In the more than five years since the George
W. Bush administration's misdirected adventurism in Iraq, the fundamental balance
of power in the Middle East has shifted.
Iran's mullahs, once fearful of meeting the same fate as the late Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein, have become the main beneficiaries of the U.S. quagmire in
Iraq. And they have ramped up their defiance over the current wedge issue in
the twisted path of U.S.-Iranian relations: the nuclear program.
The recent conservative consolidation of Iran's parliament, coupled with the
announcement last week that 6,000 new advanced centrifuges were up and running
at the Natanz uranium-enrichment facility, suggests that U.S. pressure alone
in the form of unilateral economic sanctions has not deterred
Iran from continuing its drive toward mastering the nuclear fuel cycle.
While the Bush administration has maintained a consistent policy supporting
rigid sanctions against Tehran, a bill currently making its way through the
Senate may potentially further undermine the international support Washington
seeks to confront Iran and "change its behavior."
As Washington tries to bolster international cooperation over how to deal
with Iran's nuclear program, the domestic push for congressionally mandated
sanctions has been spearheaded by lobby groups such as the Israel Project,
the neoconservative think-tank Center for Security Policy (CSP), and the American
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).
The Iran Counter-Proliferation Act of 2007, known as S. 970, amends the Iran
Sanctions Act of 1996 to directly address the nuclear issue, and would impose
sanctions on Iran and countries doing business with it.
The House version of the bill, H.R. 1400, sponsored by the late Rep. Tom Lantos
of California, passed the House by a vote of 397 in favor and 16 against.
AIPAC has used its muscle to shape and mold certain divestment bills in state
legislatures across the U.S., and in the absence of explicit support from the
White House, it is, according to William A. Reinsch, president of the National
Foreign Trade Council, "the major group lobbying for this bill."
The bill, which has 70 cosponsors almost evenly divided between Republicans
and Democrats, would subject Russia to specified energy cooperation prohibition
against Iran unless Moscow suspends nuclear assistance and transfers of conventional
weapons and missiles to Iran, and until Iran dismantles its nuclear enrichment-related
programs.
Instead of engendering more Russian cooperation on Iran, S. 970 will most
likely weaken Moscow's willingness to cooperate with the U.S. in blocking Iran's
nuclear efforts.
"This is a case where the president is engaged in the delicate process
of getting both allies and not-so allies China and Russia to cooperate
with us on sanctions," said Reinsch, at a roundtable discussion last Friday.
"Beating their companies over the head with a stick, which is what this
bill will do, is not what we need."
In 2006, Congress withheld 60 percent of U.S. foreign aid to Russia because
of its continued assistance to Iran's nuclear and ballistic missiles programs.
Furthermore, by codifying an executive order, S. 970 removes the flexibility
the president would need to offer incentives or to respond effectively in the
event of positive developments from Tehran.
Phillip H. Gordon of the Brookings Institute told a Senate Finance Committee
hearing last Friday that while he supported many measures of the bill, some
of them were "such blunt instruments" that would further undermine
international cooperation with Washington.
Section 8 of the bill imposes sanctions on U.S. subsidiaries of foreign companies,
which could lead the countries in which those are companies are based to challenge
the bill at the World Trade Organization.
"Most countries, even among our closest allies, reject the extraterritorial
application of U.S. sanctions and they are willing to act to defend the principle
that countries may not impose their own foreign policy priorities on other
countries by taking action against their firms," said Gordon.
U.S. sanctions have had a minimal effect, mainly because Russia and China
have not stopped assisting Tehran in its nuclear goals, but also because Iran
has already survived through three decades of unilateral U.S. sanctions.
Despite the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate saying that Iran had suspended
its nuclear weapons program based on rational cost-benefit analysis, the consensus
among most Washington Beltway insiders is that Iran's advancement in the nuclear
fuel cycle will allow it to develop nuclear weapons if it so chooses, and that
is a possibility that is unacceptable.
Three rounds of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran have not produced the
desired effect. Last week, Iran rejected European overtures to halt its uranium
enrichment program in return for incentives. "Iran does not trade its
rights in return for incentives," government spokesman Ghalm Hossein Elham
told reporters, according to the Associated Press.
"The Islamic Republic of Iran doesn't need incentives from Europe to
obtain its rights," he said, adding, however, that Iran was open to dialogue
with Europe over its nuclear program.
The Washington view on sanctions against Iran which critics describe as
a substitute for real diplomatic engagement with Tehran has analysts agreeing
on the problem but diverging over how to confront it.
"It is obvious that the limited multilateral sanctions now in effect
will not have their desired effect. Than what? If war is off the table, submission
and tribute will remain," said Danielle Pletka of the neoconservative
American Enterprise Institute.
"This leaves us with the hope that harsher and more effective economic
sanctions can raise the cost to Iran of pursuing nuclear weapons and change
the calculus of decision-makers in Tehran," she said.
Senior officials from the major powers dealing with Iran the U.S.,
France, Germany, Britain, Russia, and China are due to meet on April
16 in Shanghai to discuss what the next steps should be against Iran.
(Inter Press Service)