I. Lewis ("Scooter") Libby, immediately praised
by the president ("Scooter has worked tirelessly on behalf of the American people
and sacrificed much in the service to this country"), his resignation accepted
with "deep regret" by the vice president ("He has given many years of his life
to public service and has served our nation tirelessly and with great distinction"),
is gone. David Addington, Cheney's counsel and an extreme believer in unfettered
presidential power, is evidently
at the top of the list to succeed him as vice-presidential chief of staff.
Addington, who was involved
in Cheney's Plame discussions, has a Cheneyesque pedigree. As the Washington
Post's Dana Milbank described him in October 2004, "Where there has
been controversy over the past four years, there has often been Addington. He
was a principal author of the White House memo justifying torture of terrorism
suspects. He was a prime advocate of arguments supporting the holding of terrorism
suspects without access to courts. Addington also led the fight with Congress
and environmentalists over access to information about corporations that advised
the White House on energy policy.
Colleagues say Addington stands out for
his devotion to secrecy in an administration noted for its confidentiality."
(For the larger administration picture, as it relates to the Plame case, check
out the latest graphic at TomPaine.com, "Dick
and Don's Cabal.")
Meanwhile, special
counsel Fitzgerald's case remains "open," as he indicated rather quietly
in his
news conference yesterday. On the significance of this, oddly enough, James
Moore, author of Bush's Brain: How Karl Rove Made George W. Bush Presidential,
and Ann Coulter seem to agree. As Moore puts it:
"Special counsel Patrick Fitzgerald must surely just be at the beginning
of rendering justice. An indictment or two will hardly serve to answer the critical
questions. The leak and any lies to the grand jury were most likely motivated
by a deep and abiding fear that a much greater crime was at risk of being uncovered.
Karl Rove is vindictive, yes. But he is not stupid. Rove would never risk treason
unless he thought it served a political purpose. And this was the most important
political purpose of all: protecting his most precious asset, George W. Bush."
And here's Coulter:
"O'BRIEN: So there you have it, Karl Rove apparently escaping indictment,
but that's the good news. The bad news is, on goes the investigation. What are
your thoughts on that one?
"COULTER: That is like the worse possible outcome.
Let's just get
it done one way or the other this Friday. Either they get indicted and they
leave, or they're not indicted and it's over. To stay under investigation
that is not the best possible outcome."
So we all continue with "the worse possible outcome." What remains with us
and the administration as well is the ongoing, devolving catastrophe in
Iraq where, in just the last
three days, eight more American soldiers have died during a month, not yet
at an end, in which 79 American
servicemen and countless Iraqis were killed. At the heart of the case that
brought us into this war were a series of deliberate lies and forgeries. And
I'm not just referring to Scooter Libby's series of ridiculous, ad-lib whoppers
to the grand jury. (Was he throwing himself on his sword to protect his boss
or was this just the typical we-can-get-away-with-it hubris of the Bush White
House?)
Former federal prosecutor Elizabeth de la Vega in the cover story of this
week's Nation magazine, a piece
being shared with and released on line by TomDispatch, turns to the question
of how to make the Bush administration accountable for having defrauded the
American people into a war. Her striking exploration offers a potential new
legal avenue that could force Bush & Co. to take responsibility for their
actions. It's an ingenious approach, the equivalent of getting Al Capone for
evading his taxes, and it should be followed up. Tom
The White House Criminal Conspiracy
by Elizabeth de la Vega
Legally, there are no significant differences
between the investor fraud perpetrated by Enron CEO Ken Lay and the prewar intelligence
fraud perpetrated by George W. Bush. Both involved persons in authority who
used half-truths and recklessly false statements to manipulate people who trusted
them. There is, however, a practical difference: The presidential fraud is wider
in scope and far graver in its consequences than the Enron fraud. Yet thus far,
the public seems paralyzed.
