December 9, 2003
Russian
Regression?
by Alan Bock
The
Russian parliamentary election, in which maximum leader Vladimir
Putin's United Russia party (which seems to stand mainly for "we're
in power and handing out favors, so keep us in power") got 37.1
percent of the vote which could translate into a working majority
with coalition parties in the Duma and maybe even a twothirds majority
to amend the constitution so Putin can run for a third term has
caused a certain amount of discomfort in the West. Much of the discomfort
is probably warranted, but most of those who have expressed it seem
to have trouble diagnosing the real problem.
Bruce
George, head of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe fretted about "regression in
the democratization of this country," mainly because the "extensive
use of the state apparatus and the media ... to the benefit of United
Russia created an unfair environment for the other parties and candidates."
Michael McFaul, billed as a Russia expert at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, was quoted by AP saying, "Whether we should
continue to call it democracy I don't know. I am less and less confident
that one should."
Press
secretary Scott McClellan at the White House said similar concerns
were shared by the U.S. government. Mark Urnov, chairman of the
Expertise Foundation, a think tank in Moscow, as AP reported it,
"said the elections marked a shift away from open democracy and
a move toward a Soviet-style system. 'I don't rule out that in this
atmosphere, ideas about strengthening power may arise,' he said
on Echo of Moscow radio."
DEMOCRACY
IS NOT ENOUGH
Most
of these concerns are well-taken. It does seem as if Vladimir Putin
is consolidating his power and seeking to extend it beyond what
the present Russian constitution would permit him. The arrest in
early November of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a relatively youthful robber
baron who managed to amass a fortune in the billions and sought
to turn some of his money toward reforming the current corrupt political
system, maybe even running for office himself, can be interpreted
as a preemptive strike against possible political opposition with
enough money to make a difference. Khodorkovsky had donated money
all around, the communists, the ultra-nationalist and the liberal
(in the European understanding) reformers.
Although
it doesn't seem to have been much of a factor in United Russia support
in this election, the arrest was a populist move that didn't hurt
Putin with the general public. Aside from some concern in the business
community, how many people can resist a touch of Schadenfreude
at the idea of a billionaire going to the pokey? And the arrest
staunched the flow of at least some money to parties in opposition
to Putin. How much that had to do with the pitiful showing of other
parties the Communists slipped to 12.7 percent, which put them
ahead of the nationalist Liberal Democrats (11.6) and Homeland (9.1)
parties, and way ahead of the market-oriented Yabloko (4.3 percent)
and Union of Right Forces (4), which missed the 5 percent mark to
have actual representatives in the Duma) I don't know yet.
What
seems to have been a bigger factor in the victory of the ruling
party was the phenomenon Bruce George noted the use of government
money and power to influence the elections. The election, as Ted
Carpenter of the Cato Institute put it to me, suggested that "Boss
Tweed-style democracy" essentially using the people's money to
buy their votes is alive and well in Russia.
The
problem with that kind of governance is not so much that it isn't
democratic democracy as understood by a political scientist, after
all, is basically a way of setting up a system whereby the people
participate in choosing who will rule over them, not a description
of the kind of governance that ensues. What most Western observers
tend to do is to conflate the term "democracy" with civil and decent
governance. In fact, however, what they're often referring to are
institutions and habits of thought that tend to moderate, even to
put the brakes on pure democracy or raw democracy.
CURBING
DEMOCRATIC IMPULSES
In
the United States, for example, the Bill of Rights was not designed
to be subject to majority rule. It delineates certain individual
rights the founders (or to a great extent those who were concerned
that the proposed constitution gave the central government too much
power over individual citizens and were inclined to oppose ratification)
believed were precisely not to be put up to a vote. No matter how
large the majority in favor, the government is not supposed to abridge
freedom of speech, religion, assembly, the right to a trial by jury,
due process and all the others.
Most
of America's founders, in fact, would have told you they opposed
democracy, at least as they understood the term. They wanted a representative
republic, with three branches of government purposely designed to
be sometimes at odds with one another, a Senate not elected by popular
vote, and a judiciary independent of political pressures (all of
this as an ideal construct; most were worldly enough to understand
that it wouldn't always work as they had designed it). Most of these
institutions were created precisely to curb the democratic impulse
to prevent temporary majorities from having their absolute way,
and to stave off the "tyranny of the majority."
