Titled "Responses to Al Qaeda’s Initial Assaults," the fourth chapter of the 9/11 report follows the government’s slow appreciation of Osama bin Ladin’s threat to America. Overall, the chapter demonstrates the internal conflicts within various government agencies on how to respond to the growing threat of terrorism. 1996 saw the first concerted effort to focus on Bin Ladin with the formation of the CIA’s "Bin Ladin Unit." It was set up "to analyze intelligence on and plan operations against Bin Ladin." (page 109). Once Bin Ladin moved back to Afghanistan the Bin Ladin unit was able to use CIA contacts [tribals] in the regions to get fairly reliable information on his location. However, action could not follow until the US charged him with a crime:
- "The eventual charge, conspiring to attack U.S. defense installations, was finally issued from the grand jury in June 1998—as a sealed indictment.The indictment was publicly disclosed in November of that year." (page 110)
The first plan to capture or kill Bin Ladin was ready by early 1998:
- "Tenet apparently walked National Security Advisor Sandy Berger through the basic plan on February 13. One group of tribals would subdue the guards, enter Tarnak Farms [a Bin ladin hideout] stealthily, grab Bin Ladin, take him to a desert site outside Kandahar, and turn him over to a second group.This second group of tribals would take him to a desert landing zone already tested in the 1997 Kansi capture. From there, a CIA plane would take him to New York, an Arab capital, or wherever he was to be arraigned." (page 112)
Due to a concern for civilian casualties and a belief that the capture plan was too flawed, the CIA did not go ahead with the operation. This plan was the last before the embassy bombings of 1998. In response, President Clinton ordered a Tomahawk missile strike on a suspected Bin Ladin camp. Although the missiles hit their targets, Bin Ladin escaped the attack reportedly because he was tipped off by Pakistani military intelligence. As readers may recall, these attacks occurred during the Monica Lewinsky scandal, leading some pundits to claim that the action was meant to distract the American public. The commission claims that such sentiments affected the way America approached Bin Ladin in the following years:
- "The failure of the strikes, the ‘wag the dog’ slur, the intense partisanship of the period, and the nature of the al Shifa [supposed chemical plant in Sudan] evidence likely had a cumulative effect on future decisions about the use of force against Bin Ladin. Berger told us that he did not feel any sense of constraint." (page 118).
The chapter continues to chronicle new attempts to capture or kill Bin Ladin. The most enthusiastic supporter of such plans was Richard Clarke, head of the administration’s counter-terrorism team. Clark and the Bin Ladin unit had to deal with a Congress and administration officials who thought Bin Ladin could only cause "hundreds of casualties, not thousands." (page 119). New approaches included attempts at diplomacy with Saudi Arabia and the Taliban. Two options remained:
- "The first, championed by Riedel and Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth, was to undertake a major diplomatic effort to end the Afghan civil war and install a national unity government.The second, favored by Sheehan, Clarke, and the CIA, called for labeling the Taliban a terrorist group and ultimately funneling secret aid to its chief foe, the Northern Alliance.This dispute would go back and forth throughout 1999 and ultimately become entangled with debate about enlisting the Northern Alliance as an ally for covert action." (page 124)
Osama and Iraq
The report again mentions a possible connection between these two men:
- "In February 1999,Allen proposed flying a U-2 mission over Afghanistan to build a baseline of intelligence outside the areas where the tribals had coverage. Clarke was nervous about such a mission because he continued to fear that Bin Ladin might leave for someplace less accessible. He wrote Deputy National Security Advisor Donald Kerrick that one reliable source reported Bin Ladin’s having met with Iraqi officials, who ‘may have offered him asylum.’" (page 134)
Again, nothing occurred.
Worries
One of the more surprising aspects of the chapter is the constant worry about collateral damage – i.e. civilian casualties. After Kosovo and the war on Iraq, most should be skeptical that the government really cares about what its bombs do to innocents. Nonetheless, the commission contends that such worries hindered repeated plans to attack or capture Bin Ladin. One such incident involves a planned bombing of Kandahar that was ordered stopped because "the military doubted the intelligence and worried about collateral damage." [emphasis mine] (page 140).
Another impediment to action was the administration’s worry that a failed attack would lead to "blowback":
- "In his handwritten notes on the meeting paper, Berger jotted down the presence of 7 to 11 families in the Tarnak Farms facility, which could mean 60–65 casualties. Berger noted the possible ‘slight impact’ on Bin Ladin and added, ‘if he responds, we’re blamed.’" (page 141)
Of course, in hindsight such concerns seem stupid and dangerous. However, one is amazed by the supposed deliberation the administration, CIA and military engaged in before any possible reaction. Things certainly have changed since 9/11.