With the occupation of Iraq soon to enter its
sixth year and the looming possibility of war against Iran, it's easy for Americans
not to notice the Bush administration's attempt to expand the U.S. military
presence in Europe. A new Cold War between the United States and Russia threatens.
And the U.S. media is paying little attention.
Even many in the peace movement don't know that Washington has proposed
to install 10 interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar military base in the
Czech Republic. The missiles and radar taken together constitute an anti-missile
system purportedly meant to defend against Iran and other "rogue"
states. In fact, they represent a new expansion of U.S. global military power
and an escalation of the arms race with Russia.
Opposition to the proposed U.S. installations, however, is gathering force
within Poland and the Czech Republic. And even the U.S. Congress has shown a
measure of skepticism. The expansion of U.S. military presence in Eastern Europe
is far from a done deal.
Why Eastern Europe?
Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
United States has moved resolutely to create a unipolar world based on ever-greater
military dominance. Though much weakened, Russia remains a major international
"player" because of its vast size, its still-formidable nuclear arsenal,
and its ability to use its gas and oil resources for political advantage. Consequently,
Moscow is viewed by Washington as a major potential threat to its imperial ambitions,
one that must be undermined.
The U.S. drive since 1991 to increase its global military hegemony and cow
all possible challengers is evident in many areas; the unilateral abrogation
of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), the launching of a new Star
Wars project, the elimination of uncooperative strongmen Slobodan Milosevic
and Saddam Hussein (mass murderers with whom Washington had once been content
to do business), and now the plan for bases in Poland and the Czech Republic.
New U.S. radar and missiles in Central and Eastern Europe are obviously meant
to intimidate Russia; the "rogue states" rationale is an absurd
piece of camouflage.
Although the new missile "defense" system is manifestly intended
as an extension of U.S. power, the Bush administration hoped at first to construct
it with the help of European allies. Even before taking office, Bush advisors
like Richard Armitage wanted
to rename the proposed system the Allied Missile Defense to reflect the
inputs from Europe. European allies were happy to allow the upgrading of key
bases on their territories. In 2003, Britain agreed to beef up the radar facility
in Fylingsdale so that it could be part of U.S. missile defense plans. Denmark,
too, acceded to a similar
upgrading at the Thule base in Greenland, which was completed early this
year. But they balked at linking their own modest theater missile defense systems
to the larger, strategic missile defense program that the Bush administration
was pushing, calling it unworkable, prohibitively expensive, and needlessly
provocative. As former French president Jacques Chirac
said in 2001, U.S. missile defense plans ''cannot fail to relaunch the arms
race in the world.'' Compliant governments in Eastern Europe, however, eager
to cement relations with the United States as it squares off against neighboring
Russia, have not been so cautious. This is the reality behind U.S. Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld's angry division of Europe into "old" and "new"
in 2003.
Russia and Iran
Washington's scheme has already produced an ominous
response from Russia. Russian officials have threatened to direct their missiles
toward Poland and the Czech Republic if the United States proceeds with the
system. They also have threatened to withdraw from the Cold War-era Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty banning medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and to
suspend participation in a separate treaty limiting the deployment of conventional
forces in Europe.
A radar station in the Czech Republic and 10 missile interceptors in Poland
don't constitute an immediate challenge to Russia's nuclear deterrent,
with its thousands of warheads. But there is a clear long-range threat that
these U.S. bases will be upgraded. Official U.S. documents bear this out. National
Security Presidential Directive 23, signed by President Bush on Dec. 6, 2002,
stated that the United States would begin to deploy missile defenses in 2004
"as a starting point for fielding improved and expanded missile defenses
later." This presidential directive was preceded in January 2002 by a
memorandum from Rumsfeld, directing the Missile Defense Agency to develop defense
systems by using whatever technology is "available," even if the
capabilities produced are limited relative to what the defense must ultimately
be able to do.
When the Soviet Union first built a limited missile defense system in the late
1960s, the United States responded by building up a nuclear strike strategy
to overwhelm the new technology. The cycle of nuclear one-upmanship was partially
halted by the ABM Treaty, but then the Bush administration withdrew from the
treaty in 2002. Now, writes
Hans Kristenson of the Federation of American Scientists, "history repeats
itself, but the table has been turned. Today it is the United States building
a limited missile defense system (more capable than the Soviet system, but purportedly
focused on "rogue" state missiles), and it is the Russians who say
they need to target it to maintain the effectiveness of their deterrent. The
Cold War may be over, but military and policy planners in both countries still
think in Cold War terms."
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has called Russian concerns "ludicrous,"
insisting that the Czech-Polish missile defense is aimed at Iran and not Russia.
Yet U.S. officials rejected Russia's offer to make available to the United
States the data from early-warning radar in Azerbaijan and Armavir, Russia,
and not to object to U.S. missile defense interceptors being stationed in Iraq
or Turkey or other southern European sites, nor to the United States employing
ship-based interceptors. Washington's lack of interest in Russia's
proposal reveals the real intent of the Czech-Polish anti-missile defense: to
counter Russia's deterrent. If the goal were just to defend against a
putative Iranian threat, the alternatives suggested by the Russians would actually
be more effective.
Moreover, there is no credible evidence that a missile threat from Iran exists
today. The National Intelligence Estimate released in December 2007 further
undermined the credibility of that claim by stating that Iran had discontinued
its nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003. Even the Polish government,
which looks set to try to overcome domestic opposition and accept the U.S. interceptor
missiles, has dismissed the Iranian justification. In January 2008 Polish Foreign
Affairs Minister Radoslaw Sikorski said
publicly, "We feel no threat from Iran." And the belligerent stance
of the United States toward Iran, far from protecting the United States or Europe
from such a threat in the future, only enhances its likelihood. The example
of North Korea, where years of U.S. military threats provided a strong inducement
to seek nuclear weapons, is cautionary.
