The Trouble With Tucker

Jeffrey Tucker, of the Mises Institute, blogging on LewRockwell.com, takes me to task for “adoring” Patrick J. Buchanan’s new book, Where the Right Went Wrong:

    I’m happy that Justin adores Pat’s new book, and it may be as good as he says. But just last week, I happen to catch Pat on one of those Sunday TV shows and he was asked about what the US should do in Najaf. Bomb them, was Pat’s answer. Bomb them until they comply. It’s the only choice, he said, because otherwise “we” lose the war.

    My first thought was that Pat’s isolationist credentials make his call for violence all the more compelling (just as Cato’s call for overthrowing the Taliban was particularly valuable to the Bush administration). Perhaps that is the role that Pat is supposed to play: so that the regime can always say that even Pat Buchanan favors escalation.”

As a long-time aficionado of talking-heads policy-wonk shows, I have to say that Jeff fails to understand an important point: these guys (and gals) are paid to analyze, as well as give their opinions. What Jeff heard and saw (it was The McLaughlin Group) was Pat in his reportorial/analyst mode, wherein the goals and objectives of U.S. policymakers are assumed as the given, and the analysis proceeds from there.

By taking these comments out of context – the context of a show where Buchanan’s anti-interventionist views have been exhaustively expounded – Tucker makes it seem as though Pat is talking out of both sides of his mouth. But anyone who actually reads Buchanan’s book, or even any of his many newspaper columns on the subject, can easily familiarize themselves with his anti-interventionist views.

The key point to make here is that Pat, and the other members of The McLaughlin Group, aren’t paid to just give their opinions: after all, everybody has opinions. But journalists, on the other hand, are supposed to have a store of knowledge about the particular subjects they’re discussing, and this, theoretically, gives them some predictive power lacking in the rest of us mere mortals. Journalism is not only about reporting what is happening, but is also about the answer to the question on everyone’s lips: What will happen next? It’s not for nothing The McLaughlin Group ends each show with the Group’s predictions. This is what viewers are most interested in, far more than the moral pronouncements of the talking heads, and the transcript makes it crystal-clear that this is the context in which Pat’s comments appeared:

    John McLaughlin: “Pat Buchanan, is the assault on Najaf, including the bombing of al-Sadr’s residence, as we see it here, a good call or a bad call?”

    Pat Buchanan: “It is a necessary call, John. Allawi tried to bring al-Sadr into the process by offering virtual amnesty to him. We have left them alone. They continue to do battle. What you’ve got now is a strategic sanctuary in Fallujah and one in Najaf. And Allawi’s made this tough call, and the Americans agree with it. They’re going to take the risks attendant to it and go in and finish this guy off. I think, militarily and strategically, it is a tremendously risky decision. I think it’s a necessary decision and the right decision.”

The subject was Iyad Allawi: will he survive? What will he do about Moqtada al-Sadr? The decision to go in is “necessary” and “the right decision,” as Pat said, given the administration’s policy. But since these shows are basically a conversation, and the conversation wasn’t about the rightness or wrongness of the policy, Tucker’s interpretation of what was said is based on a very selective and fatally flawed hearing of what really went on in this segment.

Tucker avers that Newsweek’s Eleanor Clift gave the “right” answer, but he neglects to notice Pat’s concurrence with Clift:

    “There’s tremendous risks attendant. Eleanor’s right. There’s no doubt about it. It’s a great risk. This could explode. You could lose the Shi’as. But Tony [Blankley] is right in this sense. If you do not eliminate these two sanctuaries, Fallujah and Najaf, you are going to lose the war. That is what they’re playing with right now, and they’ve rolled the dice. And, no, we don’t know how it’s going to come out.”

Here Pat is clearly in his analytical mode: this, after all, is what journalists do.

If Tucker’s misinterpretation of what Buchanan meant seems oddly … deliberate – I mean, why is he cherry-picking his way through the transcript for evidence of heresy? – well, it is. In his LRC blog entry, Tucker refers (and links) to a piece he wrote recently about how conservatives – all conservatives – are somehow inherently militaristic:

    This is conservatism. There’s no use in denying it. The war party and American conservatism are interchangeable and inseparable. They are synonyms. The same thing. They co-exist. How many ways can we put it? Militarism and violence is at the core of conservatism.