In response to the outcry raised by Enron and other scandals, Congress
passed the Corporate Corruption Bill, which President Bush signed on July
30, 2002, amid great fanfare. Bush declared that he was signing the bill because
of his strong belief that corporate officers must be straightforward and honest.
If they were not, he said, they would be held accountable.
Ironically, the day Bush signed the Corporate Corruption Bill, he and his aides
were enmeshed in an orchestrated campaign to trick the country into taking the
biggest risk imaginable a war. Indeed, plans to attack Iraq were already in
motion. In June, Bush announced his "new" preemptive strike strategy. On July
23, 2002, the head of British intelligence advised Prime Minister Tony Blair,
in the then-secret Downing Street memo, that "military action was now seen as
inevitable" and that "intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy."
Bush had also authorized the transfer of $700 million from Afghanistan war funds
to prepare for an invasion of Iraq. Yet all the while, with the sincerity of
Marc Antony protesting that "Brutus is an honorable man," Bush insisted he wanted
peace.
Americans may have been unaware of this deceit then, but they have since learned
the truth. According to a Washington Post/ABC News poll conducted in
June, 52 percent of Americans now believe the president deliberately distorted
intelligence to make a case for war. In an Ipsos Public Affairs poll, commissioned
by AfterDowningStreet.org and completed Oct. 9, 50 percent said that if Bush
lied about his reasons for going to war, Congress should consider impeaching
him. The president's deceit is not only an abuse of power; it is a federal crime.
Specifically, it is a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371,
which prohibits conspiracies to defraud the United States.
So what do citizens do? First, they must insist that the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence complete Phase II of its investigation, which was to be an analysis
of whether the administration manipulated or misrepresented prewar intelligence.
The focus of Phase II was to determine whether the administration misrepresented
the information it received about Iraq from intelligence agencies. Second, we
need to convince Congress to demand that the Justice Department appoint a special
prosecutor to investigate the administration's deceptions about the war, using
the same mechanism that led to the appointment of Patrick Fitzgerald to investigate
the outing of Valerie Plame. (As it happens, Congressman Jerrold Nadler and
others have recently written to Acting Deputy Attorney General Robert McCallum
Jr., pointing out that the Plame leak is just the "tip of the iceberg" and asking
that Fitzgerald's authority be expanded to include an investigation into whether
the White House conspired to mislead the country into war.)
Third, we can no longer shrink from the prospect of impeachment. Impeachment
would require, as John Bonifaz, constitutional attorney, author of Warrior-King:
The Case for Impeaching George Bush and co-founder of AfterDowningStreet.org,
has explained, that the House pass a "resolution of inquiry or impeachment calling
on the Judiciary Committee to launch an investigation into whether grounds exist
for the House to exercise its constitutional power to impeach George W. Bush."
If the committee found such grounds, it would draft articles of impeachment
and submit them to the full House for a vote. If those articles passed, the
president would be tried by the Senate. Resolutions of inquiry, such as already
have been introduced by Representatives Barbara Lee and Dennis Kucinich demanding
that the administration produce key information about its decision-making, could
also lead to impeachment.
These three actions can be called for simultaneously. Obviously, we face a
GOP-dominated House and Senate, but the same outrage that led the public to
demand action against corporate lawbreakers should be harnessed behind an outcry
against government lawbreakers As we now know, it was not a failure of intelligence
that led us to war. It was a deliberate distortion of intelligence by the Bush
administration. But it is a failure of courage on the part of Congress (with
notable exceptions) and the mainstream media that seems to have left us helpless
to address this crime. Speaking as a former federal prosecutor, I offer the
following legal analysis to encourage people to press their representatives
to act.
The Nature of the Conspiracy
The Supreme Court has defined the phrase "conspiracy to defraud the United
States" as "to interfere with, impede, or obstruct a lawful government function
by deceit, craft, or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest." In
criminal law, a conspiracy is an agreement "between two or more persons" to
follow a course of conduct that, if completed, would constitute a crime. The
agreement doesn't have to be express; most conspiracies are proved through evidence
of concerted action. But government officials are expected to act in concert.
