According to Washington Post Staff Writer
Warrick, "intelligence agencies" and "nuclear experts"
are "all asking the same question: Is Iran attempting to thwart future
military strikes against its nuclear facility by placing key parts of it in
"U.S. officials at several military and intelligence-gathering agencies
said they are aware of the construction and are watching it closely, though
none would comment publicly or speculate on the purpose of the tunnels.
"A tunnel complex would reduce options for a preemptive military strike
to knock out Iran's nuclear program, according to U.S. officials who closely
follow Iran’s nuclear activities."
Those dirty rotten Persians; frantically attempting to thwart a repeatedly
threatened, but totally unjustified, act of aggression against them.
Warrick goes on;
"It also could further heighten tensions between the Bush administration
and the government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has said he is committed
to pursuing a peaceful use of nuclear power."
That dirty rotten Islamic; committed to pursuing the peaceful use of nuclear
Don’t tell Warrick, but Iran – as required by the Treaty
on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – concluded a Safeguards Agreement
with the International Atomic Energy Agency, in return for which, Iran has been
guaranteed the "inalienable right" to the use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes "without discrimination."
Furthermore, the NPT requires that the Safeguards agreement be implemented
by the IAEA so as "to avoid hampering the economic or technological development"
of a signatory or its "international cooperation in the field of peaceful
nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material
and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for
Here are the particularly pertinent provisions of that Iran-IAEA Safeguards
"The Government of Iran undertakes, pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article
III of the Treaty, to accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this
Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear
activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under
its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material
is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."
As of this writing the IAEA continues to "verify" that there is no
indication that any amount of NPT-proscribed materials has ever been
diverted from a peaceful to a military purpose.
"(a) In order to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards
under this Agreement, the Government of Iran shall, in accordance with the provisions
set out in Part II of this Agreement, provide the Agency with information concerning
nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement and the features
of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material.
"(b) (i) The Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information
and data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities under this Agreement.
"(ii) Information pertaining to facilities shall be the minimum
necessary for safe-guarding nuclear material subject to safeguards under this
Since Condi Rice became Secretary of State, the IAEA Board of Governors have
been demanding Iran provide them far, far more information than is required
to be – in some cases even could be – supplied under the Iran-IAEA Safeguards
"If the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an
action by the Government of Iran is essential and urgent in order to ensure
verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement
is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Board
may call upon the Government of Iran to take the required action without delay,
irrespective of whether procedures have been invoked pursuant to Article 22
of this Agreement for the settlement of a dispute."
The key phrase in this article is that the Board can only call upon Iran to
take certain actions "upon report of the Director General".
Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei has yet to report that he has been
unable to verify that no Iranian safeguarded materials have been diverted
from a peaceful purpose. Quite the contrary.
Hence, the IAEA Board has been corrupted. It has violated the Iran-IAEA Safeguards
Agreement. It has violated the IAEA Statute. And when the Board had the Director-General
"report" the "Iran dossier" to the UN Security Council last
year, with a recommendation that sanctions be imposed on Iran, the IAEA Board
may even have violated the UN Charter.
In any case, on March 29, 2007, Iran informed the IAEA that it had "suspended"
its voluntary implementation of the so-called Additional Protocol to its Safeguards
Agreement which had been "accepted in 2003, but not yet ratified by Parliament."
This "suspension" of voluntary compliance with an un-ratified modification
of its Safeguards Agreement is probably what Warrick has in mind when he makes
this absolutely false and highly inflammatory charge.
"In April, Iran unilaterally withdrew from an international treaty
that would have required it to publicly disclose design plans for any new nuclear-related
Under the subsidiary implementing agreements to the Iranian Safeguards Agreement
of 1974 – which is the only agreement the NPT requires of Iran – design information
on new facilities that are ultimately to be safeguarded is required to be submitted
"normally not later than 180 days before the facility is scheduled to receive
nuclear material for the first time."
According to Warrick, an IAEA spokeswoman told him last week that "We
have been in contact with the Iranian authorities about this [construction]
and we have received clarifications."
So, if the IAEA has received "clarifications," and Iran is still
in compliance with its original Safeguards Agreement, who cares what questions
Warrick’s "intelligence agencies" and "nuclear experts"
might have. Apparently what the Iranians are doing is none of their business.
If it was the IAEA could answer their questions.
And what about Warrick’s report that Iran’s construction is "reducing
options" to "knock out" Iran’s Safeguarded nuclear programs?
Is Warrick saying that US military and intelligence officials have told him
they may "have to" nuke Iran’s Safeguarded nuclear programs in order
to be certain they have knocked them out?
Well, what about the NPT? What about this result of the 2000 NPT Review Conference?
"The [Sixth] Conference notes the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon states
of their commitment to the United Nations Security Council resolution
984 (1995) on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon states parties
to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons."
What assurances are those?
Well, basically Russia and China, as well as France and the United Kingdom,
will "provide immediate assistance" to Iran if it "is
a victim of an act, or an object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear
weapons are used."
How do you like them apples?