Notes on Chapter 5 of the 9/11 Report

This chapter covers the various actors in al-Qaeda before 9/11. Much of the information, the report warns, comes from interrogations of captured terrorists. (page 146)

First, the report covers Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the “mastermind” behind the attacks on 9/11. Rather than hating America because it is capitalist democracy, KSM’s

    “…animus toward the United States stemmed not from his experiences there as a student, but rather from his violent disagreement with U.S. foreign policy favoring Israel.” (page 147)

This theme repeatedly pops up throughout the report. KSM intended to use terrorism to influence American foreign policy by “targeting the country’s economy.” (page 153).

Named the “planes operation,” the 9/11 plot took years of planning and training. One of the first plans, later rejected, involved the hijacking of ten planes:

    KSM himself was to land the tenth plane at a U.S. airport and, after killing all adult male passengers on board and alerting the media, deliver a speech excoriating U.S. support for Israel, the Phillippines, and repressive governments of the Arab world. (page 154)

The chapter continues to detail the growth of the group of 19 hijackers. Here we are introduced to the infamous “20th hijacker”, Mohammed Atta. He ends up a part of the “Hamburg contingent,” the core of the 19 hijackers.

Financing

The esimated cost of the 9/11 attacks range from $400,000 to $500,000. This money did not come from bin Ladin’s riches:

    Instead, al Qaeda reled primarily on a fund-raising network developed over time. The CIA now estimates that it cost al Qaeda about $30 million per year to sustain activities before 9/11 and that this money was raised almost entirely through donations. (page 169)

Also, state sponsors were lacking:

    It does not appear that any government other than the Taliban financially supported al Qaeda before 9/11, although some governments may have contained al Qaeda sympathizers who turned a blind eye to al Qaeda’s fundraising activities. Saudi Arabia has long been considered the primary source of al Qaeda funding, but we have found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded the organization.(page 171)

Finally, despite the federal government’s insistence, the drug trade does not support al Qaeda:

    While the drug trade was a source of income for the Taliban, it did not serve the same purpose for al Qaeda, and there is no reliable evidence that Bin Ladin was involved in or made his money through drug trafficking. (page 171)