Conciliatory noises from Tehran over the nuclear
issue have left Washington and Brussels baffled and unconvinced of Iran's intentions.
Having grown accustomed to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's uncompromising language,
Tehran's new tone has raised more suspicion than hope among cynics in Western
capitals.
At a lunch with a dozen U.S. journalists in New York last week, Iranian Foreign
Minister Manouchehr Mottaki indicated that Iran would likely respond favorably
to the latest proposal by the Security Council's permanent members plus Germany
(P5+1). The reason seems to be that alongside an incentive package that didn't
differ significantly from a 2006 package that Tehran rejected, a formula may
have been agreed upon that would enable all parties to come to the negotiating
table without losing face.
European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana presented the formula orally
to the Iranians: For a period of six weeks, Iran would halt any advancement
in its enrichment activities while the Security Council would refrain from
imposing additional sanctions on Iran. During this period, the Europeans and
Iran would negotiate an agreement on the modalities of a full suspension, after
which the United States would formally join the talks. This way, Tehran can
claim that it didn't suspend as a precondition, but rather as a result of talks,
and Washington can claim that it did not join talks until Iran had suspended
all enrichment activities.
This formula is not new, however. Why and whether Iran would
agree to it now has become the subject of much speculation. In typical fashion,
Iran has sent contradictory signals. Iran's foreign minister struck an uncharacteristically
conciliatory tone in New York, refusing to repeat Tehran's mantra that enrichment
is non-negotiable. Days before, former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati
argued in favor of negotiations in an interview to the conservative daily Jomhouri-ye
Eslami.
As a senior adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, Velayati's words
carry particular weight. Not only did Velayati reassert Khamenei's dominion
over Iranian foreign policymaking, he indirectly rebuked Ahmadinejad for his
radical stance and argued that Iran should negotiate since it had won de facto
recognition of its right to enrich. Iran would negotiate from a position of
strength, unlike other regional powers that had negotiated out of weakness
and had been humiliated by the West accordingly. And since the George W. Bush
administration didn't want Iran to respond favorably to the P5+1 proposal,
Iran should engage in diplomacy and show the international community that it
was not the obstacle to peace, in Velayati's view.
On the other hand, government spokesperson Gholamhossein Elham dampened hopes
of a breakthrough by publicly rejecting a freeze on Iran's nuclear activities,
asserting that negotiations should take place without Iran agreeing to Solana's
formula. According to early reports, Iran's formal response to Solana seemed
to have been in line with Elham's and not Velayati or Mottaki's statements.
Reactions in the West have varied from skepticism to outright suspicion. Tehran
is either putting on a nicer face to win time or it has recognized the dangers
of an Israeli attack and is showing greater flexibility as a direct result
of the Jewish state's muscle flexing. Tehran only responds to force (or threats
of force) and the imposition of new sanctions by the EU combined with Israeli
bluster has proven that point, the argument goes.
While Iran certainly may be playing for time reducing tensions tactically
while awaiting the Bush administration's exit from the U.S. political scene
could help outmaneuver any effort by Washington to push for additional measures
against Iran the idea that Iran is responding to the threat of force
remains, at best, an incomplete explanation for the latest developments.
If the threat of force has caused the Iranians to bend, then it remains a
mystery why Tehran didn't succumb two years ago when it was more vulnerable
and the credibility of the threat was greater. Today, oil prices are twice
as high as they were in 2006, the Bush administration's credibility is at an
all-time low, the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate has made military strikes
more complicated politically, and the public mood in the United States
even among supporters of John McCain is in favor of diplomacy.
If Velayati's words are to be taken at face value, then confidence rather
than fear may have been a more important factor in the prospective Iranian
decision.
The debate in Tehran over this issue seems to have centered on whether to
continue defying the Security Council or to consolidate Iranian gains. Those
favoring the latter have likely realized the Bush administration itself has
helped make Iranian defiance successful. Critics argue that the Bush team's
lack of credibility and incompetence has made it more difficult to assemble
a strong international coalition against Iran. Washington's soft power with
the EU under Bush has been negligible, forcing the president to strong-arm
his European allies to go along with more stringent economic measures against
Iran.
But with President Bush out of the picture by January 2009, the utility and
risk of the Ahmadinejad line can change dramatically. Whether it is Barack
Obama or John McCain, the next commander in chief will begin his presidency
with significantly higher cachet with the Europeans. The hunger for strengthening
trans-Atlantic ties and putting the past eight years of bickering behind them
is palpable in Europe. One European diplomat indicated to IPS that Europe would
even willingly go along with all the measures Bush has called for as long
as they are consulted by the next president.
In addition, Washington could enjoy much greater pull with non-aligned countries,
including Asian nations whose unwillingness to go along with sanctions have
provided Tehran with an economic escape route.
Consequently, greater interest in the freeze-for-freeze formula may have less
to do with recent Israeli bluster and more to do with the greater political
pull enjoyed by the next U.S. administration.
Furthermore, proponents of the Solana proposal in Tehran believe that a U.S.-Iran
rapprochement can be achieved under the next U.S. administration if diplomacy
is pursued. To facilitate the next U.S. president's decision to negotiate,
however, Tehran must help improve the political atmosphere and provide the
next U.S. commander in chief with a better starting point for diplomacy.
Initiating discussions at this stage could tie both an Obama and a McCain
presidency to the diplomatic track. Whoever wins the elections will inherit
a less problematic dispute and enjoy greater political maneuverability as a
result. This is particularly true for Obama, since the Illinois senator's willingness
to pursue diplomacy may not match his political ability to do so if the nuclear
deadlock persists.
Mottaki may have alluded to just that in his interview with CNN yesterday.
"We hear new voices in America
and we think that the rational thinkers
in America can, based on these new approaches, seek reality as it is. We are
ready to help them in this endeavor," Mottaki told CNN.
Whether proponents of dialogue in Tehran and Washington can initiate a process
of mutual reinforcement remains to be seen. Even if Tehran agrees to the freeze-for-freeze
formula, the Iranians will likely only agree to a full suspension if it isn't
open-ended, isn't tied to the continuation of talks but progress in talks,
and if the aim of the diplomacy is to limit but not eliminate Iran's enrichment
capability.
Neither Britain nor France has shown any flexibility on these central points
so far. But fearing that a prospective Obama administration will do away with
"self-defeating preconditions" and soften Washington's stance on
enrichment, the EU might feel compelled to talk to Tehran with the next U.S.
administration in mind and not the current. If so, Tehran's softer tone may
drive a wedge between the U.S. and its allies an objective all Iranian factions
agree upon.
(Inter Press Service)