So proof that they were conspiring requires a comparison of their public conduct
and statements with their conduct and statements behind the scenes. A pattern
of double-dealing proves a criminal conspiracy.
The concept of interfering with a lawful government function is
best explained by reference to two well-known cases where courts found that
executive branch officials had defrauded the United States by abusing their
power for personal or political reasons.
One is the Watergate case, where a federal district court held that Nixon's
chief of staff, H.R. Haldeman, and his crew had interfered with the lawful government
functions of the CIA and the FBI by causing the CIA to intervene in the FBI's
investigation into the burglary of Democratic Party headquarters. The other
is U.S. v. North, where the court found that Reagan administration National
Security Adviser John Poindexter, Poindexter's aide Oliver North, and others
had interfered with Congress' lawful power to oversee foreign affairs by lying
about secret arms deals during congressional hearings into the Iran/contra scandal.
Finally, "fraud" is broadly defined to include half-truths, omissions
or misrepresentation; in other words, statements that are intentionally misleading,
even if literally true. Fraud also includes making statements with "reckless
indifference" to their truth.
Conspiracies to defraud usually begin with a goal that is not in and of itself
illegal. In this instance, the goal was to invade Iraq. It is possible that
the Bush team thought this goal was laudable and likely to succeed. It's also
possible that they never formally agreed to defraud the public in order to attain
it. But when they chose to overcome anticipated or actual opposition to their
plan by concealing information and lying, they began a conspiracy to defraud
because, as juries are instructed, "no amount of belief in the ultimate success
of a scheme will justify baseless, false, or reckless misstatements."
From the fall of 2001 to at least March 2003, the following officials, and
others, made hundreds of false assertions in speeches, on television, at the
United Nations, to foreign leaders, and to Congress: President Bush, Vice President
Cheney, Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, National Security Adviser Condoleezza
Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and
his undersecretary, Paul Wolfowitz. Their statements were remarkably consistent
and consistently false.
Even worse, these falsehoods were made against an overarching deception: that
Iraq was involved in the 9/11 attacks. If administration officials never quite
said there was a link, they conveyed the message brilliantly by mentioning 9/11
and Iraq together incessantly just as beer commercials depict guys drinking
beer with gorgeous women to imply a link between beer-drinking and attractive
women that is equally nonexistent. Beer commercials might be innocuous, but
a deceptive ad campaign from the Oval Office is not, especially one designed
to sell a war in which 2,000 Americans and tens of thousands of Iraqis have
died, and that has cost this country more than $200 billion so far and stirred
up worldwide enmity.
The 15-month PR blitz conducted by the White House was a massive fraud designed
to trick the public into accepting a goal that Bush's advisers had held even
before the election. A strategy document Dick Cheney commissioned from the Project
for a New American Century, written in September 2000, for example, asserts
that "the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends
the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein." But, as the document reflects, the
administration hawks knew the public would not agree to an attack against Iraq
unless there were a "catastrophic and catalyzing event like a new Pearl Harbor."
Not surprisingly, the Bush/Cheney campaign did not trumpet this strategy. Instead,
like corporate officials keeping two sets of books, they presented a nearly
opposite public stance, decrying both nation-building and acting as if "we
were an imperialist power," in Cheney's words. Perhaps the public accepts
deceitful campaign oratory, but nevertheless such duplicity is the stuff of
fraud. And Bush and Cheney carried on with it seamlessly after the election.
By now, it's no secret that the Bush administration used the 9/11 attacks as
a pretext to promote its war. They began talking privately about invading Iraq
immediately after 9/11 but did not argue their case honestly to the American
people. Instead, they began looking for evidence to make a case the public would
accept that Iraq posed an imminent threat. Unfortunately for them, there wasn't
much.
