You know there's trouble ahead when Iraq, in its
present state, is the good news story for Bush administration policy. While
various civilian and military officials from the
president on down have been talking up "success" in Iraq and beating the
rhetorical war drums vis-à-vis Iran, much of the remainder of the administration's
foreign policy in what the neocons used to call "the
arc of instability" began to thoroughly unravel.
In the Horn of Africa, U.S.-backed Ethiopian troops are bogged down in a disastrous
occupation of Somalia's capital, harried by a growing Islamist insurgency. Despite
endless shuttle diplomacy by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the administration's
Middle East peace
conference, to be held at Annapolis, is already being
dismissed as a failure before the first official invitations are issued.
Meanwhile, the Turks are driving
the administration to distraction by threatening to invade and destabilize
the only moderately successful part of the new Iraq, its Kurdish region (while
the Iraqi government in Baghdad calls on Iran for help in the crisis).
Russian President Vladimir Putin recently landed in Tehran and brazenly indicated
that any U.S.
attack on Iran would be considered an attack on Russia. He then convened
a local "mini-summit"
and formed a regional Caspian Sea-based alliance with Iran and three energy-rich
former SSRs of the departed Soviet Union implicitly directed against the United
States and its local allies. On the day Secretary of State Rice announced new,
tough sanctions against the Iranians, Putin commented
pointedly: "Why worsen the situation by threatening sanctions and bring it to
a dead end? It's not the best way to resolve the situation by running around
like a madman with a razor blade in his hand."
Meanwhile, one country to the east, the resurgent Taliban has, against all
predictions, just captured a third
district in Western Afghanistan near the Iranian border – and, as the most
recent devastating suicide bomb indicates, attacks are spreading north.
And then, of course, there's the
president's greatest ally in the Muslim world, Pakistan's ruler, Pervez
Remember Bush's nightmare scenario, the one that guaranteed a surefire "preventive"
attack from his administration: an autocratic and oppressive ruler with weapons
of mass destruction, especially nuclear ones, presiding over a country that
offers a safe haven for terrorists? Well, that's now Pakistan, whose security
forces are busily jailing hundreds
of lawyers, while the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and extremist Islamists, well armed
and backed by their own radio stations broadcasting calls for jihad,
are moving out of safe havens in the tribal areas along the Afghan border and
Pakistan proper to fight. And there's essentially nothing the administration
can do, except mouth platitudes and look the other way. As Paul Woodward of
in Context Web site has pointed out: When it comes to nuclear Iran and nuclear
Pakistan, we have been living in "a Through-the-Looking-Glass world where nuclear
weapons that do exist are less dangerous than those that can be imagined." Now,
not much imagination is needed at all.
Strangely, from Ethiopia to Pakistan, despite all the signs, all the predictions,
the Bush administration, as far as we can tell, expected none of the above.
How often can it be caught off guard by the consequences of its own decisions
and actions? Eternally, it seems.
The possible collapse of the president's foreign policy across the entire arc
of instability was first written about by the always prescient Juan Cole at
He commented that, "like a drunken millionaire gambling away a fortune at a
Las Vegas casino, the Bush administration squandered all the assets it began
with by invading Iraq and unleashing chaos in the Gulf." And he ventured a prediction:
"The thunder of the bomb [that blew up as former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto returned home] in Karachi and the Turkish shells in Iraqi Kurdistan may
well be the sound of Bush losing his 'war on terror.'" Over at TPM Café,
Todd Gitlin was the first
to offer a wry, if grim, suggestion, as he considered Bush's "failure to
crush the Taliban & Co." from Tora Bora 2001 on. "Talk about dominos," he
wrote. "How about this for a Democratic slogan: Who Lost Pakistan?"
