Month: June 2011

I’m waiting for Obama’s announcement of the new policy of troop levels in Afghanistan to become old news by about Monday, but while it’s still the weekend, let’s consider further exactly how many people we’ve got in that country smaller than Texas.

From a Congressional Research Service report:

DOD relies extensively upon contractors to support overseas contingency operations. As of March 2011, DOD had more contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq (155,000) than uniformed personnel (145,000). Contractors made up 52% of DOD’s workforce in Afghanistan and Iraq.

According to DOD, in Afghanistan, as of March 2011, there were 90,339 DOD contractor personnel, compared to approximately 99,800 uniformed personnel. Contractors made up 48% of DOD’s workforce in Afghanistan at that time.

As has been reported and discussed at length here at Antiwar.com, the national security establishment, in conjunction with the Obama administration and surely whatever succeeds it, is planning on an essentially permanent U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. Secret negotiations leaked to the Guardian revealed U.S. plans to remain for decades under a broad security agreement. This was corroborated by Hamid Karzai who spoke publicly about a U.S. presence long after the 2014 date of “full withdrawal.” And now after Obama’s announcement of a minor, gradual, and incomplete draw-down, military leaders are complaining it was too drastic. These are relatively clear signs.

But one fundamental motivation behind the American strategy to maintain a military capacity in Afghanistan is to fight proxy wars with Pakistan. A podcast with New Yorker staff writers Steve Coll and Dexter Filkins provided some fresh analysis:

Steve Coll: I do think the endgame that they’re headed toward, the one they’re planning for anyway, their hope, for American deployments and strategy in Afghanistan after the troop withdrawal is completed in 2014 is rooted basically in retaining a counter-terrorism capacity in Afghanistan, one that would be rooted, the hope is, in adequate Afghan political institutions and security forces. But the American purpose, besides maintaining some good enough Afghan stability, the American purpose would be to maintain a strike capability to go into Pakistan, in particular, when necessary, so that if an opportunity like the one that presented itself in Abbottabad were to resurface, or if Pakistan were to fall further apart and present international threats out of the [sic] of its continuing civil conflicts, that the United States would be close enough to do something about it militarily.

Much of the realist analysis about how the Obama administration is pursuing a military campaign, engaging in a war, that does not present a clear and present danger to the American people or interests may be missing the point. The Obama administration is likely to have a full understanding of the fact that, in isolation, our war in Afghanistan is wasteful and unnecessary. But to be able to use Afghanistan as a proxy in any potential fight or singular operation in Pakistan, may just be worth impoverishing ourselves, letting die Americans in uniform, and continuing to wreak insufferable terror on the Afghan people.

Proxy wars are practically a pastime in American foreign policy. From our bases and troops in South Korea, to our NATO deployments throughout Europe, to our base in Honduras while we terrorized Nicaragua in the Contra war, to bases in Saudi Arabia, to fight the Gulf War and in Kuwait to fight Gulf War 2, to Uzbekistan in the early 2000’s, just north of Afghanistan when Afghanistan itself was a bigger priority. Proxies are an important part of imperial policy; they assist in controlling the world and dominating states from many strategic places, as opposed to simply from Washington.

This in part explains U.S. negotiations with the Taliban, which have been rather counter-intuitive for the American public. The U.S. doesn’t care if the brutal, extremist Taliban have control over various provinces in Afghanistan; we don’t mind the backwardness and harshness with which they rule (contrary to rhetoric). So long as any Afghan government is subservient to U.S. wishes to maintain permanent military capacity, the U.S. is happy.

The tribal areas of Pakistan, representing a threat to American hegemony, are what Americans need to keep in mind when considering Obama’s policy in Afghanistan. In isolation, Afghanistan is as meaningless as it seems.

Today the US House defeated two resolutions on the war on Libya. The first one, to authorize Obama to conduct the war for a year, failed overwhelmingly.

The second one, sold as a war limitation measure, actually authorized most of the activities currently being waged by US forces, was also defeated (a surprise to many).

