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September 14, 2004 |
National Security Experts Demand to Be Heard
by Sibel Edmonds et al
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The following letter to Congress is signed by 25 national security
experts.
To the Congress of the United States:
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States ended its
report [.pdf]
stating, "We look forward to a national debate on the merits of what we
have recommended, and we will participate vigorously in that debate." In
this spirit, we the undersigned wish to bring to the attention of the Congress
and the people of the United States what we believe are serious shortcomings
in the report and its recommendations. We thus call upon Congress to refrain
from narrow political considerations and to apply brakes to the race to implement
the Commission's recommendations. It is not too late for Congress to break with
the practice of limiting testimony to that from politicians and top-layer career
bureaucrats – many with personal reputations to defend and institutional equities
to protect. Instead, use this unique opportunity to introduce salutary reform,
an opportunity that must not be squandered by politically driven haste.
Omission is one of the major flaws in the Commission's report. We are aware
of significant issues and cases that were duly reported to the Commission by
those of us with direct knowledge, but somehow escaped attention. Serious
problems and shortcomings within government agencies likewise were reported
to the Commission but were not included in the report. The report simply does
not get at key problems within the intelligence, aviation security, and law
enforcement communities. The omission of such serious and applicable
issues and information by itself renders the report flawed, and casts doubt
on the validity of many of its recommendations.
We believe that one of the primary purposes of the Commission was to establish
accountability; that to do so is essential to understanding the failures that
led to 9/11, and to prescribe needed changes. However, the Commission in its
report holds no one accountable, stating instead that "our
aim has not been to assign individual blame." That is to play the political
game, and it shows that the goal of achieving unanimity overrode one of the
primary purposes of this Commission's establishment. When calling for accountability,
we are referring not to quasi-innocent mistakes caused by "lack of imagination"
or brought about by ordinary "human error." Rather, we refer to intentional
actions or inaction by individuals responsible for our national security, actions
or inaction dictated by motives other than the security of the people of the
United States. The report deliberately ignores officials and civil servants
who were, and still are, clearly negligent and/or derelict in their duties to
the nation. If these individuals are protected rather than held accountable,
the mindset that enabled 9/11 will persist, no matter how many layers of bureaucracy
are added, and no matter how much money is poured into the agencies. Character
counts. Personal integrity, courage, and professionalism make the difference.
Only a commission bent on holding no one responsible and reaching unanimity
could have missed that.
We understand, as do most Americans, that one of our greatest strengths in
defending against terrorism is the dedication and resourcefulness of those individuals
who work on the frontlines. Even before the Commission began its work, many
honest and patriotic individuals from various agencies came forward with information
and warnings regarding terrorism-related issues and serious problems within
our intelligence and aviation security agencies. If it were not for these individuals,
much of what we know today of significant issues and facts surrounding 9/11
would have remained in the dark. These "whistleblowers" were
able to put the safety of the American people above their own careers and jobs,
even though they had reason to suspect that the deck was stacked against them.
Sadly, it was. Retaliation took many forms: some were ostracized; others were
put under formal or informal gag orders; some were fired. The Commission has
neither acknowledged their contribution nor faced up to the urgent need to protect
such patriots against retaliation by the many bureaucrats who tend to give absolute
priority to saving face and protecting their own careers.
The Commission did emphasize that barriers to the flow of information
were a primary cause for wasting opportunities to prevent the tragedy. But it
skipped a basic truth. Secrecy enforced by repression threatens national security
as much as bureaucratic turf fights. It sustains vulnerability to terrorism
caused by government breakdowns. Reforms will be paper tigers without a safe
channel for whistleblowers to keep them honest in practice. It is unrealistic
to expect that government workers will defend the public if they can't defend
themselves. Profiles in courage are the exception, not the rule. Unfortunately,
current whistleblower rights are a cruel trap and magnet for cynicism. The Whistleblower
Protection Act has turned into an efficient way to finish whistleblowers off
by endorsing termination. No government workers have access to jury trials like
Congress enacted for corporate workers after the Enron/MCI debacles. Government
workers need genuine, enforceable rights just as much to protect America's families
as corporate workers do to protect America's investments. It will take congressional
leadership to fill this hole in the 9/11 Commission's recommendations.
