The P5+1 the permanent members of the
UN Security Council and Germany will present Tehran with a secret incentive
package in the next few days to convince Iran to suspend its enrichment program
and enter negotiations.
There is little doubt that Tehran will reject the offer since it crosses its
red line suspension of enrichment but the question is why such an offer
is being made at this time, even though reinvigorating talks is in and of itself
The nuclear offer coincides with an escalation of rhetoric between Washington
and Tehran over allegations of Iranian meddling in Iraq. Following several
stark comments by high-ranking U.S. military officials, the new buzz in the
beltway is that Iran "is killing American soldiers" a clear
casus belli if proven true.
From Senate staffers to think-tank pundits, fear of a military confrontation
between Iran and the U.S. is quickly rising once more.
Gen. David Petraeus, the new head of CENTCOM, is reportedly preparing a presentation
of evidence showcasing Iran's direct involvement in the violence in Iraq. Well
aware of their lack of credibility, George W. Bush administration officials
are keeping a low profile and letting military officials take the rhetorical
lead against Tehran.
Whether Petraeus' evidence is strong enough to convince Republicans, Democrats
and Washington's European allies of Tehran's complicity in the rising death
toll in Iraq remains to be seen.
Meanwhile, Tehran seems to be escalating the situation by retracting its previous
assertion that an explosion in a mosque in Shiraz earlier in April was an accident.
The new Iranian position reads that the explosion indeed was a bombing, conducted
by exiled opposition groups supposedly supported by Washington and London.
The offer of a secret nuclear package to Tehran at the same time as a new
case for war with Iran is presented may not be coincidental. But the calculation
that the threat of war will compel Tehran to amend its red line on suspension
has failed before and ignores the lessons Tehran drew from its earlier negotiations
Tehran sees two key problems with the suspension precondition. First, Iran
has taken away from earlier negotiations with the EU that suspension becomes
a trap unless the West at the outset commits to solutions that recognize Iran's
right to enrichment, i.e., that won't cause the suspension to become permanent.
Iran entered talks with Europe in 2003 under the impression that the parties
would identify "objective criteria" that would enable Tehran to exercise
its rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty while providing the international
community with guarantees that the Iranian nuclear program would remain strictly
civilian. During the course of the talks, however, Europe shifted its position.
The only acceptable criteria would be for Iran not to engage in uranium enrichment
in the first place, the EU began to argue.
Consequently, Tehran felt trapped since the objective had shifted from seeking
a peaceful Iranian enrichment program to seeking the elimination of Iran's
Second, the modalities of the suspension are crucial. When the EU first demanded
that Iran suspend enrichment, the discussions centered on what the suspension
would be linked to.
Tehran sought to link the voluntary suspension to progress in the negotiations.
The argument read that the suspension should not be an open-ended commitment
that could become hostage to the negotiations. For the suspension to remain
in place, the EU-Iran talks needed to make progress toward the goal of finding
objective criteria to guarantee the solely civilian nature of Iran's nuclear
The European position, however, read that the suspension should be linked
to the continuation of the negotiations rather than to their progress. Since
Europe's key objective was to put a stop to Iran's enrichment program, the
mere continuation of talks would ensure the attainment of that goal
even if no progress was made in the talks themselves.
Not surprisingly, once Tehran accepted the European position and agreed to
an essentially open-ended suspension, the ensuing negotiations produced very
little movement. In the spring of 2005, Tehran presented a compromise proposal
developed by Iranian diplomats and U.S. nuclear scientists through various
Track-II meetings. The gist of the proposal was that Iran would limit its enrichment
program to no more than 3,000 centrifuges a number that Tehran today
has moved beyond.
Feeling little pressure to make progress in the talks, the EU never responded
to that proposal. Instead, the EU states presented Tehran with a counter-proposal
in August 2005 that called for no Iranian enrichment. Tehran rejected that
offer and restarted its nuclear program.
The new package that will be presented to Tehran reportedly demands of Iran
a suspension of enrichment as a goodwill gesture for the duration of the talks
a formula not very different from the one that failed in the earlier negotiations.
Why such an offer will be made at this time remains unclear. Western diplomats
admit privately that they do not expect a positive response from Iran. Indeed,
Tehran will in the next 12 months be in a relatively comfortable position,
according to Sir John Thomson, Britain's former UN ambassador, who together
with Dr. Geoff Forden of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has developed
an alternative strategy for dealing with Iran's nuclear program.
President Bush will be too weak to make a new strong push in the nuclear field
in the seven remaining months of his administration, Sir Thomson contends.
As the country's new president takes office in January 2009, he or she will
need several months to put together an effective Iran strategy. To complicate
matters further, the Iranians will be entering their own election season in
These political factors provide Iran with at least another 12 months in which
it essentially can continue to expand its nuclear program with impunity. This
makes the recycling of a failed negotiation formula by the P5+1 all the more
peculiar there are few reasons to expect an increasingly confident Tehran
to suddenly accept the open-ended suspension precondition under these circumstances.
If the aim is to break the nuclear deadlock with Iran, and not to prepare
the ground for a new UN Security Council resolution or strengthen the case
for military action, then a softening of the suspension demand would be useful.
As former Undersecretary of State Tom Pickering pointed out at a Senate conference
organized by the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) in April, a suspension
can be demanded of Iran once the talks have commenced rather than as
Many analysts argue that the insistence on this precondition has come at the
expense of other valuable non-proliferation strategies. Indeed, rather than
becoming cornered or contained, Tehran has utilized the absence of talks to
expand its capabilities and create new facts on the ground.
"Time is not on our side," Pickering argued at the NIAC conference.
If a new formula is not pursued, he said, paraphrasing Voltaire, "The
perfect may become the enemy of the good on this particular issue"
meaning the insistence on an "ideal" resolution may end up achieving
nothing at all.
And if the latest P5+1 package is accompanied by earlier preconditions, the
perfect may set the stage for a disaster.
(Inter Press Service)