Here is Rep. Ron Paul’s statement against the limited authorization measure:

Mr. Speaker I rise to oppose this legislation, which masquerades as a limitation of funds for the president’s war on Libya but is in fact an authorization for that very war. According to HR 2278, the US military cannot be involved in NATO’s actions in Libya, with four important exceptions. If this passes, for the first time the president would be authorized to use US Armed Forces to engage in search and rescue; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; aerial refueling; and operational planning against Libya. Currently, absent an authorization or declaration of war, these activities are illegal. So instead of ending the war against Libya, this bill would legalize nearly everything the president is currently doing there.

That the war in Libya can be ended by expanding it and providing the president a legal excuse to continue makes no sense. If this bill fails, the entirety of what the president is doing in Libya would remain illegal.

Additionally, it should not really be necessary to prohibit the use of funds for US military attacks on Libya because those funds are already prohibited by the Constitution. Absent Congressional action to allow US force against Libya any such force is illegal, meaning the expenditure of funds for such activities is prohibited. I will, however, support any straight and clean prohibition of funds such as the anticipated amendments to the upcoming Defense Appropriations bill.

I urge my colleagues to reject this stealth attempt to authorize the Libya war and sincerely hope that the House will soon get serious about our Constitutional obligations and authority.

This week’s news of a resolution from senior Senators to permit military operations in Libya for one year was met with muddled reaction in Congress. The splits within both parties have been preventing clear assertions or definitive action going forward. Today’s WSJ reports that the GOP is bobbing and weaving while trying to determine its actual policy preference.

House Republican leaders on Wednesday abruptly canceled plans to vote Thursday on whether to set limits on U.S. military activities in Libya, following a caucus meeting marked by rifts over how to proceed.

The delay is the latest example of how a restive caucus is making it difficult for House Speaker John Boehner (R., Ohio) to steer a course on U.S. foreign policy. Six months into their control of the House, GOP leaders are being pressed to take tough positions by rank-and-file members, who are frustrated with bills that offer tough words but produce little action.

“You can do resolutions until you’re blue in the face; if they go over to the Senate and they don’t go anywhere, what are we going to do next—are we going to have a resolution saying we really don’t like what the president is doing or are we going to pull the trigger and cut off the faucet, so to speak?” said Rep. Tom Rooney (R., Fla.) after a GOP caucus meeting.

…One resolution would authorize a limited U.S. role in Libya, similar to a measure pushed by Sens. John Kerry (D., Mass.) and John McCain (R., Ariz.). There is little evidence Republicans will vote for it, though. House leaders are also now aiming to bring up a second measure to set funding limits on Libya activities in the current fiscal year, without leaving allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization “in the lurch,” an aide said.

Some Republicans are pushing House leaders to allow a vote on a third option: cutting off funding for the U.S. role in Libya. It isn’t clear whether that will happen.

That’s right. Nothing much is clear yet. Both parties have those who support Obama’s unconstitutional, illegal, unnecessary, and hypocritical war in Libya, those who don’t support it, and those who wish to walk the line by withdrawing their support, but still giving operational control to Obama and NATO. The result is the appearance of a weak-kneed Congress. Meanwhile, King Obama is waging war.

News yesterday that Israel is finally allowing building materials into Gaza, which has been deprived of them since Operation Cast Lead reduced much the infrastructure to rubble, was good to hear, but I’m still left slightly skeptical. First of all, it’s limited: supplies can be used only on projects that have been previously approved by Israel. This is merely another imposition, another example of the overwhelming weight of Israeli domination down to the minutiae of Palestinian life. It proves Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza was never meant to give any sort of sovereignty to Gazans, and it raises the concern that this easing of the blockade is not only limited, but temporary.

I don’t know to what extent this move is a response or an acknowledgement of the aid flotilla that will set sail for Gaza (which Israel warned against with a more or less promised use of force), but if it is I feel that’s more reason to suspect this decision is extremely temporary.

