He sneers at peaceful free enterprise (or the study thereof) while bellowing about the glories of the state – especially those segments of it most prone to snapping bones and spilling blood.
Earth to Arianna: Back to the Drawing Board, Dah-link!
The much-touted breathlessly-anticipated Huffington Post — a blog-site edited by Arianna Huffington, neo-con socialite-turned-socialist, where the Hollywood glittterati blog speak to the Huddled Masses — debuts this morning, and all I can say it ….. Yawn! Here’s Ellen DeGeneres, who gives us a re-cycled Sixty Minutes story about how those Big Bad Corporations cut up government-owned horses for food, not to mention the natterings of Julia Louis-Dreyfus of Seinfeld fame and her husband Brad Hall (who he?) about gay marriage that starts out unpromisingly:
“Look around and you’ll see the gays getting gay-married all over the place, and, to quote, well, everyone: gay marriage destroys real marriage. “
All over the place? Well, as my old Auntie Gay once told me: Just don’t scare the horses. Or it that just horse-sh*t?
Anywho, it’s onward and downward to Gerald Posner’s “exclusive” book excerpt about how the Saudis have their oil empire rigged to — yikes! — “self-destruct”:
“Based on National Security Agency electronic intercepts, the Saudi Arabian government has in place a nationwide, self-destruction explosive system composed of conventional explosives and dirty bombs strategically placed at the Kingdom’s key oil ports, pipelines, pumping stations, storage tanks, offshore platforms, and backup facilities. If activated, the bombs would destroy the infrastructure of the world’s largest oil supplier, and leave the country a contaminated nuclear wasteland ensuring that the Kingdom’s oil would be unusable to anyone. The NSA file is dubbed internally Petro SE, for petroleum scorched earth.”
Yes, the Saudis are primed to bomb themselves, and turn their country into a nuclear wasteland — but that’s only when holding their collective breath until they turn blue doesn’t work.
Puh-leeeze! Are we supposed to read this with a straight face? But perhaps this Gotterdammerung scenario is a metaphor for the fate of the Huffington Post itself. If it doesn’t succeed — that is, if the idea of Hollywood airheads (most of whom I confess to never having heard of) nattering on about nothing ad infinitum causes us all to go back to bed and pull the covers over our heads, as it ought to — rumor has it that Arianna’s head (which is already puffed up beyond human ken) is rigged to explode, along with the empty heads of her “columnists.”
Speaking of dirty bombs: the only columnist of any substance in this morning’s Huffington Post is David Frum, who berates Vladimir Putin for not building monuments to the evils of his own country and wallowing in guilt for the crimes of the Soviet era. The piece is aimed at the kind of airhead liberal who thinks that Putin is a Bad Guy because he’s roughing up those cute cuddlely Chechens, and seems never to smile. The Frum is mad because of “continued kid-gloving of Josef Stalin by senior leaders” — never mind that Stalin is long dead. Beating a dead horse is exactly what the neocons are all about — and what’s with the horse metaphor this morning? Is it because of all the horse-manure that seems to be clinging to our shoes as we traverse the highways and by-ways of the Internet this dreary Monday morn…..?
For a bracing antidode to Frum’s cold war rhetoric — we are supposed to believe that a broken-down country with a Third World economy and a declining population is “rapidly reverting to the authoritarian and expansionist past” (I think Frum is projecting here) — check out my column.
As for the verdict on Arianna’s much-heralded “blog” — back to the drawing board, dah-link!
“Intelligence” leads Marines into a trap?
This report of a botched raid is so bizarre that I had to read it repeatedly while trying to piece together the information it contains. So, let’s see. We read that, operating on the theory that "foreign fighters" are "flowing into Iraq" from Syria, 1,000 Marines are sent "north of the Euphrates" on what James Janega, reporting for the Chicago Tribune calls "Sunday’s elaborate mission, planned for weeks."
However, "a combination of bad luck and insurgent counterattacks quickly disrupted the plan." The plan was to send the Army’s 814th Multi-Role Bridge Company ahead to build a pontoon bridge across the Euphrates. But! "The trucks were forced to use their headlights to allow them to spot land mines along the route."
There were landmines in the road? OK, so this landmine problem forced the convoy to employ the "routine safety practice" of turning on their headlights. Everything went downhill from there.
But the routine safety practice apparently alerted area residents to the convoy’s presence. An entire town along the route switched off its lights all at once, a move Marines believe is used to send signals from one river town to the next.
As the bridging unit approached the river crossing early Sunday, they switched off the truck headlights even though many soldiers lacked night-vision goggles. In the gloom, one truck rolled off the road and into a ditch, bringing the column to a dead halt in the darkness.
The soldiers soon discovered another problem: The river banks, sodden after recent rains, might have been too wet to support the oncoming American tanks.
"I hope security keeps us safe all day," Capt. Chris Taylor of the 814th said as officers tried to find other ways to get troops and equipment across the river.
But when dawn broke, the column came under mortar fire from Ubaydi, the nearest town. Two mortars dropped within feet of the Marines’ command post and an officer’s Humvee. The insurgents the Marines expected to find north of the river were on the south side as well.
Marines and soldiers scrambled into a ramshackle building on a bluff overlooking the river, then devised a new strategy: They would not cross the river Sunday. They would attack Ubaydi.
Apart from information that the area is so hostile that before the Marines even got to the river, they came under attack from the locals, causing the Marines to call in F/A-18 fighter planes and helicopter gunships, we have another amazing revelation about why they had blundered into this situation in the first place.
While some American units were able to conduct limited raids north of the Euphrates on Sunday, most of the rest were trapped south of the river while Army engineers struggled to build a pontoon bridge across it.
U.S. military officials in Baghdad said forces that crossed the Euphrates had killed six insurgents and captured 54 more, using information gleaned from a captured aide to terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
Well, no wonder there were landmines in the road.
Meanwhile, Maj. Steve Lawson of the 3rd Battalion, 25th Marines led his troops through the north end of Ubaydi in tough fighting that lasted until after sunset.
Marine officers would not release casualty information, saying their policy requires families to be notified first. But during the day, evacuation helicopters swooped repeatedly to the emergency landing zone set up near the intended river crossing.
"We thought the enemy was north of the river," Lawson said. "Obviously, they were here too."
Yeah, obviously they were. Almost like they knew the Marines were coming.
Winning the War on Terror!
In Case You Missed It…
The Secret Downing Street Memo
On Sunday, May 1st (fittingly), the Sunday Times reported the existence of a top secret memo from Number 10 Downing Street dated July 23, 2002. It is definitive proof that the “bad intelligence” that fooled the American people and our congressmen into invading Iraq was absolutely, positively, outright lies.
We have all know for some time from Bob Woodward, Paul O’Neil and Richard Clarke that the decision to invade Iraq was made long before the war (in fact, long before September 11th), but now here is absolute proof that the Bush/Blair administration knew good and well that they would have to make up their excuse. That is, “fix the intelligence,” or as those of us in the private sector would say, “lie.”
Please take special note of our government’s willingness to fake an Iraqi casus belli in “Option (b) Running Start.”
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL – UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER’S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam’s regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun “spikes of activity” to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
For CIA veteran Ray McGovern’s analysis, click here
Ray McGovern and Gordon Prather on the Radio
Saturday on the Weekend Interview Show, I’ll be talking with Ray McGovern of the Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity about the absence of intelligence and sanity in our government, and Antiwar.com’s own Gordon Prather will return in the second hour to explain all those complicated details surrounding the fight America is picking with Iran.
Update: Show’s over, Archives