With the price of crude oil threatening to hit $100 a barrel and prices at
the pump surging over $3 a gallon domestically – while, on the nightly news,
experts mutter about oil at $150 a barrel and gas at $4 a gallon by next summer
– a meltdown might be in the works. Invaded and occupied Iraq, like some festering
sore, remains at the heart of this spreading disaster, the end of which is nowhere
in sight. The U.S. military, the sole instrument with which Bush's top officials
and his neocon followers imagined
they could launch their "expeditionary" sorties around the globe, as if they
were so many 19th-century British imperialists, has proved incapable of responding
to such an essentially political situation. The president might as well be using
a hammer to ward off gnats. No wonder, as retired Air Force lieutenant colonel
and historian of early 20th-century Germany William Astore makes clear, the
military and right-wing politicians are already preparing their own exit strategies
in the form of stab-in-the-back explanations of what happened. Tom
The Enemy Within
Finding American backs to stab
by William J. Astore
The world's finest military launches a highly
coordinated shock-and-awe attack that shows enormous initial progress. There's
talk of the victorious troops being home for Christmas. But the war unexpectedly
drags on. As fighting persists into a third, and then a fourth year, voices
are heard calling for negotiations, even "peace without victory." Dismissing
such peaceniks and critics as defeatists, a conservative and expansionist regime
– led by a figurehead who often resorts to simplistic slogans and his Machiavellian
sidekick, who is considered the brains behind the throne – calls for one last
surge to victory. Unbeknownst to the people on the home front, however, this
duo has already prepared a seductive and self-exculpatory myth in case the surge
The United States in 2007? No, Wilhelmine Germany in 1917 and 1918, as its
military dictators, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and his loyal second,
Gen. Erich Ludendorff, pushed Germany toward defeat and revolution in a relentless
pursuit of victory in World War I. Having failed with their surge strategy on
the Western Front in 1918, they nevertheless succeeded in deploying a stab-in-the-back
myth, or Dolchstoßlegende, that shifted blame for defeat from themselves
and Rightist politicians to Social Democrats and others allegedly responsible
for losing the war by their failure to support the troops at home.
The German Army knew it was militarily defeated in 1918. But this was an inconvenient
truth for Hindenburg and the Right, so they crafted a new "truth": that the
troops were "unvanquished in the field." So powerful did these words become
that they would be engraved in stone on many a German war memorial.
It's a myth we ourselves are familiar with. As South Vietnam was collapsing
in 1975, Army Col. Harry G. Summers Jr., speaking to a North Vietnamese counterpart,
claimed the U.S. military had never lost a battle in Vietnam. Perhaps so, the
NVA colonel replied, "but it is also irrelevant." Summers recounts his conversation
approvingly, without irony, in his book On Strategy: A Critical Analysis
of the Vietnam War. For him, even if we lost the war, our Army proved itself
Though Summers' premise was – and remains – dangerously misleading, it reassured
the true believers who ran, and continue to run, our military. Those military
men who were less convinced of our "unbeatable" stature tended to keep their
own counsel. Their self-censorship, coupled with wider institutional self-deception,
effectively opened the door to exculpatory myths.
A New American Stab-in-the-Back?
Warnings about a new stab-in-the-back myth may seem premature or overheated
at this moment in the Iraq War. Yet, if the history of the original version
of this myth is any guide, the opposite is true. They are timely precisely because
the Dolchstoßlegende was not a postwar concoction, but an explanation
cunningly, even cynically, hatched by Rightists in Germany before the
failure of the desperate, final "victory offensive" of 1918 became fully apparent.
Although Hindenburg's dramatic testimony in November 1919 – a full year after
the armistice that ended the war – popularized the myth in Germany, it caught
fire precisely because the tinder had been laid to dry two years earlier.
It may seem farfetched to compare a Prussian military dictatorship and its
self-serving lies to the current Bush administration. Yet I'm not the first
person to express concern about the emergence of our very own Iraqi Dolchstoßlegende.
Back in 2004, Matthew Yglesias first
brought up the possibility. Last year, in Harper's
Magazine, Kevin Baker detailed the history of the stab-in-the-back,
suggesting that Bush's Iraqi version was already beginning to germinate early
in 2005, when news from Iraq turned definitively sour. And this October, in
Eric Alterman warned that the Bush administration was already busily sowing
the seeds of this myth. Other Iraqi myth-trackers have included Gary Kamiya
and Jeremy Brecher and Brendan Smith at CommonDreams.org.
