In a move that has surprised many foreign policy
analysts here, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has appointed a prominent
neoconservative hawk and leading champion of the Iraq war to the post of State
Eliot A. Cohen, who teaches military history at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies (SAIS) here and has also served on the Pentagon's Defense
Policy Board (DPB) since 2001, will take up the position next month that was
left vacant late last year by Rice's long-time confidant and "realist"
thinker, Philip Zelikow.
A close friend and protégé of former Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz and advisory board member of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI),
Cohen most recently led the harsh neoconservative attack on the bipartisan Iraq
Study Group (ISG), co-chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker and former
Democratic Rep. Lee Hamilton.
Like his fellow neocons, he was particularly scathing about its recommendations
for Washington to directly engage Syria and Iran and revive the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process recommendations which Rice herself has explicitly endorsed
in the last few weeks.
"This is a group composed, for the most part, of retired eminent public
officials, most with limited or no expertise in the waging or study of war,"
Cohen wrote in column entitled "No Way to Win a War," published by
the Wall Street Journal the day after the ISG released its report in
"A fatuous process yields, necessarily, fatuous results," he went
on in a wholesale dismissal of the relevance of what he called the "Washington
establishment whose wisdom was exaggerated in its heyday, and which has in any
event succumbed to a kind of political-intellectual entropy since the 1960s..."
"Eliot brings a lot to the table in terms of being a counselor, being
somebody who can be an intellectual sounding board for her [Rice]," said
State Department spokesman Sean McCormack in confirming Cohen's appointment
Some analysts here, however, said they thought the appointment was designed
instead to reduce or pre-empt criticism from neoconservatives and other hawks
in and outside the administration for the direction she hopes to take U.S. policy,
particularly in the Middle East. With no operational responsibilities, the State
Department Counselor can be used or ignored at the secretary's
"Condi may feel she needs to have a neocon right next to her to protect
her flanks," said Chris Nelson, editor of the widely read Washington insider
newsletter, The Nelson Report. "And, if she's really planning to
put her foot down on the Israelis, which [Washington] will have to do if it
wants to get a real process with the Palestinians underway as part of a bigger
regional deal with the Saudis and Iranians, then a guy like Cohen up there on
the [State Department's] seventh floor who is in on it and can claim influence
on the outcome can help."
"Bringing on Cohen could help inoculate her from criticism by the Cheney
camp," agreed Steven Clemons, director of the American Strategy Program
at the New America Foundation in a reference to the vice president and the neoconservatives
and other hawks who surround him. "One of the things that's been consistent
is that Rice never takes Cheney head-on and is very careful not to take on people
who might antagonize him."
In that respect, Cohen is a nearly ideal choice. Like Cheney, Cohen was a founding
member in 1997 of the Project for the New American Century whose positions on
how to prosecute the "war on terror" including the invasion
of Iraq and cutting ties to the Palestinian Authority (PA) under Yassir Arafat
he has consistently endorsed.
Although lacking in any regional expertise or policy-making experience, Cohen
has written prolifically in recent years on U.S. policy in the Middle East.
Cohen first gained national prominence shortly after the 9/11 attacks when
he published a Wall Street Journal column entitled "World War IV"
a moniker quickly adopted by hard-line neocons like former CIA director
and fellow-DPB member James Woolsey, former Commentary editor Norman
Podhoretz, and Center for Security Policy president Frank Gaffney (on whose
board Cohen also sits) to put Bush's "war on terror" in what
he considered to be the appropriate historical context and to define its enemy
as "militant Islam."
After defeating the Taliban, he argued, Washington should not only "finish
off" Iraq's Saddam Hussein, whom he accused of having "helped al Qaeda,"
but also seek to overthrow "the mullahs" in Iran whose replacement
by a "moderate or secular government would be no less important a victory
in this war than the annihilation of [Osama] bin Laden."
In another Journal article in April 2002 when the second Palestinian intifada
was at its height, Cohen, who had just signed a PNAC letter which called for
severing ties to the PA and asserted that "Israel's fight against terrorism
is our fight," argued that proposals to send an international force that
would separate Israeli forces from the Palestinians were "not serious."
"[T]here are times when well-intentioned measures can only make matters
worse," he warned.
Cohen has also been quick to label critics of Israel and the so-called "Israel
Lobby" in the U.S. as anti-Semites.
"Only a reshuffling of the deck through the disappearance of Arafat,
or an event, (such as the overthrow of Saddam Hussein) that profoundly changes
the mood in the Arab world will make something approaching truce, let
alone peace, possible," he argued in a favorite pre-Iraq war neoconservative
The following summer, Cohen achieved new fame when Bush was photographed carrying
Cohen's just-published book, "Supreme Command," which argued that
the greatest civilian wartime leaders, such as Abraham Lincoln and Winston Churchill,
had a far better strategic sense than their generals. It was a particularly
timely message in the months that preceded the Iraq war when a surprising number
of recently military brass here were voicing strong reservations about the impending
He also became a charter member of the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq
(CLI), an administration-supported group both to lobby for war in Iraq, largely
on behalf of Ahmad Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress (INC). Indeed, Cohen, like
his friend Wolfowitz, was already arguing publicly for Washington to rely heavily
on the INC in any effort to overthrow Hussein in December 2001.
After the Iraq invasion, however, Cohen became progressively more critical
of the way in which the subsequent occupation and counterinsurgency were being
carried out, although, after a Pentagon-sponsored tour of Iraq that featured
interviews with top U.S. military commanders there, including Gen. George Casey,
last February, he became briefly more optimistic.
"After a wretched start, we have the right people at the top and the right
policies in effect and even more importantly, the right philosophy behind
it all," he wrote in yet another Journal article entitled "Will
Just nine months later, however, he had changed his mind. In the same article
in which he attacked the ISG, he described U.S. difficulties as "stem(ming)
not so much from failures to find the right strategy, as from an astounding
and depressing inability to implement the strategic and operational choices
we have nominally made" an inability, for example, "as personal
as picking the wrong people for key positions."
Still, while admitting in a Vanity Fair interview late last year that
U.S. choices in Iraq range between "bad and awful," Cohen has called
for perseverance and played a key role in selling AEI-hatched plan to add some
30,000 troops to the 140,000 soldiers in Iraq to Bush with whom he met personally
as part of a small group of "surge"-boosters at the White House in
If the surge should fail, however, Cohen's preferred and "most plausible"
option, which he laid out in an October 2006 Journal column titled "Plan
B," would be a coup d'etat ("which we quietly endorse") that
would bring to power a "junta of military modernizers," a development
which, as he noted himself, would call into question the administration's and
Rice's avowed goal of democratization.
In any event, he argued in the same column, "American prestige has taken
a hard knock [in Iraq]; it will probably take a harder knock, and in ways that
will not be restored without a considerable and successful use of American military
power down the road."
"The tides of Sunni salafism and Iran's distinct combination of messianism
and power politics have not crested, and will not crest without much greater
violence in which we too will be engaged," he asserted.
In a Vanity Fair interview last fall, Cohen said, "I'm pretty grim.
I think we're heading for a very dark world, because the long-term consequences
of this are very large, not just for Iraq, not just for the region, but globally
for our reputation, for what the Iranians do, all kinds of stuff."
If Rice's intent was to reassure Cheney and the neoconservatives that she is
not a captive of the ISG and the "Washington establishment," that
passage alone should do the trick.
(Inter Press Service)