In fact, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in effect as of
December 2001 said that Iraq did not have nuclear weapons; was not trying
to get them; and did not appear to have reconstituted its nuclear weapons
program since the UN and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors
departed in December 1998. This assessment had been unchanged for three years.
As has been widely reported, the NIE is a classified assessment prepared under
the CIA's direction, but only after input from the entire intelligence community,
or IC. If there is disagreement, the dissenting views are also included. The
December 2001 NIE contained no dissents about Iraq. In other words, the assessment
privately available to Bush administration officials from the time they began
their tattoo for war until October 2002, when a new NIE was produced, was unanimous:
Iraq did not have nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programs. But publicly,
the Bush team presented a starkly different picture.
In his January 2002 State of the Union address, for example, Bush declared
that Iraq presented a "grave and growing danger," a direct contradiction of
the prevailing NIE. Cheney continued the warnings in the ensuing months, claiming
that Iraq was allied with al-Qaeda, possessed biological and chemical weapons,
and would soon have nuclear weapons. These false alarms were accompanied by
the message that in the "post-9/11 world," normal rules of governmental procedure
should not apply.
Unbeknownst to the public, after 9/11, Wolfowitz and Undersecretary of Defense
for Policy Douglas Feith had created a secret Pentagon unit called the Counter
Terrorism Evaluation Group (CTEG), which ignored the NIE and "reevaluated" previously
gathered raw intelligence on Iraq. It also ignored established analytical procedure.
No responsible person, for example, would decide an important issue based on
thirdhand information from an uncorroborated source of unknown reliability.
Imagine your doctor saying, "Well, I haven't exactly looked at your charts or
X-rays, but my friend Martin over at General Hospital told me a new guy named
Radar thinks you need triple bypass surgery. So when are you available?"
Yet that was the quality of information Bush administration officials used
for their arguments. As if picking peanuts out of a Cracker Jacks box, they
plucked favorable tidbits from reports previously rejected as unreliable, presented
them as certainties, and then used these "facts" to make their case.
Nothing exemplifies this recklessness better than the story of lead 9/11 hijacker
Mohammed Atta. On Dec. 9, 2001, Cheney said it was "pretty well confirmed" that
Atta had met the head of Iraqi intelligence in Prague in April 2001. In fact,
the IC regarded that story, which was based on the uncorroborated statement
of a salesman who had seen Atta's photo in the newspaper, as glaringly unreliable.
Yet Bush officials used it to "prove" a link between Iraq and 9/11, long after
the story had been definitively disproved.
But by August 2002, despite the administration's efforts, public and congressional
support for the war was waning. So Chief of Staff Andrew Card organized the
White House Iraq Group, of which Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove was a member,
to market the war.
The Conspiracy Is Underway
The PR campaign intensified Sunday, Sept. 8. On that day, the New York Times
quoted anonymous "officials" who said Iraq sought to buy aluminum tubes suitable
for centrifuges used in uranium enrichment. The same morning, in a choreographed
performance worthy of Riverdance, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Powell, Condoleezza
Rice, and Gen. Richard Myers said on separate talk shows that the aluminum tubes
were suitable only for centrifuges and so proved Iraq's pursuit of nuclear weapons.
If, as Jonathan Schell put it, the allegation that Iraq tried to
purchase uranium from Niger is "one of the most rebutted claims in history,"
the tubes story is a close second. The CIA and the Energy Department had been
debating the issue since 2001. And the Energy Department's clear opinion was
that the tubes were not suited for use in centrifuges; they were probably
intended for military rockets. Given the lengthy debate and the importance
of the tubes, it's impossible to believe that the Bush team was unaware of
the nuclear experts' position. So when Bush officials said that the tubes
were "only really suited" for centrifuge programs, they were committing fraud,
either by lying outright or by making recklessly false statements.
When in September 2002 Bush began seeking congressional authorization to use
force, based on assertions that were unsupported by the National Intelligence
Estimate, Democratic senators demanded that a new NIE be assembled. Astonishingly,
though most NIEs require six months' preparation, the October NIE took two weeks.