The Commission, with its incomplete report of "facts and circumstances,"
intentional avoidance of assigning accountability, and disregard for the knowledge,
expertise and experience of those who actually do the job, has now set about
pressuring our Congress and our nation to hastily implement all its recommendations.
While we do not intend to imply that all recommendations of this report are
flawed, we assert that the Commission's list of recommendations does not include
many urgently needed fixes, and further, we argue that some of their recommendations,
such as the creation of an "intelligence czar" and haphazard increases
in intelligence budgets, will lead to increases in the complexity and confusion
of an already complex and highly bureaucratic system.
Congress has been hearing not only from the commissioners but from a bevy of
other career politicians, very few of whom have worked in the intelligence community,
and from top-layer bureaucrats, many with vested interests in saving face and
avoiding accountability. Congress has not included the voices of the
people working within the intelligence and broader national security communities
who deal with the real issues and problems day after day and who possess the
needed expertise and experience – in short, those who not only do the job, but
are conscientious enough to stick their necks out in pointing to the impediments
they experience in trying to do it effectively.
We the undersigned, who have worked within various government agencies (FBI,
CIA, FAA, DIA, Customs) responsible for national security and public safety,
call upon you in Congress to include the voices of those with firsthand knowledge
and expertise in the important issues at hand. We stand ready to do our part.
Respectfully,
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Costello, Edward J., Jr., former special agent, Counterintelligence,
FBI
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Cole, John M., former Veteran Intelligence Operations specialist, FBI
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Conrad, David "Mark," retired agent in charge, Internal Affairs,
U.S. Customs
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Dew, Rosemary N., former supervisory special agent, Counterterrorism
& Counterintelligence, FBI
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Dzakovic, Bogdan, former Red Team leader, FAA
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Edmonds, Sibel D., former language specialist, FBI
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Elson, Steve, retired Navy Seal & former special agent, FAA &
U.S. Navy
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Forbes, David, aviation, logistics and govt. security analyst, BoydForbes
Inc.
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Goodman, Melvin A., former senior analyst/ division manager, CIA; senior
fellow at the Center for International Policy
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Graf, Mark, former security supervisor, planner, & derivative classifier,
Department of Energy
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Graham, Gilbert M., retired special agent, Counterintelligence, FBI
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Kleiman, Diane, former special agent, U.S. Customs
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Kwiatkowski, Lt. Col. Karen U., USAF (ret.); veteran policy analyst,
DoD
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Larkin, Lynne A., former operation officer, CIA
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MacMichael, David, former senior estimates officer, CIA
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McGovern, Raymond L., former analyst, CIA
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Pahle, Theodore J., retired senior intelligence officer, DIA
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Sarshar, Behrooz, retired language specialist, FBI
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Sullivan, Brian F., retired special agent & risk management specialist,
FAA
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Tortorich, Larry J., retired U.S. Naval officer, U.S. Navy & Dept.
of Homeland Security/TSA
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Turner, Jane A., retired special agent, FBI
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Vincent, John B., retired special agent, Counterterrorism, FBI
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Whitehurst, Dr. Fred, retired supervisory special agent/laboratory forensic
examiner, FBI
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Wright, Col. Ann, U.S. Army (ret.); former Foreign Service officer
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Zipoli, Matthew J., Special Response Team (SRT) officer, DOE
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Sibel Edmonds
began working for the FBI shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks. Until
the spring of 2002 she worked in the FBI's Washington field office
translating top-secret documents pertaining to suspected terrorists.
She first gained wide public attention in October of that year when
she appeared on '60 Minutes' on CBS and charged that the FBI, State
Department, and Pentagon had been infiltrated by agents of a Turkish
intelligence officer suspected of ties to terrorism. She also accused
members of the FBI's translation services of sabotage, intimidation,
corruption and incompetence. On October 18, 2002, at the request
of FBI Director Robert Mueller, Attorney General Ashcroft imposed
a gag order on Ms. Edmonds, citing possible damage to diplomatic
relations or national security.
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