan, America\u2019s longest, has cost about 2,300 US lives, over 20,000 wounded, and about $1 trillion. Now, thanks to the persistence of the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.msn.com\/en-us\/news\/world\/confidential-documents-reveal-us-officials-failed-to-tell-the-truth-about-the-war-in-afghanistan\/ar-BBXY8l1\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\"><i>Washington Post<\/i><\/a>, we have an abundance of interviews which, like the Pentagon Papers, reveal the enormous wastefulness, ignorance, and deceit that make Afghanistan, like Vietnam, a chapter in the history of failed US interventions.<\/p>\n<p>In my October 2015 blog, \u201cTruth and Consequences,\u201d I cited a report at the time that Richard Nixon had complained to Henry Kissinger about the US failure to win the Vietnam War given all the firepower at its disposal. But that\u2019s not what Nixon said publicly. I concluded: \u201cWe are now witness in Afghanistan to the same scenario: public lies, private doubts.\u201d I also identified some of the problems with the US war effort in Afghanistan that the <i>Post<\/i> documents now reveal \u2013 problems that should have led Obama to deliver on his promise to withdraw US troops. Instead, he continued the failed effort and passed Afghanistan on to Trump. Both presidents had plenty of bipartisan support from people who, as in Vietnam, use \u201cresolve\u201d and \u201ccommitment\u201d to justify the sacrifice of blood and treasure in a country they barely know. \u201cAfghanistan is blessed with a substantial number of lobbyists who seem incapable of thinking beyond war,\u201d I concluded in my blog.<\/p>\n<p><b>Vietnam Syndrome<\/b><\/p>\n<p> Decision making on Afghanistan, the interviews tell us, parallels that in Vietnam in several specific ways. Here are some symptoms of this seemingly chronic illness drawn from the <i>Post<\/i> interviews:<\/p>\n<p><!--more--><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<p><i>Unwarranted optimism.<\/i> No matter how badly things go, decision makers remain determined to win. (Donald Trump has recently said as much: If negotiations with the Taliban don\u2019t work out, \u201ccomplete victory\u201d is the alternative.)<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p><i>Manipulating the Metrics<\/i>: \u201cThe metrics were always manipulated for the duration of the war,\u201d says one interviewee. (As a French general famously told his American counterpart in Vietnam, \u201cYou want the numbers to go up, we will make them go up. You want them to go down, we\u2019ll make them go down.\u201d)<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p><i>Bureaucratic Politics<\/i>: A former brigadier general pointed to the confusion of activity with impact, and therefore treated money and projects as equivalent to real accomplishment. \u201cThe crack cocaine of development was how much money was spent. It was an addiction that affected every agency,\u201d he said. USAID was the worst offender: Its \u201cmission is to perpetually involve itself in projects to justify its existence\u201d and make local people dependent on it.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p><i>Lie When You Have To<\/i>: Most everyone on the ground saw the disconnect between what was actually happening and what had to be said in public. Lying became commonplace. As one colonel said, \u201cEvery data point was altered to present the best picture possible.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p>Mission Impossible: \u201cWe were devoid of a fundamental understanding of Afghanistan \u2013 we didn\u2019t know what we were doing,\u201d said one general. In agreement, a former commanding general in Afghanistan said: \u201cI tried to get someone to define for me what winning meant, . . . and nobody could. . . . Some people were thinking in terms of Jeffersonian democracy, but that\u2019s just not going to happen in Afghanistan.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p><i>Nation-Building Hubris<\/i>: Thinking US involvement would eventually cure Afghanistan of official corruption, reform the military and police, and transform the economy. The emphasis was on building a strong central government, contrary to the tribal character of Afghanistan\u2019s political culture. As one former ambassador said, the Americans had to deal with \u201cfeudal lords\u201d \u2013 people who weren\u2019t about to give up their power, or their weapons. Corruption was endemic, much like \u201cTammany Hall\u201d or Chicago: People take care of their own in return for loyalty.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p><i>Inability To Separate Development From Security<\/i>: \u201cIf you look at the amount of money spent in Afghanistan, you see a tiny percentage of it went to help the people of the country. It almost all went to the military and even most of that money went for local militia and police training.\u201d There were also budgeting cycles and fights over programs in \u201cthe snake pit that Washington is,\u201d making it extremely difficult to make progress on Afghanistan\u2019s development.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p><i>Failure To See the Big Picture<\/i>: \u201cCollectively the system is incapable of stepping back to question basic assumptions,\u201d said one former National Security Council staffer. The \u201cbigger question,\u201d he said, is \u201cwhy does the U.S. undertake actions that are beyond its abilities?\u201d Afghanistan \u201cis not government-in-a-box or nation-building,\u201d yet it was treated as such. Introspection, questioning those approaches, didn\u2019t occur. \u201cThere is too much momentum and not enough reflection,\u201d he concluded.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p><i>Wrong Prescription<\/i>: James Dobbins, a former diplomacy: \u201cWe don\u2019t invade poor countries to make them rich. We don\u2019t invade authoritarian countries to make them democratic. We invade violent countries to make them peaceful and we clearly failed in Afghanistan.\u201d Invading for peace?<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Someday, someone will write a memoir of Afghanistan with a mea culpa similar to Robert McNamara\u2019s In Retrospect. Like his, it will be too little, too late. Probably unlike his, the war in Afghanistan will still be going on when that memoir is written, telling us that despite all the US wrongdoing, and the \u201clessons learned\u201d that prompted the interview project, no president has had either the courage or the wisdom to say, enough.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/melgurtov.com\"><i>Mel Gurtov<\/i><\/a><i>, syndicated by <\/i><a href=\"http:\/\/www.peacevoice.info\/\"><i>PeaceVoice<\/i><\/a><i>, is professor emeritus of political science at Portland State University, and editor-in-chief of Asian Perspective. His most recent book is<\/i><a href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Will-This-Be-Chinas-Century\/dp\/1588268748\/antiwarbookstore\">Will This Be China&#8217;s Century? A Skeptic&#8217;s View<\/a><i>(Lynne Rienner, 2013). <\/i><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The war in Afghanistan, America\u2019s longest, has cost about 2,300 US lives, over 20,000 wounded, and about $1 trillion. Now, thanks to the persistence of the Washington Post, we have an abundance of interviews which, like the Pentagon Papers, reveal the enormous wastefulness, ignorance, and deceit that make Afghanistan, like Vietnam, a chapter in the [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":273,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_seopress_robots_primary_cat":"","_seopress_titles_title":"","_seopress_titles_desc":"","_seopress_robots_index":"","_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"coauthors":[],"class_list":["post-34286","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"meta_box":{"disable_donate_message":"","custom_donate_message":"","subtitle":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.antiwar.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/34286","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.antiwar.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.antiwar.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.antiwar.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/273"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.antiwar.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=34286"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.antiwar.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/34286\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":34288,"href":"https:\/\/www.antiwar.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/34286\/revisions\/34288"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.antiwar.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=34286"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.antiwar.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=34286"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.antiwar.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=34286"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.antiwar.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=34286"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}