This haste resulted from Bush's insistence that Iraq presented an urgent threat,
which was, after all, what the NIE was designed to assess. In other words, even
the imposition of an artificially foreshortened time limit was fraudulent.
Also, the CIA was obviously aware of the administration's dissatisfaction with
the December 2001 NIE. So with little new intelligence, it now maintained that
"most agencies" believed Baghdad had begun reconstituting its nuclear weapons
programs in 1998. It also skewed underlying details in the NIE to exaggerate
the threat.
The October NIE was poorly prepared and flawed. But it was flawed in favor
of the administration, which took that skewed assessment and misrepresented
it further in the only documents that were available to the public. The 90-page
classified NIE was delivered to Congress at 10 p.m. on Oct. 1, the night before
Senate hearings were to begin. But members could look at it only under tight
security on-site. They could not take a copy with them for review. They could,
however, remove for review a simultaneously released white paper, a glitzy 25-page
brochure that purported to be the unclassified summary of the NIE. This document,
which was released to the public, became the talking points for war. And it
was completely misleading. It mentioned no dissents; it removed qualifiers and
even added language to distort the severity of the threat. Several senators
requested declassification of the full-length version so they could reveal to
the public those dissents and qualifiers and unsubstantiated additions, but
their request was denied. Consequently, they could not use many of the specifics
from the October NIE to explain their opposition to war without revealing classified
information.
The aluminum tubes issue is illustrative. The classified October NIE included
the State and Energy departments' dissents about the intended use of the tubes.
Yet the declassified white paper mentioned no disagreement. So Bush in his Oct.
7 speech and his 2003 State of the Union address, and Powell speaking to the
United Nations on Feb. 5, 2003, could claim as "fact" that Iraq was buying aluminum
tubes suitable only for centrifuge programs, without fear of contradiction
at least by members of Congress.
Ironically, Bush's key defense against charges of intentional misrepresentation
actually incriminates him further. As Bob Woodward reported in his book Plan
of Attack, Tenet said that the case for Iraq's possession of nuclear
weapons was a "slam dunk" in response to Bush's question, "This is the best
we've got?" Obviously, then, Bush himself thought the evidence was weak. But
he did not investigate further or correct past misstatements. Instead, knowing
that his claims were unsupported, he continued to assert that Iraq posed an
urgent threat and was aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons. That is fraud.
It can hardly be disputed, finally, that the Bush administration's intentional
misrepresentations were designed to interfere with the lawful governmental function
of Congress. They presented a complex deceit about Iraq to both the public and
to Congress in order to manipulate Congress into authorizing foreign action.
Legally, it doesn't matter whether anyone was deceived, although many were.
The focus is on the perpetrators' state of mind, not that of those they
intentionally set about to mislead.
The evidence shows, then, that from early 2002 to at least March 2003, the
president and his aides conspired to defraud the United States by intentionally
misrepresenting intelligence about Iraq to persuade Congress to authorize force,
thereby interfering with Congress' lawful functions of overseeing foreign affairs
and making appropriations, all of which violates Title 18, United States Code,
Section 371.
To what standards should we hold our government officials? Certainly standards
as high as those Bush articulated for corporate officials. Higher, one would
think. The president and vice president and their appointees take an oath to
defend the Constitution and the laws of the United States. If they fail to leave
their campaign tactics and deceits behind if they use the Oval Office to trick
the public and Congress into supporting a war we must hold them accountable.
It's not a question of politics. It's a question of law.
Elizabeth de la Vega is a former federal prosecutor with more than 20 years'
experience. During her tenure, she was a member of the Organized Crime Strike
Force and chief of the San Josι branch of the U.S. attorney's office
for the northern district of California.
This is the cover story of the November 14 issue of the Nation
magazine just now appearing on the newsstands.
Copyright 2005 Elizabeth de la Vega