What
Russia lacks, then, is not so much democracy as such the election
came off, although turnout was down, perhaps reflecting a certain
burgeoning cynicism but the intermediating institutions that keep
democracy from being two wolves and a sheep voting on what's for
dinner.
Having
emerged only a dozen years or so ago from communist totalitarianism,
it lacks a truly independent judiciary. It lacks certain habits
of thought that prevent politicians from assuming autocratic power.
It lacks experience with keeping politicians under control. While
it has a theoretical respect for private property, it has little
experience with the institution or the idea. Since most of the "privatization"
of the 1990s was a corrupt process whereby those with political
connections got most of the attractive properties, it doesn't yet
have a truly independent business sector dependent more on pleasing
consumers than on pleasing the state. It has few independent organizations
(though some are developing) that can shield citizens from direct
contact with the business end of government or allow them to express
their non-political or apolitical but still often profoundly social
sides.
In
short, Russia lacks what we call a civil society. A civil society
is not an inevitable development in a democracy; in fact it is rather
rare. And its function in society is to blur democracy, to stem
the majoritarian impulse, to provide ways other than having political
influence, PR, or being part of the majority to find both personal
fulfillment and a way of making a living.
Russia
may develop more of a civil society and some of the institutions,
both voluntary and governmental, that tend to make government bearable
by limiting its scope and power in practice. It has a rich history
and culture to draw on, although the political culture is relatively
impoverished by the fact that it went from an autocratic czarist
system to a totalitarian communist system with only a few months
of reasonably well-intentioned quasi-democratic governance between
them. The generation that knew not Brezhnev, as it matures, may
develop intermediating institutions if Putin's autocratic tendencies
can be held in check to some extent. But it's an open question.
Meantime,
it would be helpful to distinguish between democracy and what we
might call freedom or personal independence. The two are not necessarily
mutually exclusive (though there's wisdom in the old saw that a
democracy can last only until the majority figures out it can vote
itself a living from the public purse) but they certainly don't
necessarily go together.
On
balance, freedom is probably more important to a system in which
it is possible to work and strive to live a good life without inheriting
the means or having them bestowed on one through the act of systematic
looting that is democratic governance. So it would be helpful to
avoid the trap of using the catchword "democracy" when what one
really means is a civil and decent society that in some respects
involves controls and limitations on pure democracy. One hopes that
democracy will be decent, but having elections by no means assures
this happy outcome.
DRAFT
UPDATE
I
have learned a little more about the prospects for conscription
since last week's
column. It turns out that the House tried to add $2 million
to what had been a $26 million Selective Service System, but the
Senate wouldn't go along with it. So the system is not likely to
get a budget increase for the next fiscal year.
However,
all the stuff about performance indicators I described last week
moving from plans for mobilization on paper to a relatively "live"
demonstration project is accurate enough. The notice about draft
boards potentially being needed soon really did appear on the website,
only to be taken down without explanation.
A
letter to the Orange County Register offers a semi-hopeful
note, suggesting that we're trying to fight a war on a budget and
there just isn't money enough for recruiting and training a bunch
of draftees. That's probably an accurate assessment to some extent,
but it might understate the desire to believe that they way to achieve
more warfighting capability on the cheap would be through conscription
after all (some might bring themselves to believe), you could
pay draftees less than you have to pay volunteers.
This
wishful thinking ignores the cost of training draftees and the costs
involved in rapid turnover in a more technologically-oriented
military, you could find yourselves losing draftees very soon after
they'd been trained to a level of minimal competence and you'd have
to start over. On balance I haven't looked into the comparative
figures for a number of years it is probably more likely that
a conscript army might well be more expensive, if you take all costs
into account, than a volunteer military. But certain politicians
might well believe that it would be cheaper. If the threat of a
draft becomes more concrete than it is now, it would behoove opponents
of conscription to study this carefully and get the results widely
publicized.
–
Alan Bock
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