This chapter covers the end of the Clinton administration to the transition into the Bush administration. Clearly, the 9/11 plot was in full force, many of the hijackers already in the US learning to fly or preparing their missions. The commission continues to reiterate Richard Clarke’s enthusiasm for attacking al’Qaeda as soon as possible. Such demands fell on deaf ears in both administrations. However, the report claims that the Clinton administration did its best:
- “President Clinton was deeply concerned about Bin Ladin. He and his national security advisor, Samuel ‘Sandy’ Berger, ensured they had a special daily pipeline of reports feeding them the latest updates on Bin Ladin’s reported location. In public, President Clinton spoke repeatedly about the threat of terrorism, referring to terrorist training camps but saying little about Bin Ladin and nothing about al Qaeda. He explained to us that this was deliberate—intended to avoid enhancing Bin Ladin’s stature by giving him unnecessary publicity.” (page 191)
Around late 1999, Jordanian and American officials each captured al’Qaeda suspects. The arrests in Jordan helped to thwart a large millennium attack, while the arrest of a man on the Canadian border – with a trunk full of explosives – was a lucky catch (“It appears that the heightened sense of alert at the national level played no role in [the] arrest.” (page 196)). Unfortunately, these arrests did nothing to excite either administration into facing al’Qaeda head-on. Nonetheless, Richard Clarke’s staff warned after the events in Jordan that “[f]oreign terrorist sleeper cells are present in the US and attacks in the US are likely.” (page 196) Later, Clarke concluded:
- ” . . .U.S. disruption efforts thus far had ‘not put too much of a dent’ in Bin Ladin’s network. If the United States wanted to ‘roll back’ the threat, disruption would have to proceed at ‘a markedly different tempo.'” (page 199)
The next attempts to disrupt al’Qaeda were diplomatic. The President and a few cabinet members repeatedly visited Pakistan in 2000 with the hope of convincing its government to lessen its support of the Taliban. Pakistan’s repeated pronouncements of help never went into action, for as Madeleine Albright pointed out, the US had “few carrots to offer.” (page 200).
The government also focused on terrorist financing…sort of:
- “Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.” (page 201).
During these years, the CIA gradually received more funds for counter-terrorism operations. Unfortunately, symptomatic of any large bureaucracy, the OMB reported that “CIA spending on counterterrorism from its baseline budget had shown almost no increase.” (page 201)
Attack on the USS Cole
- “… on October 12, 2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole .The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole , killing 17 members of the ship’s crew and wounding at least 40.” (page 207)
Initially, the attackers were unknown, so the US didn’t know how or where to retaliate:
- “There was no American strike. In February 2001, a source reported that an individual whom he identified as the big instructor (probably a reference to Bin Ladin) complained frequently that the United States had not yet attacked. According to the source, Bin Ladin wanted the United States to attack, and if it did not he would launch something bigger.” [emphasis mine] (page 208).
Yemeni authorities held back most evidence that would have indicated an al’Qaeda operation, enough that the Clinton administration never responded:
- “…Berger recalled that to go to war, a president needs to be able to say that his senior intelligence and law enforcement officers have concluded who is responsible. He recalled that the intelligence agencies had strong suspicions, but had reached ‘no conclusion by the time we left office that it was al Qaeda.'”
Michael Sheehan, the State Department member of the CSG voiced disappointment with the lack of US retaliation. He presciently asked:
- “Does al Qaeda have to attack the Pentagon to get their attention?” (page 213).
A New Administration
The Bush administration had new priorities:
- “Their policy priorities differed from those of the Clinton administration. Those priorities included China, missile defense, the collapse of the Middle East peace process, and the Persian Gulf.” (page 216).
However, the commission reports that there was “significant continuity on counterterrorism policy” mainly stemming from the retention of Richard Clarke’s staff. Clarke continued to press for action:
- “Within the first few days after Bush’s inauguration, Clarke approached Rice in an effort to get her—and the new President—to give terrorism very high priority.”
He wrote a memo in early 2001 demanding high-level attention, stating that “[w]e urgently need . . . a Principals level review on the al Qida network.” (page 217) It took months for the administration to respond:
- “The national security advisor did not respond directly to Clarke’s memorandum. No Principals Committee meeting on al Qaeda was held until September 4, 2001 (although the Principals Committee met frequently on other subjects, such as the Middle East peace process, Russia, and the Persian Gulf ).” (page 218)
Say What?
Ashcroft’s did little to fight terrorism before 9/11:
- “On May 9, the attorney general testified at a congressional hearing concerning federal efforts to combat terrorism. He said that ‘one of the nation’s most fundamental responsibilities is to protect its citizens . . . from terrorist attacks.’ The budget guidance issued the next day, however, highlighted gun crimes, narcotics trafficking, and civil rights as priorities. Watson told us that he almost fell out of his chair when he saw this memo, because it did not mention counterterrorism.”
Drugs don’t help terrorists…the drug war helps terrorists!