For the first time since 1942, Japan has resumed
the strategic offensive. Since the beginning of the year, Japan has claimed the
island of Takeshima, now occupied by South Korea; seized control of an area in
the South China Sea also claimed by Beijing; and, most ominously, announced that
Tokyo might intervene militarily to defend Taiwan.
Taiwan was Japanese from 1895 to 1945, a fact that neither the Chinese nor
the Taiwanese have forgotten; if they had to choose, many Taiwanese would rather
be governed from Tokyo than from Beijing.
I do not know what has motivated the Japanese government to resume the strategic
offensive. I do know it is a mistake. Japan's low-profile, defensive strategy
has served her well for more than half a century. It is exactly the right strategy
for a Fourth Generation 21st century, where survival will depend heavily on
staying off other people's hit lists. As in the 1930s and early '40s,
Japan shows an odd sense of timing.
The Takeshima issue offers an example. A divided Korea is very much in Japan's
interest. By laying claim to what is now Korean territory, Japan brings South
and North Korea together. In fact, North Korea missed an opportunity. Had Pyongyang
said that in the face of any Japanese claims, the armed forces of both Koreas
were one in defending Korean soil, it would have scored a propaganda triumph.
While a united Korea would be no danger to the United States, it would be perhaps
the most dangerous state threat to Japan. Even today, South Korea's navy
and air force are structured more for a war with Japan than for a conflict with
North Korea. Any war with Japan, including an aggressive one, would be wildly
popular with the Korean people. Asian memories run deep, and Japan's current
military weakness offers an opportunity that may not last forever (although
given Japan's demographics, it might).
Taking the offensive against China is an even greater blunder on Tokyo's part.
Here, the danger is less Chinese aggression than internal Chinese dissolution
and the regional instability that would result. Any humiliation of China by
Japan damages the legitimacy of the Beijing government. A Chinese defeat by
Japan and America in a crisis over Taiwan could well bring that government down.
Contrary to neocon blather, its likely successor would not be parliamentary
democracy but a new "Period of Warring States" within China, which
is to say Fourth Generation war throughout the most critical part of the Asian
landmass. The resulting chaos would not be good for Japanese interests, especially
if nukes started to fly. Putting a few on Japan would be an easy way for a Chinese
contender to establish its patriotic credentials.
Predictably, the strategically imbecilic Bush administration is supporting
Japan's new offensive posture. In reality, with its military forces tied
down in the Middle East, the last thing America needs is a new source of crises
in East Asia. The mix there is already volatile enough; adding a Japan on the
strategic offensive is the equivalent of smoking in the powder magazine.
American interests require that both China and Japan follow defensive strategies
as indeed they require the United States to follow a defensive strategy.
China wants to do exactly that, knowing that time is on her side. Only the Taiwan
question is likely to push here to take the offensive, which means we should
let that sleeping dog lie. As for Tokyo, I suspect the new Japanese offensive
would collapse quickly if Washington quietly signaled its disapproval. Without
American support, any rising of the Japanese sun will quickly prove a mirage
made of hot air.
All that is required is a morsel of strategic sense in Washington. Alas, that
horizon remains blank.