The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
the "inalienable right" of all signatories to "the fullest possible exchange
of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information" related
to the "use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."
Furthermore, all NPT signatories are to "undertake" to "facilitate"
That means Iran has the "inalienable right" to acquire the nuclear reactors
that Russia has undertaken to supply and the uranium-conversion equipment that
China undertook to supply.
As a non-nuclear-weapons signatory, the NPT requires Iran to subject
all transfers to the Safeguards regime of the International Atomic
On the other hand – thanks to Bush-Cheney-Condi-Bolton – the
Democratic Republic of North Korea (DPRK) is no-longer a NPT signatory,
and hence, has no such "inalienable right" to acquire nuclear reactors,
uranium-enrichment and uranium-conversion equipment, even if to be used
for peaceful purposes.
But neither is DPRK prohibited from making such acquisitions.
However, the 44-members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group have voluntarily agreed
to coordinate their export rules, regulations and laws relating to "nuclear"
and "dual use" materials, equipment and technology. Since 1992 the
NSG has required the importing country of certain NPT-proscribed materials,
equipment and technology to subject all their nuclear activities – peaceful
or otherwise – to IAEA Safeguards.
That means that NSG guidelines have effectively prevented the importation of
certain NPT-proscribed materials (such as nuclear power plant fuel) to Israel,
India, Pakistan and now DPRK, because of their understandable unwillingness
to subject their nuke stockpiles and nuke-related programs to IAEA Safeguards.
But now Bush-Cheney-Condi have concluded the US-India
Strategic Partnership and have, necessarily, pressured the NSG to permanently
exempt India from the requirement to subject all their nuclear activities
– peaceful or otherwise – to IAEA Safeguards.
The Russians immediately agreed to the permanent exemption and have already
supplied India nuclear reactor fuel that the US had pressured them – up until
now – not to supply. Is there a Russia-India Strategic Partnership on
the horizon? Why not?
And perhaps the Chinese will decide to permanently exempt Pakistan – rather
than India – from that 1992 NSG guideline. Perhaps even conclude a China-Pakistan
Strategic Partnership. Why not?
(There is considerable reason to believe that the United States has always
had a covert Strategic Partnership with Israel.)
So, that would leave only the DPRK subject to the 1992 NSG Guidelines.
You know, the country the Soviet Union persuaded to sign its first
Safeguards Agreement in 1977, to sign the NPT in 1985, and the country
Russia persuaded to sign its NPT Safeguards Agreement in 1992.
Of course, that was just after the IAEA had discovered that Iraq’s Safeguards
Agreement hadn’t given its inspectors the authority needed to satisfy themselves
that all materials and activities that should be "declared" in a country
are, in fact, declared.
DPRK balked at voluntarily providing that additional authority to
the IAEA that the UN Security Council had just provided it in Iraq. So,
IAEA Director-General Hans Blix appealed to the IAEA Board to appeal to
the Security Council to provide him that authority.
So, on 12 March, 1993, DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT,
thereby voiding its IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Its principal stated rationale
for withdrawing was its claim that the United States had threatened its national
security by, inter allia, strong-arming the IAEA Board of Governors into
adopting on 25 February, 1993, a resolution requiring DPRK officials to open
military sites to inspection that were not related to its declared source and
special nuclear materials or activities involving the physical or chemical transformation
of such materials.
(Like what Condi has got the IAEA Board to require of Iranian officials?)
Then, on 21 October, 1994, the US and DPRK signed the so-called Agreed
Framework, wherein the DPRK agreed to "freeze" and "eventually
dismantle" its Russian-supplied plutonium-producing reactors and related
facilities, in return for United States "provision" by 2003 of two
light-water moderated and cooled 1000 MWe power plants.
(Like the offer Condi and the Brits-French-Germans-Chinese-Russians have reportedly
just made to Iran?)
As we now know, Clinton-Gore never intended to comply with the
requirements of the Agreed Framework, not expecting the Kim dynasty to
And of course, Condi doesn’t intend to comply with any agreement
reached with the Iranians, the Mullahs not expected to survive long.
But here it is, 2006, and the Kim dynasty’s still in power, demonstrating its
principal cash crop – ballistic missiles – some no doubt capable of delivering
its newest cash crop – nukes – developed courtesy Bush’s unilateral abrogation
of the Agreed Framework in October, 2002.