    Some protest that conservatism once meant resistance to the welfare-warfare state. That is a fascinating piece of historiography, as interesting as the fact that liberalism once meant freedom from the state. Glasses were once called spectacles too, but in our times, language has it own meaning.

A key concept held in common by Tucker and the neocons: “in our times, language has its own meaning” – and history is “interesting,” but all this talk about the Old Right is bunk. I’m sure David Frum would agree. And isn’t it odd, but here’s another Tuckerite-Frummian convergence: they’re the only two people (so far) who are attacking Pat’s excellent book (and the author) in truly vicious terms. It’s incredible that Tucker actually has the nerve to imply that Buchanan is actually a pro-war mole sent into the antiwar camp to somehow rationalize the assault on Najaf: “perhaps that is the role that Pat is supposed to play” rants Tucker. And just whose orders is Pat following, Jeff? You really ought to lay off the Kool-Aid.

The important point here is that Tucker is simply wrong – and in a way that is injurious to the antiwar cause, and to the libertarian movement. Because there is indeed a flourishing revival of the Old Right: The American Conservative, Chronicles magazine, and lots of independent thinkers on the Right side of the political spectrum who despise the neocons, imperialism, and the Welfare-Warfare State. Thousands of conservative rank-and-filers, especially young people, are questioning neoconservative orthodoxy and discovering the suppressed anti-imperialist legacy of the Old Right. To assail these people as insufficiently pure is sectarian nonsense. David Frum wants these people to just go away, and so, apparently, does Jeff Tucker.

Christmas in Cambodia

I notice that neither Tex nor the New York Times nor the Washington Post nor the LA Times, nor in fact any of the media who are so eager to call the Swift Boad Veterans “lying” seem to ever be able to utter the word “Cambodia.” Kerry said that his “Christmas in Cambodia” was “seared” on his memory. Tex and the others are sure afraid of this topic. Why? And why is someone who blogs for an anti-interventionist web site pro-Kerry anyway? You know, John “don’t bring the boys home” Kerry.

Saturday blog tour

This is a mini blog tour because I had a crazy day!

How about that Iraqi soccer team?

How bad IS the missile defense system the Bushies are insisting on deploying pre-election? Noah Schachtman at Defense Tech posts that the former Pentagon testing chief Phillip Coyle says it is about this bad. More.

Mark Elf posts that Israel Shamir has been outed as a Swedish neo-Nazi.

Everyone’s talking about those lying Swift Boat Vets. The best treatment of the SBVT (Notice how that acronym spells subvert?) controversy is by Arthur Silber, of course.

Salam Pax is back and is posting on a new blog. He called the new blog shut up you fat whiner!, probably so people wouldn’t doubt it was really him. He was in Najaf today. Meanwhile, the mathematically challenged Raed Jarrar is still AWOL.

Mike Mayakis, RIP (III)

The San Francisco Chronicle ran a very nice obituary of Mike Mayakis, longtime libertarian and antiwar activist, and my best friend. Following is the article:

Mike Mayakis – Libertarian activist and agile debater

by Charlie Goodyear, Chronicle Staff Writer
August 19, 2004

Mike Mayakis, a prominent Libertarian whose surprising political positions made him a formidable debater, has died. He was 53.

Mr. Mayakis died at his home in San Francisco on Sunday after a long struggle with leukemia.

A native of Los Angeles, he moved to San Francisco in 1971 and worked for more than a decade at the Haight Ashbury Switchboard as a counselor and trainer for the service that provided information, assistance and counseling to the city’s growing counterculture.

Mr. Mayakis was elected to the switchboard’s Board of Trustees in 1973 and became its president in 1980.

During the 1970s, he worked as an aide to liberal Republican state Sen. Milton Marks of San Francisco and eventually became active in Libertarian politics, founding a chapter of Students for a Libertarian Society at San Francisco State University.