Just this August, Thomas
Ricks, Washington Post columnist and author of the best-selling book
Fiasco, worried publicly about whether the military itself wasn't already
embracing elements of the myth whose specific betrayers would include "weaselly
politicians" (are there any other kind?) and a "media who undercut us by focusing
on the negative."
Is an American version of this myth really emerging then? Let's listen
in on a recent Jim Lehrer interview with Sen. John McCain, who, while officially
convinced that the president's surge plan in Iraq was working, couldn't seem
to help talking about how we might yet lose. His remarks quickly took a disturbing
turn as he pointed out that our Achilles' heel in Iraq is… well, we the people
of the United States and our growing impatience with the war. And the historical
analogy he employed was Vietnam, the catalyst for the deployment of the previous
While the Vietnam War was disastrous, McCain conceded, our military had – he
argued – turned the tide after the enemy's Tet Offensive in 1968 and the replacement
of Gen. William Westmoreland with Gen. Creighton Abrams as commander of our
forces there. Precisely at that tipping-point moment, he insisted, the American
people, their patience exhausted, had lost their will to win. For McCain, there
really was a light at the end of that Vietnamese tunnel – the military saw it,
yet the American people, blinded by bad news, never did.
In today's Iraq – again the McCain version – Gen. David Petraeus is the new
Abrams, finally the right general for the job. And his new tactic of protecting
the Iraqi people, thereby winning their hearts and minds, is working. Victory
beckons at the end of the "long, hard path" (that evidently has replaced the
Vietnamese tunnel), unless the American people run out of patience, as they
did back in the late 1960s.
McCain is no Hindenburg. Yet his almost automatic displacement of ultimate
responsibility from the Bush administration and the military to the American
people indicates the traction the stab-in-the-back myth has already gained in
mainstream politics. For the moment, with hope for some kind of victory, however
defined, not quite vanquished in official circles, our latest dagger-myth remains
sheathed, its murderous power as yet unwielded.
Then again, perhaps that's not quite the case, even now. In The Empire Strikes
Back, young Luke Skywalker asks Yoda, his wizened Jedi Master, whether the
dark side of the Force is stronger than the good. No, Yoda replies, just "easier,
quicker, more seductive" – an accurate description of the dark power of the
stab-in-the-back myth. Politicians sense its future power and alter their positions
accordingly. For example, no leading presidential candidate, Republican or Democrat,
dares to be labeled "defeatist" by calling for a major withdrawal of U.S. troops
in 2008. Exceptions like Ron Paul, Dennis Kucinich, or even Bill Richardson
only prove the rule – with support in the low single-digits, they risk little
in bucking the odds.
Fear of being labeled "the enemy within" is already silently reshaping our
politics as even decorated combat veterans like Congressman (and retired Marine
Corps colonel) John Murtha are not immune from being smeared for criticizing
the president's war. Politicians recognize that, in a campaign, it's well-nigh
impossible to overcome charges of weakness and pusillanimity. Sen. Hillary Clinton
senses that she may be unelectable unless she argues for us to continue to fight
the good fight in Iraq, albeit more intelligently. In fact, if you're looking
for significant changes in troop levels or strategy there, better hunker in
for Inauguration Day 2009 – and then prepare to wait some more.
Of Myths and Accountability
McCain's comments did echo a Clausewitzian truth. In warfare, the people's
will is an indispensable component of a nation's war-fighting"trinity" (that
also includes the government and the military). It's exceedingly difficult to
prevail in a major war, if a leg of this triad is hobbled. By choosing not to
mobilize the people's will, by telling us to go about our normal lives as others
were fighting and dying in our name, the Bush administration actually hobbled
its own long-term efforts. Now, they are getting ready to claim that it was
all our fault. We were the ones who lost our patience and will
to victory. This is rather like the boy who killed his father and mother, only
to throw himself on the mercy of the court as an orphan.