Resistance
Internal opposition to the anti-missile system
has unexpectedly emerged in Poland and the Czech Republic. In the Czech Republic,
the No Bases Initiative (NBI) has organized grassroots opposition to the installation
of the U.S. base. Popular opposition to the radar installations has held steady,
even increased, despite the intensive propaganda efforts of the Czech and United
States governments. As of this writing, 70% of the population is
opposed to the radar, with only 20% in favor, and the rest undecided.
The No Bases Initiative group has been sharply critical of the Czech government
for trying to push through the radar agreement with the United States and not
informing Czech voters of this intention in the last election. NBI has repeatedly
challenged the government to hold a popular referendum on the question so that
the Czech people can decide. Thus far, the government has refused to do so.
In Poland, opposition to the anti-missile system is less well organized than
in the Czech Republic. But there, too, public opinion is opposed, with 60%
reported to be against the interceptor missiles. Nonetheless, on February
1 of this year Radoslaw Sikorski and Condoleezza Rice announced that they had
agreed in principle to install interceptor missiles on Polish soil, as Warsaw
demanded. In return, the Bush administration has said it will help strengthen
Poland's air defenses. However this deal remains to be finalized. According
to The Washington Post, Sikorski's spokesman said
after the announcement that there was "definitely no agreement" on
missile defense. "Ultimately, we will have to sell it to the public."
Peace activists from around Europe have joined their counterparts in the Czech
Republic and Poland to oppose the two new facilities. "The realisation
of the U.S. plan will not lead to enhanced security," reads the Prague
Declaration of 2007. "On the contrary - it will lead to new dangers
and insecurities. Although it is described as 'defensive,' in reality it will
allow the United States to attack other countries without fear of retaliation.
It will also put 'host' countries on the front line in future U.S. wars."
Protest actions in front of the
Czech Embassies have already been mounted in various European cities. To coincide
with large demonstrations in Prague and Brno in November, the Campaign for Peace
and Democracy organized a group of peace leaders to meet with Czech Ambassador
to the U.N. Martin Palous and present him with a statement
opposing the U.S. radar. In addition, the New Humanists further strengthened
this transnational effort by picketing the Czech Mission to the UN.
Congressional Hesitation
Resistance in Europe and elsewhere has received
reinforcement from the U.S. Congress, which has hesitated to move forward with
the bases. In May 2007, the Senate Armed Services Committee cut $85 million
from the 2008 Defense Authorization act intended for site activation and construction
work on the missile installation in Poland and radar site in the Czech Republic.
The Senate committee action followed a House vote earlier in May to cut the
president's request for the anti-missile system by $160 million.
Not surprisingly, neither the House nor the Senate actions were framed as outright
opposition to the anti-missile bases as new outposts of the U.S. empire. The
cuts were justified on the basis of narrower technical arguments that the proposed
missiles have not yet been sufficiently tested, and on concerns that Czech and
Polish public opposition would prevent actual deployment, which would mean that
the funds would have been wasted. Nonetheless this congressional foot-dragging
offers an opportunity for opponents of the anti-missile system from Poland,
the Czech Republic, the rest of Europe and the United States to collaborate
in stopping the program altogether.
Next Steps
According to foreign policy analyst Chalmers
Johnson, the United States had 737 overseas military bases in 2004, not counting
garrisons in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Qatar, and Uzbekistan,
or U.S. military and espionage installations in the United Kingdom. This vast
network of overseas bases supports a foreign policy of military interventions
and global intimidation. The proposed bases in Eastern Europe are part of this
overall strategy. The Bush administration hopes to override resistance in the
Czech Republic and Poland and finalize agreements with both countries within
the next few months. Activists are organizing on both sides of the Atlantic
to derail the agreement.
Protests are planned to coincide with upcoming visits from the Czech and Polish
prime ministers. Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek has been invited to the
White House on February 27 to meet with President Bush and push the radar project
forward. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk is scheduled to meet with President
Bush in March. Both prime ministers will be greeted with placards showing that
there is "another America" opposed to the radar and supportive of
the Czech opponents of the base.
The planned "missile defense" system in the Czech Republic and
Poland will, if implemented, further increase the danger to human and all other
forms of life that nuclear weapons pose, significantly expand U.S. military
power, and contribute to a new Cold War between the United States and Russia.
But it can be stopped. Its dangers are obvious and easy to demonstrate, and
it is deeply unpopular among the citizens of the "host" countries.
Stopping it will, however, require action by American peace organizations, to
strengthen our friends in the Czech Republic and Poland, to pressure our elected
representatives, and to educate public opinion in this country.
For More Information
Please contact CPD at cpd@igc.org if you are interested in participating in
solidarity protests in Washington, DC on February 27 when the Czech prime ministers
visits the White House.
The leader of No Bases Initiative, Jan Tamas, will be coming to the United
States in April, and a number of peace groups will be helping to organize a
speaking tour for him. If you are interested in the tour, please contact Bruce
Gagnon, national coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear
Power in Space at globalnet@mindspring.com The Campaign for Peace and Democracy
will be working on a major meeting for Tamas in New York City, so please contact
us at cpd@igc.org if you want to work on this part of the tour.
Sources
Thanks to Stephen Shalom and Jesse Lemisch for their comments.
Reprinted with permission from Foreign Policy
in Focus.