In 1982, Mr. Mayakis was the Libertarian Party’s candidate for state Senate. He was elected chair of the San Francisco Libertarian Party and held that position three times during the 1980s.

He became well known for defying assumptions in political debates. He argued frequently for the rights of smokers when he himself was an asthmatic.

In 1988, he worked for the Libertarian Republican Organizing Committee at the Republic Convention in New Orleans. But he was never a Republican, and in 1995 helped found the popular Web site Antiwar.com.

His failing health took its toll on his political activism. But Mr. Mayakis turned his frustrating experiences with the medical system into a guide called "Express Hospital Emergency Room Admission & Survival Kit" to help other patients.

He is survived by his wife, Betty Honeycutt; siblings Matthew Mayakis, Martha Mayakis and Sara Tisher, all of Los Angeles; and stepfather Lloyd Daic, also of Los Angeles.

A memorial service is being planned. For details, phone (650) 838-0381.

Notes on Chapters 7 and 8 of the 9/11 Report

Chapter 7 meticulously chronicles the arrival and actions of the nineteen hijackers. Little interesting information is found in the chapter. However, one is surprised by the remarkable ease at which many of the men moved around and in and out of the United States. Also, beyond stopping each at the border, it seems little could have been done once the men were inside the U.S. Their lives consisted of time at the mosque, the gym and flight training, setting off few alarms at the FBI or CIA.

The government has attempted to adjust its law enforcement capabilities to these simple methods of assimilating and moving about the country [read: PATRIOT Act]. However, this chapter’s narrative suggests that new methods of hiding and concealing identities will adapt to anything the government implements. This scenario suggests more should be done on the policy front; i.e. altering those policies that anger individuals enough to lead them to commit suicide in response.

Chapter 8 is best summed up by its conclusion:

    “We see little evidence that the progress of the plot was disturbed by any government action. The U.S. government was unable to capitalize on mistakes made by al Qaeda.Time ran out.” (page 294)

Entitled “The System Was Blinking Red,” the chapter details a plethora of missed opportunities. Simply, various government bureaucracies failed to connect the dots. This problem stemmed from a few issues. One was a problem of information sharing. The report describes a meeting between CIA and FBI who were separately investigating the attack on the USS Cole. Each attendee held information, that if put together, would have suggested al Qaeda was planning something in the US. However, due to technical issues between bureaucracies, the information was never shared:

    “It is now clear that everyone involved was confused about the rules governing the sharing and use of information gathered in intelligence channels.”(page 288)

Upon investigation, each member of this meeting told the commission that if they had seen the others’ info, action would have been taken.

The government also struggled with the new and unseen threat of domestic terrorism:

    The September 11 attacks fell into the void between the foreign and domestic threats. The foreign intelligence agencies were watching overseas, alert to foreign threats to U.S. interests there.The domestic agencies were waiting for evidence of a domestic threat from sleeper cells within the United States. (page 290)

Despite the above setbacks, DCI Tenet still claimed that the “system was blinking red.” Here’s a quick overview of some of the warnings the administration received in 2001:

“In the spring of 2001, the level of reporting on terrorist threats and planned attacks increased dramatically to its highest level since the millennium alert.” (page 272)

“On May 17, based on the previous day’s report, the first item on the CSG’s agenda was ‘UBL: Operation Planned in U.S'”(page 273)

“One al Qaeda intelligence report warned that something ‘very, very, very, very’ big was about to happen, and most of Bin Ladin’s network was reportedly anticipating the attack.” (page 274)

“On June 30, the SEIB contained an article titled ‘Bin Ladin Threats Are Real.’ Yet Hadley told Tenet in July that Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz questioned the reporting.”(page 276)

“To give a sense of his anxiety at the time, one senior official in the Counterterrorist Center told us that he and a colleague were considering resigning in order to go public with their concerns.” (page 276)

Unfortunately, no one in the government was “looking for foreign threats to domestic targets” and “time ran out.” (page 280)