Back in 2002-2003, with an all-volunteer military, a new Blitzkrieg
strategy, and believing God to be on their side, it appears Bush and Company
initially assumed that broader calls for support and sacrifice were militarily
unnecessary – and unnecessarily perilous politically. Now, despite dramatic
setbacks over the last four years, they still refuse to mobilize our national
will. Their refusal reminds me of the tagline of those old Miller Lite beer
commercials: Everything you always wanted in a war, and less – as in less (or
even no) sacrifices.
So let me be clear: If we lose in Iraq, the American people will not be to
blame. We cannot be accused of lacking a will that was never wanted or called
upon to begin with. Yet the stab-in-the-back myth gains credibility precisely
because so few high-level people either in government or the military are being
held accountable for failures in Iraq.
In World War II, Thomas
Ricks reminds us, our military relieved 17 division commanders and four
corps commanders of duty. With the possible exception of Brig. Gen. Janice Karpinski
of Abu Ghraib infamy, has any senior officer been relieved for cause in Iraq?
Since none apparently has, does this mean that, unlike the spineless American
people, they have all performed well?
To cite just one typical case, Maj. Gen. Kenneth Hunzeker served as the commanding
general, Civilian Police Assistance Training Team, from October 2006 to July
2007 in Iraq. Surely, this was a tough job, especially for a man with no proficiency
in Arabic. Yet, by all accounts, Iraqi police units to this day remain remarkably
corrupt, militia-ridden, and undependable. Does this mean Hunzeker failed? Apparently
not, since he was promoted to lieutenant general and given a coveted corps command.
Interestingly, his most recent official
biography fails to mention his time in Iraq leading the police assistance
team. Even if Hunzeker was indeed the best man for the job, what kind of progress
could have been possible in a 10-month tour of duty? By the time Hunzeker learned
a few painful lessons, he was already jetting to Germany and command of V Corps.
If no one is held accountable for failed policies, if, in fact, those closest
to the failures are showered with honors – as was, for instance, L. Paul Bremer
III, who headed the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad for the President
from May 2003 to June 2004 – it becomes easier to shift blame to anyone (or
everyone). Here, German precedents are again compelling. Because the German
people were never told they were losing World War I, even as their Army was
collapsing in July and August 1918, they were unprepared for the psychological
blow of defeat – and so, all-too-willing to accept the lie that the collapse
was due to the enemy within.
This is not to say that today's military has been silent. To cite three examples,
retired Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez recently criticized
the surge strategy and called the Iraq war "a nightmare with no end in sight."
Another perspective came from 12
Army captains formerly stationed in Iraq, who, writing in the Washington
Post, also rejected the surge and called for rapid withdrawal as the best
of a series of bad options. Finally, seven NCOs in the elite 82d Airborne Division
(and then still in Iraq) offered graphic illustrations (on the
op-ed page of the New York Times) of the one-step-forward, two-steps-back
nature of "progress" on the ground in Iraq.
Think of these as three military perspectives on a disastrous war. But even
they can serve as only a partial antidote to the myth that some kind of victory
is inevitable as long as we, the American people, remain supinely supportive
of administration policy.
Given the right postwar conditions, the myth of the stab-in-the-back can facilitate
the rise of reactionary regimes and score-settling via long knives – just ask
Germans under Hitler in 1934. It also serves to exonerate a military of its
blunders and blind spots, empowering it and its commanders to launch redemptive,
expansionist adventures that turn disastrous precisely because previous lessons
of defeat were never faced, let alone absorbed or embraced.
Thus, the German military's collapse in World War I and the Dolchstoß
myth that followed enabled the even greater disaster of World War II. Is it
possible that our own version of this, associated with Vietnam, enabled an even
greater disaster in Iraq? And, if so, what could the next version of the stab-in-the-back
bring in its wake?
Only time will tell. But consider yourself warned. If we lose Iraq, you're
William J. Astore, a retired lieutenant colonel (USAF), earned a doctorate
in modern history from the University of Oxford in 1996. He has taught military
cadets at the Air Force Academy and officers at the Naval Postgraduate School,
and now teaches at the Pennsylvania College of Technology. His books and articles
focus primarily on military history and include Hindenburg:
Icon of German Militarism (Potomac Press, 2005). He may be reached at
Copyright 2007 William J. Astore