Meanwhile, the indelible caricature of himself Elliot Abrams is huffing and puffing over an open letter to President Obama just published in the New York Review of Books from a group of prominent academics and public intellectuals about Israel-Palestine. It urges the most prosaic and reasonable approach to the conflict (1967 lines with minor and mutual swaps, sharing Jerusalem, solution to refugee problem,  security guarantees, etc.), but Abrams can’t believe his ears: they are “blaming almost every aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Israel and urging heavy American pressure to change Israeli policy.” He of course totally ignores the fact that his opposition to this sacrilege is a recipe for conflict with no end in sight.

Israel has of course been concerned about the Arab Spring for similar reasons the U.S. is concerned: policy ought not reflect the will of the people in that region. Huff Po:

“We are looking at an area which is under a political turmoil, something we have not witnessed for maybe 90 years since the collapse of the Ottoman empire, he said. “I cannot say that their (others in the government) doubts don’t have a certain foundation but I still believe despite all uncertainty Israel should make a real attempt to enter negotiations.”

Since the beginning of the year, the Arab world has been wracked by pro-democracy demonstrations, which brought down the governments in Tunisia and Israel’s neighbor Egypt.

There has been some worry in Israel that the new governments that emerge in the region might be more hostile to the Jewish state than their predecessors. Israeli skeptics note that elections in the Middle East have brought groups like Hamas and Hezbollah to power.

“It’s clear to us that (with) these events of the Arab spring that under certain situation we might find ourselves having to defend ourselves alone,” Barak said.

Unfortunately U.S.-Israeli policy has not adapted to the changing environment; there is complete obstinacy in the face of these potential changes, despite plenty of opportunity to settle for peace with only minor concessions. Little victories like being allowed to re-building your bombed homes and schools are not enough to postpone much needed honesty about U.S. policy in this regard.

As harsh crackdowns on protests continue in Syria, and as allegedly forced pro-Assad rallies have been orchestrated by the regime, some European countries have been pressing the Assad regime with additional sanctions. This has yet to prove effective in stopping Assad’s brutality and unfortunately squawking from war hawks continue to encourage U.S. military intervention in Syria.

But Tony Badran, in an impressive piece at Foreign Policy, argues that there is plenty the U.S. can do short of bombs and armies to stop Assad and save potentially thousands of more innocent Syrian lives from this particular Middle Eastern tyrant who doesn’t happen to be our client. He says essentially that diplomatic isolation has the potential to rid Assad’s regime of any power it has left and could even pave the way towards a peaceful transition led by the Syrian people.

Bringing [U.S. Ambassador to Damascus Robert] Ford home would be an obvious way to deprive Assad of the legitimacy that comes with relations with the world’s only superpower. It would send an unambiguous message that the United States is done dealing with the Syrian regime. That message would embolden the protesters and dishearten Assad. Perhaps most importantly, it would send a clear signal to the silent majority in Syria, which is watching apprehensively and wondering who will win.

…[international] consensus [against Assad] requires American leadership to coalesce. French, Qatari, and Turkish officials are operating on their own because they cannot be sure of Washington’s position.

Washington could then widen the coalition against Assad to include other key Arab states, including Saudi Arabia. Washington should make clear that it seeks Assad’s ouster as part of a broader strategy of countering Iranian influence in the region — something about which Riyadh remains deeply concerned. There are several signs that the Saudis will be receptive to this argument, not least of which is the relentlessly critical line Saudi-owned media have taken against Assad over the last three months.

The administration could then induce other regional allies to use the leverage they have on Syria to its advantage. To assuage their worsening financial distress, for instance, the Assads have been reaching out to the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Iraq. Obama can lean on these Arab allies to refrain from assisting Assad’s regime and investing money in it, just as he works with the Europeans to choke off sources of revenue for Damascus. These measures could become a significant factor in the calculation of the Sunni business class still on the fence and might potentially accentuate rifts in the army, which is already showing signs of cracks and fatigue amid growing reports of defections.

Doug Bandow recently put it eloquently how dire the situation is when leading congressmen start arguing for War # 6. The prospect of war with Syria makes any of the above attempts at diplomatic pressure appear to have a cherry on top. But Obama plainly has refused to speak out strongly against Assad. The reason is similar to our continuing support of the rest of the Middle Eastern tyrannies: the U.S. will do everything in its power to prevent democracy in the region.